Warranty of Legality and Public Policy by Wang, Feng
1 
 
 Warranty of Legality and Public Policy 
 
 
Volume 1 of 3 
 
 
Submitted by Wang Feng, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
In January 2015 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for 
the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
(Signature) …………………………………………………………………………… 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It has been pointed out by numerous authorities that the legality issue is one of 
the most complex and difficult areas in English law. Countless rules and 
principles have been created by former authorities, on one hand, principles 
which have been created by common law give guidance to the English courts 
when deal with this issue, on the other hand, however, these judgments make 
this area far from clear and stable. 
However, compared with one more special area, the legality issue in marine 
insurance law, the instability of rules in English common law makes itself a useful 
instrument. Section 41 of Marine Insurance Act 1906, which is known as 
warranty of legality requires the adventure is a lawful and so far as the assured 
can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner. 
However, this piece of law has imposed a rigid and unfair system on the assured. 
According to former authorities, it can be seen that, the illegality rules in marine 
insurance law is far more complex than section 41; and moreover, English 
common law also provide useful instruments for marine insurance law. 
This thesis begins with the analysis of section 41 in marine insurance law and 
tries to explore the true scope of section 41 in marine insurance. And then the 
principles of legality issue in English common law will be introduced in detail; 
furthermore, the pattern of resolve legality issue in Australia and New Zealand 
will be introduced as well, since the common grounds these three legal systems 
3 
 
share. And based on the introduction of the reform which have been taken by 
Australia and New Zealand, this thesis will try to explore the positive methods 
which can be absorb by English law as well. 
And in the end, the new reform of English law on the legality issue in insurance 
and marine insurance law which has been proposed by the Insurance Contract 
Law Bill 2014 will be analysed as well, and based on former analysis, this thesis 
will propose a practical method to reform this issue in English law, that is to apply 
the common law rules in marine insurance law. 
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Introduction 
1. Background 
The illegality issue is a difficult and chaotic field in both marine insurance law 
and common law. 
The doctrine of the warranty of legality in English maritime law originates from 
the 18th century and has influenced the jurisdictions of many commonwealth 
countries which have developed their own marine insurance law with reference 
to English law, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. In English law, as 
codified in section 41 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906: “There is an implied 
warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so far as the 
assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful 
manner”1. The legality issue in marine insurance law is quite a difficult one. From 
the perspective of the consequence of a violation of this law, the effect of such a 
breach is somewhat controversial and harsh on the assured. On the one hand, 
since this section is an implied warranty, it requires the strict compliance of the 
assured, and the breach of such a warranty according to English law, entitles the 
insurer to discharge his liability automatically from the time of such a breach with 
no regard to materiality and causation. On the other hand, the boundaries of the 
concept “lawful” in this section - which may cover not only statute and common 
                                                             
1 Marine Insurance Act 1906 section 41 
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law, but also technical rules and regulations, which in most circumstances are 
unfamiliar to the assured - are very wide. It is clear that, on the face of it, this 
section gives the insurer too much power and it is very difficult to balance the 
interests of the assured and the insurer. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of the application of this warranty, it is very 
hard to ascertain how far the English courts can apply the illegality defence rules 
in common law to marine insurance cases, what factors should be considered by 
the courts when dealing with such issues, and what the function of section 41 
under current circumstances and the restrictions on the application of this 
implied term are. 
The chaos of the illegality issue has been noticed by the legal institutions in the 
UK and work to clarify it has been carried out. The Law Reform Committee and 
the Law Commission has published three consultation papers on this issue: 
consultation paper 154, which concerns the illegality defence in contract and 
transaction; consultation paper 160, which concerns the illegality defence in tort; 
and consultation paper 189, which is a consultative report on both areas. Most 
recently, in 2010, the Law Commission published paper No. 320 mainly on the 
illegality issues in trust. Unlike the situation in common law, the illegality issue in 
marine insurance law has been considered by the Law Commission only in their 
consultation papers which relate to warranty. There are two former papers which 
contain the warranty of legality: issues paper 2 and consultation paper No. 182. 
However, in both of these papers only contradict reform recommendations that 
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have been proposed. In the most recent Law Commission paper, No 3532, the 
Law Commission proposed a universal reform recommendation on the express 
warranty as well as implied warranty in insurance and marine insurance law; the 
most important proposal is that breach of the warranty only suspends the 
insurer’s liability and that the breach of warranty can be fixed, making the insurer 
liable from that point again. This new proposal has been recognised in clause 10 
of the new insurance bill 2014. However, this is clearly not the end of the story. 
2. Aims and Objectives 
This research aims to analyse the problem of the current status of the warranty 
of legality in marine insurance law in the UK, and through a comparative study of 
the illegality defence in English common law and other jurisdictions, the research 
also attempts to explore a more reasonable approach in marine insurance law 
when dealing with illegality. 
Firstly, this study will introduce the history and development of the warranty of 
legality in marine insurance law and try to explore whether section 41 really 
reflected the true intention of the authorities prior to 1906. The warranty of 
legality can be traced back to the late 18th century and this research study will 
illustrate what is the true scope of section 41 and how English law has 
developed into its current state. 
Secondly, this research will also cover the illegality defence in English common 
law. The study will explore the origin of the illegality defence in both tort law and 
                                                             
2 Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insurers' Remedies for 
Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment Law Com No 353 July 2014 
14 
 
contract law and then clarify the illegality defence rules which are applied in 
current English law and the rationales underlying these rules. It will also explain 
whether the rules in common law can be applied to insurance cases. The 
differences between common law illegality and statutory illegality will also be 
examined. 
The third objective of this research study is to compare the differences between 
the illegality defences in common law and the warranty of legality in marine 
insurance. Through this comparison, this research will attempt to ascertain why 
the English courts adopt a different pattern from the illegality defences in 
common law when dealing with illegality in marine insurance. 
The fourth objective is to find out whether the illegality defence in common law is 
eligible in marine insurance cases. Because of the marked differences between 
common law and marine insurance law, it is worth discussing whether the rules 
in common law can be applied to marine insurance cases freely and, if not,  
what are the obstacles to this application and what is the boundary to this 
application. 
The fifth objective of this research study is to explore the marine insurance law 
illegality defence in other commonwealth jurisdictions which have similar rules to 
English law, especially in Australia law, and to examine how the local courts 
resolve such problems, and whether this is valuable for the reform of English 
law. 
The sixth objective is to explore and clarify English law when dealing with 
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illegality under foreign law. This is a controversial issue in English law, since 
according to authorities, section 41 only applies to illegality under English law.. 
This issue is becoming a more pertinent one, because of the increase in 
commercial relationships between nations, and the necessity therefore to 
understand foreign law illegality. 
The final objective of this research study is to explore ways in which the warranty 
of legality in marine insurance law can be reformed. This part will attempt to 
propose a reasonable way of reforming this piece of law, and also assess the 
reform which has been carried out by the Law Commission in the upcoming new 
insurance act. 
3. Structure and Methodology 
This study will be divided into three parts. The first part will concentrate on the 
warranty of legality in marine insurance law. The second section will focus on the 
illegality defence in common law. Finally, the third part will comprise a 
comparison of the warranty of legality and the illegality defence in common law 
and the illegality issue in other jurisdictions, ending with a possible pattern for 
reform. 
The theme of part one is to explore the origins of the warranty of legality in 
marine insurance law. The research in this part will examine the law in 
chronological order so as to reveal how the law evolved into its current position. 
In this part, the research will begin with an analysis of cases are prior to 1906 
and trace back to 18th century. There are almost two hundred cases prior to 1906 
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which underlie this implied warranty. With this data and analysis, part one will 
give a clear answer as to whether section 41 has reflected former authorities 
which are prior to this Act, what the meaning and boundary of the word “lawful” is, 
what the “so far as the assured can control the matter” means, and also whether 
there exist any exceptions in former authorities. In addition, because of the 
specificity of this section, the work will be divided into two different sections: the 
first section will consider the first part of section 41, that is, that the adventure 
should be a lawful one; and the second part will consider the second part of the 
section, that is, lawful performance. The first part will pay particular attention to 
the differences between these two sections, which are of key importance as a 
matter of law. By doing so, this part will explore every detail of section 41 and its 
defects at the end of this part; this will be a preparation for the later comparison. 
The theme of the second part is to investigate the illegality defence in tort law 
and contract law and summarize the ex turpi causa defence in common law. In 
this part, the work will be divided into two sections: firstly, the ex turpi causa 
defence in tort law will be examined; and secondly, the illegality defence in 
contract law will be investigated, and its origins and rules will be summarized 
separately. In the tort law chapter, the origin of the ex turpi causa defence will be 
considered first, as well as the categories of such a defence in tort law; then the 
applicable general rules of this defence will be introduced and the rationales 
which underlie such rules considered. Finally, the application of the ex turpi 
causa defence in insurance law will be introduced and summarized, looking 
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especially at why the defence can be applied and how the defence has been 
applied to insurance cases and the special situations that exist in insurance law, 
such as the circumstances in motor insurance. 
The structure of the chapter which deals with the illegality defence in contract 
law will be same as that dealing with the tort law; the only difference is that this 
chapter will also discuss the differences between statutory illegality and common 
law illegality, and the differences between the illegality defence in tort law and 
contract law. The reason for discussing these differences is because section 41 
in marine insurance is one kind of statutory illegality and the illegality issue in 
marine insurance circumstances will also contain tort illegality - such as collision 
or physical injury on the sea - and contract illegality - such as insurance on illegal 
subject, or violation of navigation rules during transport -; therefore, the 
comparison with common law will give a direction of how the warranty of legality 
in marine insurance should evolve.  
The methodology of this part will still be based on the case analysis and opinions 
from a number of articles will also be considered; besides the comparison and 
case analysis, this part will also criticize the current rules in the illegality defence. 
In part three, several issues will be covered. Firstly, this part will examine the 
differences between the illegality defences in common law and the warranty of 
legality in marine insurance. By exploring these differences, this section will 
attempt to answer the question of why the English courts have adopted different 
methods for dealing with the same issue. By answering this question, it is 
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possible to examine the obstacles to applying the common law illegality defence 
to marine insurance cases, and the possibility of this application will be 
considered as well. 
The second section of this part will examine the illegality rules in marine 
insurance cases in other commonwealth jurisdictions, including Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand; the law in Australia will be examined particularly 
carefully, since it is of great value to English law. 
The third section of this part will examine the status of foreign law illegality in 
English law - a very difficult and special area of law which is becoming 
increasingly important. This section will begin with examining the common law 
rules when dealing with foreign law illegality before considering the current 
status of section 41 on this issue, and finally proposing a reasonable solution for 
when foreign law illegality in marine insurance circumstances is encountered. 
The final section of the third part and also the dissertation is the reform of 
English law in section 41. This section will based on the former analysis of the 
insufficiencies of section 41, the rules in common law and other jurisdictions and 
also the latest judgments to give a combined and more reasonable method when 
dealing with illegality issues in marine insurance. Naturally, the most recent 
reform by the Law Commission and the new insurance bill on this section will 
also be introduced and the possible impact on this section of insurance law will 
be considered. 
4. Outcomes 
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As a result of the research, the following points should be made clear: 
(1) What the origins of the warranty of legality in marine insurance law are and 
whether section 41 truly reflects the judgments of former authorities. 
(2) What the origins of the illegality defence in common law - namely in tort law 
and contract law – are and what the currently applicable rules are. Also, what the 
differences between statutory illegality and common law illegality are. 
(3) The nature of section 41 and the differences between section 41 and the 
illegality defence in common law and the reasons behind such differences. 
(4) Whether the common law illegality rules can be applied when dealing with 
illegality issues in marine insurance. 
(5) What the law of illegality in other jurisdictions is and whether it is valuable to 
English law. 
(6) What a reasonable way to reform section 41 in English law might be. 
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Part 1: The Warranty of Legality in Marine Insurance Law 
Chapter two: Illegal Performance of Marine Insurance Contracts 
2.1 Introduction to the warranty of legality in marine insurance law 
 
Warranty is unanimously recognised as a complex and difficult area in marine 
insurance law. There are basically two types of warranties under current marine 
insurance law, namely, express warranties and implied warranties.  The implied 
warranty only exists in marine insurance3. Several species of implied warranty 
have been discussed and introduced into the market, such as warranty of 
seaworthiness4, no implied warranty of nationality5 and warranty of legality. The 
main purpose of this article is to introduce and discuss the development and the 
true scope of the warranty of legality.  
 
The main origin of this warranty was based on early judgments during the 18th 
and 19th centuries. The main purpose of introducing this principle was to 
balance the conflict between public and private interests. Another purpose of this 
principle in common law, as cited by Lord Mansfield, was that no court will lend 
its hand to the illegal party and no one can benefit from his own illegality6. 
                                                             
3 Rhidian Thomas, The Modern Law of Marine Insurance volume 2, p167 
4 For example, Dixon v. Sadler (1841) 8 M & W 895 
5 For example, Eden v. Parkinson (1781) 2 Doug KB 732 
6 As will be seen in the case Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 
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There are two sections in Marine Insurance Act 1906 which relate to legality 
issues, section 41 and section 3(1). Section 41 states that:  
 
There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, 
and that so far as the assured can control the matter, the adventure shall 
be carried out in a lawful manner. 
 
Section 3(1) states that: “every lawful marine adventure may be the subject of a 
contract of marine insurance”. The words of those sections are straightforward 
and can be summarised into two points: firstly, the warranty of legality can be 
divided into two sections: the legality of the adventure itself and the legality of the 
performance of that adventure, these two distinct sections are closely connected; 
secondly, a lawful adventure is the foundation of a marine insurance contract, 
and therefore without the lawful adventure a marine insurance contract will not 
exist. 
 
The importance of the warranty of legality is incontestable, there are four points 
to support this argument: firstly, as can be concluded from former cases the 
legality of the adventure and performance is the foundation of the insurance 
contract7; secondly, since the legality issue is regulated as a warranty in marine 
                                                             
7 Redmond v Smith (1844) 7 M.&Gr 474 “where is a voyage is illegal an insurance upon 
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insurance law, the insurance policy can be terminated by the insurer from the 
time of that breach and such consequence is clearly severe; thirdly, by 
examining the judgments of cases prior to section 41, this section seems unable 
to cover former case law and several factors may influence the consequence of 
illegality which happens under marine insurance, such factors and the assured’s 
connection with it shall be considered8; fourthly, the implied warranty means that 
there is no need to express the requirement of legality of adventure in the marine 
insurance policy, by taking the severe consequence of the breach of warranty 
into account, it is important for the assured to be familiar with this warranty and 
strictly comply with it.  
 
In this chapter, both legality of the adventure and the legality of the legal 
performance will be discussed, and since there are significant differences 
between these two kinds of warranties, this chapter will first introduce the origin 
and formation of these two sections separately, and then clarify the species and 
scope of this warranty; lastly, this chapter will discuss the insufficiency of s41 
based on former case law and common law and attempt to solve the question of 
whether Section 41truly reflects the former common law or not and attempt to 
explore the true scope of section 41. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
it is invalid” 
8 As will be seen in S 2.4 
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2.2 Origin and Formation of the warranty of legal adventure in marine insurance 
law 
 
The origin of the warranty of legal adventure is still open to debate, as hardly any 
books or articles have clarified this ambiguity. In Arnould’s Law of Marine 
Insurance and Average, the case Redmond v Smith seems to be considered as 
one of the possible sources of the marine insurance and illegality issue 9, 
however earlier cases related to illegality can be traced back to the late 18th 
century.  
 
2.2.1 The origin of the warranty of legal adventure 
 
As stated before, most illegality cases were decided in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, during the Napoleonic Wars. Although there were several cases which 
related to the legality adventure issue, none of them can be regarded as the sole 
origin of section 41. Therefore the cases prior to the 1906 Act should be 
considered carefully. 
 
The first case which relates to legality in marine insurance can be traced back to 
                                                             
9 Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average 18thed, para 21.03 
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1797, namely Farmer v Legg10. This case related to the slave trade, losses 
happened in consequence of an insurrection, which was the result of improper 
command and navigation. The principle question of this case was whether the 
ship had been navigated according to the 31 Geo.3; c.54, a statute which 
regulated the qualification of the master who participated in the slave trade, 
according to this statute the adventure was lawful only if the master fulfilled the 
requisition of the statute. By failing to provide a certificate which complied with 
the statute, the plaintiff was nonsuited, because by failing to do so the whole 
adventure was unlawful and the policy upon it was rendered void. 
 
The case Farmer v Legg was one of the earliest cases which related to the 
illegality of adventure. Another case which can be treated as a combined origin 
of this piece of legislation is Law v Hollingswirth11, which was codified three 
months earlier than Farmer v Legg. In Law v Hollingswirth, the plaintiff failed to 
recover the loss of the vessel because there was no qualified pilot on board 
when the loss happened; this was prohibited by the statute of that time, even 
though there was no connection between the violation and the loss. Although, 
the judgment of this case mainly concentrated on whether there was a pilot on 
board, no words such as “warranty” or “legality” were mentioned, it can easily be 
concluded that, the absence of such pilot was violation of the law, and the 
legality of the adventure was essential to the validity of the insurance policy. One 
                                                             
10 Farmer v Legg (1797) 7 TR 186 
11 Law v Hollingsworth (1797) 7 TR 160 
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of the grounds for discharging the responsibility of the underwriter, raised at the 
trial was: “it being an implied condition in every policy that the ship shall be 
navigated according to the law.”12 This was the first time that the legality issue 
was clearly raised in marine insurance cases. Although, the judgment used the 
word “condition”, the consequence of the breach of that “condition” was almost 
the same as a breach of warranty undercurrent marine insurance law. 
 
Other cases mainly happened in early 19th century during the period of war with 
France. There were several restrictions on navigation during that period, 
therefore the policies relating to vessels which sailed in contravention of convoy 
acts were held void13 as well as voyages which were against the provisions of 
the East India Company acts, or the South Sea Company acts14, or the general 
navigation act; and in the judgments of these cases the word “illegal” was 
commonly used because of violation of these laws. The consequences and 
punishments on illegal voyages were severe; in most cases the assured could 
not recover the losses and in some particular cases they even could not recover 
the premium15.  
 
The phrase “implied warranty” was first raised in Sadler v Dixon, a case dealt 
with the loss of a vessel. In the judgment of that case, Tindal C.J. cited Law v 
                                                             
12 Law v Hollingsworth (1797) 7 TR 160 
13 Hinckley v Walton (1810) 3 Taunt 131 
14 Wainhouse v. Cowie, 4 Taunt 178 
15 Such as in Vandyck and others v Hewitt (1800) 1 East 96 
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Hollingswirth and stated that the requirement of statute 5 Geo. 2 “was an implied 
contract on the part of the assured”16 and “The decision of that case may be 
maintainable, on the ground of an implied warranty to observe the positive 
requisitions of an act of Parliament”17. Therefore, in this case, in the absence of 
the express requirement of legality, the legality issue was rendered as an implied 
one in contract. However, these cases only stated that an illegal adventure could 
taint the insurance policy, but the reason behind it was never clearly explained; 
furthermore, there were no clear general rules on illegality issues, until the 
judgment of Redmond v Smith. In this case, the defendant insurer issued a 
policy on a ship which covered any loss and misfortune which should be lawful to 
the assured. The ship foundered and sank on its voyage to London. By refusing 
to pay the losses, one of the defendant’s pleas to the court was that the failure of 
the payment of seamen’s wages on the said voyage was contrary to the 5 & 6 W. 
4, c. 19 and rendered the voyage wholly illegal. By analysing former cases, 
Tindal C.J. considered the defendant’s argument and stated in his judgment that 
“A policy on an illegal voyage cannot be enforced; for it would be singular, if, the 
original contract being invalid and therefore incapable to be enforced, a 
collateral contract founded upon it could be enforced. It may be laid down, 
therefore, as a general rule, that, where a voyage is illegal, insurance upon such 
voyage is invalid.”18 This statement not only explained the reason why the 
                                                             
16 Sadler v Dixon (1841) 8 M & W 895 
17 Ibid 
18 Redmond v Smith (1844) 7 M & G 474 
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adventure must be lawful but also explained the consequence of an insurance 
which based upon an illegal adventure, i.e. no valid contract of insurance was 
ever created. 
 
This is the first authority which clearly expounded the legal basis of the legality 
issue; however, the judgment of this case was based on several former cases. 
Thus both the terms “implied warranty” and “lawful” can be supported by former 
cases. 
 
Consequently, judgments of these series of cases were codified in 1906 Act, and 
the requisition of lawful adventure was regulated as one of the implied 
warranties. 
 
2.2.2 Explain of the word “lawful” 
 
According to the first part of section 41, the adventure insured must be a lawful 
one. However, there is no clear definition of the word “lawful”. Besides the 
clarification of the word lawful, the definition of which kinds of conduct can be 
regarded as a breach of the lawful adventure warranty is also an ambiguous 
issue which needs to be resolved. In addition, the statute has omitted to mention 
the formation of such illegality and some special situations. 
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An adventure can be rendered illegal as a result of breach of statute, breach of 
the King’s or Council’s order or breach of public policy and common law. Some 
books calculate the EU legislation or international instruments as one of the 
species which can be covered by the word lawful, however this point is still 
uncertain under current circumstance: firstly, according to former judgments, the 
adventure must be illegal under English law and the mere illegality under foreign 
law is not necessary to render the whole adventure void; secondly, for  EU 
legislation and international instruments to be effective in UK, the legislation 
must be incorporated into domestic law. Therefore, in order to render an 
adventure illegal under EU law, the former two points must be fulfilled19. 
 
2.2.2.1 Illegal adventure by statute 
 
A marine adventure can be rendered illegal by statute, and this is the most 
straightforward and common method to decide whether an adventure is legal or 
not.  
 
In the early cases prior to the 1906 Act, numerous marine insurance policies 
were rendered illegal because of violation of statutes. In the case Farmer v Legg, 
the adventure was rendered illegal because the ship had not been navigated 
                                                             
19 This argument has been supported by the most recent case, Sea Glory Maritime Co, 
Swedish Management Co SA v AL Sagr National Insurance Co [2013] EWHC 2116 
(Comm) at para 291. 
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according to the 7th section of the 31 Geo.3, c.54. In the case Law v 
Hollingsworth the adventure was rendered unlawful because the pilot on board 
was not properly qualified according to the provisions of 5 Geo.2, c.20.  
 
However, there are various circumstances which need to be emphasized: firstly, 
the words in statutes may not always be straightforward or without doubt, 
therefore the intention of the statutes needs to be examined in such cases. This 
principle was firstly cited in the case Farmer v Legg, and in that case the 
fundamental issue was to find out what exactly the Act required the assured to 
perform during the slave transport. Therefore in the judgment, Ashhurst J stated 
that “In a case where the words of an Act of Parliament are doubtful, we must 
see what were the mischiefs against which the Legislature meant to guard, and 
endeavour to find out the most probable means of effecting that purpose”20. 
Another approach to understanding the intention of the statute is to examine the 
aim of the policy of the statute, namely “whether the intention of parliament was 
to ban such contracts or merely to impose fines upon those transgressing its 
terms21”.  
 
Secondly, not every violation of statute may render the policy void. This is the 
case when the requirements of statutes can never be complied with under some 
special circumstances. In the case Suart and Another v Powell the supply of 
                                                             
20 Farmer v Legg (1797) 7 TR 186 
21 Soyer, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2nd ed 
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seamen on a vessel was completely impossible so as to comply with the 
proportion of English seaman required by Navigation Act. The court rendered 
this voyage legal because of the unavoidable circumstance the vessel 
encountered. However, the courts still need plenty of evidence to prove such 
unavoidable circumstances, which will be discussed later. 
 
2.2.2.2 Illegal adventures by King’s or Council’s order 
 
A policy can be rendered illegal by King’s or Council’s order, this kind of illegality 
is unique in the late 18th century and 19th century during the Napoleonic wars. 
The most significant case was Parkin v Dick22,this was a case which related to 
the prohibition of exportation. According to His Majesty by proclamation or order 
in Council which originated from the stat.33Geo.3, c.2, the exportation of naval 
stores was prohibited and therefore the whole contract was rendered illegal and 
void. Two points need to be noticed: firstly, this kind of illegality mainly happened 
in earlier cases and rarely happens under current circumstance. Secondly, the 
King’s or Council’s order also originates from statute. Therefore, this kind of 
violation can be seen as a derivate of the statutory illegality. 
 
2.2.2.3 Illegal adventures because of violation of public policy and common law 
                                                             
22 Parkin v Dick (1809) 2 Camp 221 
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An insurance policy can be rendered illegal because of violation of public policy. 
There are various kinds of public policy principles under common law, such as 
the assured cannot rely on his own illegality to get compensation and the 
assured cannot profit from his own illegality. However, in early marine insurance 
cases, adventure which was rendered illegal by public policy was rare. This 
section will only consider the public policies which relate to lawful adventure.  
 
There is no clear definition of public policy, neither in marine insurance law nor in 
contract law. Cases which can be classified into this category are illegal activities 
not covered by clear statutory regulations, trading with the enemy was a case 
which fell into this scope. For instance, in the case Vandyck and Others v 
Hewitt23, the insurance policy was rendered illegal based on the decisions of two 
former cases, therefore, even though there was no statute which forbad trading 
with the enemy at that time, the former judgments were viewed as public policy 
in this case and were therefore the foundation of the judgment. Furthermore, 
when there is an absence of statute, public policy was used as an ancillary 
instrument by courts. In the case Kensington v Inglis and Another24 when the 
court decided whether the insurance was illegal or not, one of the elements 
which the court took into account was whether this insurance contravened the 
public policy of this country.  
                                                             
23 Vandyck and Others v Hewitt (1800) 1 East 96 
24 Kensington v Inglis and Another (1807) 8 East 273. 
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However public policy was not limited by former judgments, judges could create 
new public policy according to the facts of different cases, thus in the case 
Pieschell v Allnutt Same v Lavie25 it was decided that not every communication 
with enemy could render the insurance void, which was a supplement to former 
judgments.  
 
The positive effect of the application of public policy when deciding cases of 
illegality is obvious: statutes are unable to list every kind of illegality, therefore 
the applications of public policy increases flexibility. However, on the other side, 
public policy is a very unstable foundation of judgments, just like Burrough J. 
said “against arguing too strongly upon public policy; it is a very unruly horse, 
and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you”.26 
 
2.2.3 Formation of illegal adventure 
 
The objective of this section is to explore the different stages of unlawful 
adventure under marine insurance law. Illegal conduct which happens in 
different stages may lead to different results, even though this rarely happened 
in early cases. 
                                                             
25 Pieschell v AllnuttSame v Lavie (1813) 4 Taunton 792 
26 Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, at 252 
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There are basically two forms of illegal adventure, firstly, the adventure or 
voyage insured is itself expressly prohibited by law; secondly, the voyage itself is 
lawful, however the adventure is tainted by performance before its 
commencement?  
 
So far as the first type of illegal adventure is concerned, where the adventure 
itself is illegal, it is undoubtedly true that some kinds of voyages were expressly 
prohibited by law. Therefore a voyage to an enemy port during wartime was 
rendered illegal and the insurance upon it was void 27 ; a voyage which 
transported English manufacture to any port to the Eastward of the Cape was 
rendered illegal by statute as well28. Furthermore a voyage without sufficient 
proportion of English seaman on board was rendered illegal as well, unless it 
was impossible for the assured to provide enough seamen29. 
 
So far as the second type of illegal adventure is considered, according to early 
cases, there were basically three kinds of performance which may render an 
adventure illegal before its initiation. 
 
Firstly, sail without licence or convoy which needed to be acquired before the 
                                                             
27 Hagedorn v Bazett (1813) 2 M & S 100 
28 Gray and Another v Lloyd (1811) 4 Taunt 136 
29 Suart and Another v Powell (1830) 1 B& A 266 
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commencement of voyage. In the early 19th century, several statutes required 
ships to sail with convoy or licence and the absence of this would be rendered as 
illegal. There were various kinds of licences such as the licence to sail without 
convoy and the licence to trade with the South Sea Company or trade with an 
enemy. Both the licence or convoy need to be granted or arranged before the 
commencement of a voyage, as stated in the judgment of Wainhouse v Cowie 
“the first answer is, every person shipping goods must know and see that a 
sufficient licence is given”30 this phrase clearly indicated that a licence needs to 
be granted before a voyage. In the case Wainhouse v Cowie a licence which 
was granted for a previous voyage would not render the next voyage legal, and 
licence for a specific voyage was unable to legalize a voyage to a different 
destination, as in this case, a licence to Gibraltar did not legalize a voyage to 
Malta31. This was the same in convoy cases, in the case Cohen v Hinckley32 it 
was decided that “a ship cannot legally sail from port to port without convoy”. 
Therefore the voyage in that case which was from Portsmouth to Falmouth 
without a convoy was rendered illegal as well.  
 
Secondly, the loading operation before a voyage can render a lawful voyage 
illegal. In the case Cunard and Others v Hyde33 the adventure was rendered 
illegal before its initiation because the master did not load the timber below the 
                                                             
30 Wainhouse v Cowie (1811) 4 Taunt 178 
31 Ibid 
32 Cohen v Hinckley (1809) 2 Camp 51 
33 Cunard and Others v Hyde (1858) EB & E 670 
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deck and sailed without certificate which was requested by statute. Therefore 
even though a voyage from North America to UK was not prohibited by law, the 
loading operation before the voyage tainted it. This case was frequently 
compared with the case Wilson V. Rankin, this was also a case which related to 
the illegal stowage of goods. The main difference between the two cases is that, 
in Cunard case the illegality happened before the commencement of the voyage, 
however in Wilson case the illegality happened during the voyage, and this 
minor distinction resulted in two different judgments. In the latter case, the illegal 
performance which was carried out by the master did not affect the assured’s 
right to claim for compensation under insurance policy, however, in the Cunard 
case, the whole adventure was rendered illegal and the assured could not claim 
compensation under it. Thus, this is also one of the reasons why illegal 
performance before initiation of adventure and illegal performance during 
adventure should be considered separately. 
 
Thirdly, if there is no sufficient or competent crew on board before the commerce 
of a voyage, the voyage can be rendered illegal as well. In the case Clifford v 
Hunter34, the captain who was very ill before sailing rendered the whole voyage 
illegal, because he was incompetent to take charge of the vessel which resulted 
in the losses. 
 
                                                             
34 Clifford v Hunter (1827) M & M 103 
36 
 
Besides the three scenarios which have been introduced, there are numerous 
kinds of performance before the commencement of an adventure; nevertheless, 
the former three cases can demonstrate the existence of the second kind of 
formation of illegal adventure.  
 
There may be confusion between the second formation of illegal adventure and 
the illegal performance of 1906 Act. However, there are two differences between 
them.  
 
First of all, even though both kinds of illegality include the performance of the 
assured, the second form of illegal adventure mainly happens before the 
commencement of the adventure; however the second part of s41 regulates 
unlawful activities after the initiation of the adventure.  
 
Secondly, the requirement on the performance of the assured is different, which 
leads to different results after violation. In the second part of s41, it requires that 
“so far as the assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out 
in a lawful manner”. However, there is no such defence for the assured before 
the commencement of the adventure. Thus, if the assured performs illegally 
before the commencement of an adventure, the whole policy upon it is rendered 
void, however, if the illegal performance happens during the adventure, there 
are various kinds of defences for the assured.  
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The proposal to divide the lawful adventure into two kinds of formation is to 
enable the courts and contractual parties to consider the legality of adventure in 
a more specific way, and may provide the possibility to provide more defences 
for the assured to avoid the automatic discharge rule in warranty. However, 
based on former authorities, the second formation of unlawful adventure means 
that, the adventure can only be performed in an illegal way, or the contractual 
parties intend to perform such adventure illegally, therefore, unless there are 
some particular circumstances, the second formation of unlawful adventure 
always renders the whole policy void. 
 
2.3 Origin and scope of the warranty of legal performance in marine insurance 
law 
 
This section will discuss the origin and scope of the second kind of illegality, the 
illegality of performance. The origin of such illegality is open to doubt as well. 
There are no clear authorities on this issue. However, the origin and scope of the 
illegal performance may share some identical characteristics with illegal 
adventure. 
 
2.3.1 Origin of the warranty of legal performance in marine insurance law 
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The origin of the second part of s41 almost developed at the same time as the 
warranty of legal adventure. The origin of this piece of legislation can also be 
traced back to the late 18th century. 
 
The case which may be seen as the origin of this legislation is Planche and 
Another v Fletcher in which the issue of the legality of the performance of the 
assured was first raised by the court. In this case, the defendant argued that by 
exporting enemy property during the time of war the whole adventure was 
rendered illegal because of the performance of the assured, and the insurance 
upon it was void. However, by considering the facts of the case, Lord Mansfield 
overruled the defendant’s argument based on two points, the first was that: 
“What had been practised in this case was proved to be the constant course of 
the trade, and notoriously so to everybody35”; and the second one is that every 
man in England and France expected the commencement of a war and the 
underwriter was aware of that, therefore, the assured was not bound to give the 
insurer notice of this and since the insurer was aware of the risk and insured 
such risk, he was liable in case of capture. This can be seen as the first case in 
marine insurance law in which the legality of performance issue was first 
considered by a court. In this case, even though there was no fact proved the 
phrase “so far as the assured can control the matter” indicated that the 
                                                             
35 Planche and Another v Fletcher (1779) 1 Doug 251 
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adventure should be carried out in a lawful manner. In the case Farmer v Legg 
and Law v Hollingswirth it can also be seen that, the court required the 
adventure be carried out in a lawful manner as well, otherwise the adventure 
would be rendered illegal. Former cases mainly concentrated on or related to 
trade with enemy during war time. Therefore if an adventure was carried out to 
trade with an enemy or to profit the enemy , such conduct could render the 
voyage illegal, regardless of whether such adventure was carried out prior to the 
commencement of hostilities or not36. If the assured carried out the adventure 
not in strict compliance with the King’s licence, the adventure was rendered 
illegal as well37. 
 
However, not every illegal performance which happens during the course of the 
voyage can render the adventure illegal, which is the origin of the phrase “so far 
as the assured can control the matter”. The first case which relates to this issue 
is Moss and others v Byrom38.In this case, a loss happened because of the 
illegal capture of an American ship. The underwriter in this case argued that 
because an illegal letter of marque was taken on board and because of the 
illegal capture of a vessel, the policy was put to an end and the underwriter 
should not be liable for any losses. However by denying such argument, the 
court cited that the action of the master was a barratry and even though the 
                                                             
36 Furtado v Rogers (1802) 3 B & P 191 
37 Vandyck and Others v Whitmore (1801) 1 East 475 
38 Moss and others v Byrom 101 E.R. 605 
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capture was partly for the owner’s benefit the underwriter was still liable for 
damage in consequence of that conduct, since the act was no longer under the 
control of the assured. 
 
These early cases which relate to this piece of legislation only developed the 
basic rule of legal performance. Most of the cases in the early development of 
this section were similar. The fundamental principle which the courts follow was 
the same as the principle in legal adventure, which is that the insurance contract 
based upon an illegal adventure is void39.  
 
In the later development of legal performance in marine insurance law, several 
exceptions had been cited by common law and more factors had been taken into 
consideration when deciding such cases which will be discussed later.  
 
It can be seen that the foundation of the origin of this piece of law is the same as 
the origin of lawful adventure, however, the main difference is that, in the 
warranty of lawful performance, the adventure which is insured is lawful and can 
be performed legally, however, the assured chose an illegal method to perform 
it. 
 
2.3.2 Species and formation of illegal performance  
                                                             
39 Furtado v Rogers (1802) 3 B & P 200 
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The aim of this part is to examine the scope and species of illegal performance 
in marine insurance law which is based on cases to prior s41. It will first illustrate 
different kinds of illegal performance in former cases and then clarify and 
analyse several ambiguities and exceptions in case law, such as the phrase “so 
far as”. 
So far as the first issue is concerned, it is similar to illegal adventure, a lawful 
adventure can be performed illegally because of violation of statute, King’s or 
Council’s order, treaty between nations and public policy. 
 
2.3.2.1 Violation of statute 
 
An adventure which is lawful in its inception can become illegal because the 
performance of the assured is a violation of statute. This is the most common 
kind of illegality; an adventure may be rendered illegal because of violation 
statute either by the assured himself or his agent.  
 
An example of an adventure rendered illegal because of violation of statute is 
the case Vandyck and Others v Whitmore40. In this case a voyage was rendered 
illegal because of the lack of a valid licence, which was regulated by the stat 34 
Geo 3, c, 9 as the legal method of performance. However, one difference 
                                                             
40 Vandyck and Others v Whitmore (1801) 1 East 475 
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between the violation of statute in illegal adventure and illegal performance is 
that, in the illegal adventure scenario, if the adventure is clearly prohibited by 
statute then the insurance is void, nevertheless in illegal performance scenarios, 
the factors which may influence the performance of assured will be considered, 
as will be introduced later. 
 
2.3.2.2 Violation of King’s or Council’s order and licence 
 
This kind of illegality is common in cases which relate to trade with an enemy or 
trade with the subjects of an enemy. Therefore any trade with an enemy is 
rendered illegal if such licence has not been obtained or no valid licence has 
been granted, in the case Potts v Bell and others, it was cited that according to 
the principle of common law trading with an enemy without king’s licence was 
illegal in British subjects41. The trading with enemy case in this illegality category 
is similar to the illegality of unlawful adventure. In fact, this kind of illegality is a 
combination of illegal adventure and illegal performance because the statute 
which the assured violated was the legal method with which to perform such 
adventure. Thus, the adventure is only legal by trading with King’s licence and 
without such licence or without a valid licence the whole adventure is rendered 
illegal. In the case Vandyck and others v Whitmore42the adventure was rendered 
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illegal because the King’s licence granted was for a limited time and any trade 
beyond this period was illegal. However, a valid King’s licence or Council’s Order 
is not enough to legalize such adventure; the assured also need to ensure the 
spirit of this document. Therefore, in the case Atkinson v Abbott43, the adventure 
was not rendered illegal because the judge found that the assured was “without 
any purpose of defeating the Order of Council or trading with an enemy”. 
Otherwise, even if such document has been granted, if the assured intended to 
violate the law the adventure would be rendered illegal as well. 
 
2.3.2.3 Violation of treaties between nations 
 
This kind of violation was not very common in early judgements. The first reason 
was that commercial treaties between nations were not very common during that 
period and secondly, as cited in the case Planche and Another v Fletcher “one 
nation does not take notice of the revenue law of another”44 therefore it appears 
that if the UK is not one party of a treaty and the content of the treaty has not 
been enacted into UK law, then a court will not follow such treaty and render an 
adventure illegal accordingly, as in the case Pollard and Another v Bell45, where 
the legality of an insurance policy was not falsified by the judgment of a foreign 
court. However, there are some exceptions, in the case Bell, and other v 
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Carstairs46 an American assured could not recover their loss against the British 
underwriter because the ship was not properly documented according to the 
existing treaty between France and America and this was the efficient cause of 
the loss. Compared with the former two cases, the courts decided to follow the 
treaty and render the adventure illegal based on two points: firstly, the assured 
subject in this case was an American property, therefore, it should be regulated 
by the treaty of their state, whereas all the assureds in the two former cases 
were British; secondly, the document which was not on board was material to 
the adventure. Therefore, there was no reason why an English court could not 
use foreign treaties when dealing with a foreign assured’s case. And this was 
also the case in Baring and others v The Royal Exchange Assurance Company 
where Le Blanc J cited that “And if they expressly condemn a prize for a breach 
of treaty, that is binding on our Courts where the same question arises upon the 
propriety of that condemnation”47. Thus violation of treaty was clearly one kind of 
illegal performance under English law. 
 
2.3.2.4 Violation of common law and public policy 
 
Violation of common law was very common in the early judgments of illegal 
cases. This was the case because firstly, in the early period the performance of 
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illegality in most cases was the same, such as traded with enemy or sailed 
without documents; secondly, the statutes in early period were incapable of 
covering many kinds of illegality. Therefore, there were several early cases 
which followed the judgments cited before. Such as in the case Potts v Bell and 
others the judge rendered the adventure illegal because the authorities that cited 
by the insurer “were so many, so uniform, and so conclusive, to show that a 
British subject’s trading with an enemy were illegal”48. This provided a reliable 
source for the English court to decide illegality cases. 
 
So far as the violation of public policy is concerned, there is still no clear scope of 
how public policy relates to illegal performance. Just like the comment on 
violation of public policy in illegal adventure, public policy in illegal performance 
is a very unruly horse as well. As there is no clear definition of public policy in 
marine insurance law therefore which kinds of cases can be contained in this 
category is vague. According to early cases, new public policy can be created by 
the courts. In the case Raphael Brandon v Nesbitt after analysing former cases 
and statutes, the court rendered the adventure illegal on the ground that “an 
action will not lie either by or in favour of an alien enemy”49, which originated 
from judgments of former cases and was cited as a new public policy by the 
court. Therefore a public policy may be a supplement to common law or a 
summary of common law.  
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2.3.3 Scope of “so far as the assured can control the matter” 
 
The phrase “so far as the assured can control the matter” can be divided into two 
different parts: firstly, the difference of who commits the illegality can lead to 
different consequences and secondly, not every illegality which is committed by 
the assured can render the adventure illegal. Thus the scope of this phrase 
should be discussed from two aspects, firstly, illegality which involves the agent 
of the assured; secondly, illegality which is committed by the assured only. This 
section will consider the first scenario only, and the second scenario will be 
covered in the insufficiencies of section 41. 
 
According to early judgments, when the courts dealt with the first scenario, 
several factors were taken into consideration, such as the connection between 
the losses and the assured, the relationship between the assured and his agent, 
and the intention and the knowledge of the assured and his agent.  
 
The law clearly indicates that, if there is no connection between the conduct of 
the assured’s agent which lead to the loss and the assured, then such cases will 
not be regarded as violation of this warranty. In the case Moss and others v 
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Byrom50 the captain illegally took a prize during a voyage and violated the 
instructions of the assured, then even though the vessel was lost because of 
such illegality, the assured was entitled to recover against the insurer. This is 
also the case in Metcalfe v Parry, in this case it was decided that “to invalidate a 
policy on ship on the ground that she sailed without convoy, it is necessary to 
prove that this happened with the privity of the owner”51. But this is not always 
the case according to former cases, in the case Pipon v Cope52 even though the 
smuggling committed by the crew had no connection with the assured and the 
losses were not caused purely because of such illegality (the loss happened 
because of a collision in harbour), the assured was not entitled to compensation. 
This was because the assured failed to prevent the repeated acts of smuggling 
by the crew which increased the risk to the insurer and discharged the insurer’s 
responsibility accordingly. Therefore, so far as the assured can control the 
matter, the assured has a duty to pay due diligence on the performance of the 
crew, otherwise even if there is no connection between the assured and the loss, 
the assured may not be entitled to claim for insurance. 
 
The relationship between the assured and his agent is another factor which is 
significant when deciding with the breach of this warranty. The agents of the 
assured may include the crew on the ship or the broker of the assured. In former 
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cases if losses happen because of the barratry of the crew then in most 
circumstances the assured is entitled to claim such losses. In the case Heyman 
and others v Parish Lord Ellenborough decided that if barratry was proved and 
no surprise upon the defendant then the assured could recover such loss53. The 
assured is also not liable for the negligence of his agent, for instance, in Busk v 
The Royal Exchange Assurance Company54 once the assured had provided a 
sufficient crew on board, the negligence of the crew which caused the loss did 
not vitiate the assured’s right to claim for loss. However, the mere act of barratry 
will not result in such consequence; only the barratry which commits an illegality 
will not prejudice assured’s right55. In contrast, if the illegality committed by the 
crew is in obedience to the orders of the assured, then such act may contribute 
to the violation of such warranty. In the case Hobbs v Hannam56 which dealt 
with smuggled goods on board, the court found that the smuggled goods were 
brought on board because of the orders of the agent of the assured and the 
master implicitly obeyed, in this case the order from the agent was considered as 
the order from the assured. Therefore, in this case even though the assured 
himself did not participate in the illegal performance, the illegality which was 
committed by his agent rendered the loss irrecoverable. Thus, so far as the 
assured can control the matter, the insurer is liable for the losses which are 
caused by barratry and not liable for the illegality which is caused because of the 
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orders of the assured or his agent. However, it is clear that the Hobbs case was 
wrongfully decided, since it is unfair for the assured, if orders from any of his 
agents are considered as his orders, thus, in the case Carstairs and others, 
executors of Lyon v Allnutt it was decided that “it is not enough to shew that the 
ship sailed without convoy by the instrumentality of an agent of the assured, 
unless it appear that the agent had authority from his principal for this 
purpose”57. 
 
Furthermore, if it turns out that the assured has no knowledge of the illegality 
then the assured should not be liable for the loss, this is another factor which is 
beyond the assured’s control. Thus in the case Wilson v Rankin58 without the 
knowledge that the master carried the timber on deck, the assured still had the 
right to claim for loss. In the case Oom and others v Bruce59 which dealt with 
insurance on enemy subjects, the agent of the assured still carried out the 
insurance even after the commencement of hostilities between Britain and 
Russia. Lord Ellenborough however, decided that the insurance was not 
rendered illegal, because the assured carried out the insurance without any 
knowledge of the illegality and the hostilities between the nations and the agent 
of assured was entitled the return of premium. Another case which was based 
on the judgment of Oom and goes much further is Henting and Another v 
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Staniforth. In this case, a voyage was illegal from its inception because the ship 
sailed before the licence was granted which was unknown to the assured who 
resided abroad, when deciding whether the voyage was illegal and whether the 
assured was entitled to recover back his premium Lord Ellenborough decided 
that “The illegality depended upon a fact, viz. the posteriority of the licence to the 
ship's departure, which was not known to the parties, and was contrary to the 
opinion and expectation that the plaintiff might reasonably entertain”60. Therefore, 
the assured had a right to suppose that the voyage would be legal. And therefore, 
“he (the assured) is not a party to a violation of the law and is entitled to recover 
back his premium”61. From this point of view, the knowledge of the illegality of 
the adventure is not within the scope of the matter which the assured can control. 
However, one factor which is crucial when deciding such cases is that, the 
assured’s intention has to be proved, which will be discussed later. 
 
Based on the introduction of the origin of this piece of law and the former 
judgments which formulate the phrase “so far as the assured can control the 
matter”, it is clear that the intention of this phrase is to provide a defence for the 
assured during the voyage, because the assured is not able to control everything 
during the course of a transaction. However, according to former analysis there 
are still two obligations for the assured to comply with: firstly, the assured should 
have no connection with the losses, either by physical performance or indirect 
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performance, such as orders on agent; secondly, during a voyage, the assured 
should observe due diligence on the adventure and his agent.  
 
2.4 The insufficiencies of section 41 in 1906 Marine Insurance Act 
 
After the analysis of the origin and the phrases of warranty of legality in marine 
insurance law, the objective of this section is to resolve the questions raised in 
the introduction: whether s41 of 1906 Act truly reflects the judgments of former 
cases, and what is the true scope of s41? To answer these questions, two 
issues need to be expounded, firstly, the insufficiencies of section 41 and 
secondly, whether this section should be regulated as a warranty. 
 
The insufficiencies of section 41 can be summarised as: the language of this 
piece of law is abstract. There is no clear description of defences for the assured 
in both of the two pieces of legislation and the elements which may influence the 
consequence of the case have been ignored by the legislation as well. 
Furthermore, some specific circumstances which may not render the adventure 
illegal have not been covered by the law. Therefore, from this point of view, the 
legislation has not inflected the former cases properly and can be proved as 
follows: 
 
Firstly, not every illegality can render the whole policy void. This is a very 
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important defence for the assured which has been ignored by the 1906 Act. This 
exception exists in several circumstances: (1) Statute itself may clearly provide 
such exception: for instance, it has been demonstrated that sailing without 
convoy contributes to an illegal voyage, however, according to the stat.43 Geo.3, 
c. 57, unless the party interested in the insurance was privy to or instrumental in 
the sailing without convoy, the statute may not avoid such policies62. (2) If the 
circumstances which prevent the assured fulfilling the lawful requirement are 
permanent and unchangeable, then such illegal act will not render the insurance 
policy void. For instance, the case Suart v Powell63 the assured is not guilty if a 
due proportion of such seamen cannot be procured in any foreign port. (3) If the 
entire cargo belongs to different parties which have no partnership between 
them, and covered by distinct policies then the illegality of part of the cargo may 
not taint the others. In the case Hagedorn v Bazett64, the illegality of the cargo 
which was exported to Russia did not render the cargo which was exported to 
Hamburg illegal, even though the cargo was carried in the same vessel. And this 
is also the case when the illegality happens during the performance of an 
adventure, for example, in the case Keir v Andrade the assured was allowed to 
export 150 barrels of gunpowder, however the assured exported 300 barrels 
instead. The vessel was captured and caused the loss, the insurer alleged that 
the exportation of the extra 150 barrels was a violation of statute and 
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consequently illegal and contaminated the whole adventure. However, the court 
divided the cargo into two parts and “the adding 150 barrels afterwards did not 
vitiate the application of the licence to the first”65. Therefore the whole adventure 
was not illegal and the insurance on the first 150 barrels was valid. (4)The 
voyage may not be rendered illegal as well if the intention of the parties and law 
has been taken into consideration, which will be discussed later. 
 
The exceptions which may not render the whole policy void vary from case to 
case, it is impossible to enumerate them and there are no general rules related 
to this defence. This exception depends upon how the courts construe the law 
and what facts the courts take into consideration. Consequently, this kind of 
defence is not stable, however when the courts decide similar cases they may 
take the decisions of former cases into account. 
 
Secondly, the intention of the parties which had been taken into account by 
several former cases has been ignored by s41 as well. The intention of parties 
has provided a defence for the assured in illegality issues. The intention of 
parties was considered by Lord Ellenborough C.J in two cases: in the case 
Ingham and others v Agnew, the voyage was rendered illegal not because there 
was no licence on board as required by the law, but because the parties had no 
intention to obey it “it appears that at the very time the parties obtaining that 
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licence meditated a voyage up the Mediterranean. The voyage was therefore 
illegal and the insurance void”66. In another case Wilson v Foderingham, the 
defendant refused to pay the freight because he argued that the voyage had 
been taint by illegality, namely sailing without convoy. Even though this was not 
a marine insurance case, determination of the legality of the voyage is the 
foundation of carriage contracts as well. In this case the voyage was rendered 
legal because as cited by Lord Ellenborough C.J “If this contract had been made 
upon an understanding that it was intended to contravene the provisions of the 
Act of Parliament, perhaps the voyage might have been illegal, as being an act 
contemplated to be done in violation of a law of the State; but this contract was 
entered into, as we must presume until the contrary be shown, in perfect 
innocence, and with the purpose of effectually complying with the Act of 
Parliament67”. 
 
Therefore two kinds of intention of parties have been considered by Lord 
Ellenborough C.J namely the intention of the parties when entering the contract 
and the intention of the parties when executing the contract, if the assured 
enters into the insurance policy without the intention to commit the adventure 
illegally, then the illegal performance may not render the policy void. However, if 
both of the parties enter into the contract with intention to commit it illegality, then 
even though it can be performed legally, the contract is void.  
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However, this may only provide limited protection to the assured, because on the 
one side, it is inconvenient to estimate the moral intention of the assured as 
admitted by Lord Ellenborough C.J himself “it would lead to this inconvenience, 
that in every case we should have to estimate the moral rectitude of the 
captain68”; and on the other hand, it is hard to prove this either by the assured or 
insurer. Besides these two reasons, the courts tend to adopt a severe attitude 
towards illegality issues and frequently ignore this factor. However, such 
intention issue should raise the attention of the courts when dealing with illegality 
in marine insurance cases, and this has been considered by the judges in the 
most recent case Sea Glory. 
 
The intention factor had also been considered in illegal performance 
circumstances, in the case Atkinson v Abbott which dealt with shipping goods to 
enemy territory, the intention of the assured and his agent had been considered 
by the Lord when deciding this case. In this case, an insurance policy was 
issued on a voyage to a neutral port in Sweden which the assured had no 
intention of visiting; the object of the voyage was to supply the British fleet in 
Denmark which was a hostile country then. The ship was captured by a Danish 
vessel and the assured claimed for damage. When deciding whether the 
intention of the assured and the voyage was fraud or illegal the Lord analysed 
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that because “the object of it was to supply the British fleet and forces engaged 
in the expedition to Copenhagen with provisions69” and the voyage was “without 
any purpose of defeating the Order of Council or trading with an enemy70”, the 
object of the voyage was not illegal, therefore the voyage was not illegal either in 
intention or act. It is clear that the intention of the assured in this case was 
considered a very important element. However, this is not always the case when 
the assured has no intention to violate the law. In the case Denison v Modigliani 
which has been analysed before, even though it was alleged by the assured that 
the letter of marque which had been taken on board was “not being intended to 
be made use of and not having been acted upon in the voyage out71” the court 
decided that the conduct of the assured has raised the risk insured and the 
whole adventure was illegal. 
 
Thirdly, the intention of the law has been ignored by s41 as well. Under some 
circumstances, the courts need to clarify the ambiguities of legislations. For 
example, in the case Farmer v Legg it was cited that “In a case where the words 
of an Act of Parliament are doubtful, we must see what were the mischiefs 
against which the Legislature meant to guard, and endeavour to find out the 
most probable means of effecting that purpose”.72 And “we (the court) must 
decide according to the intention of the Legislature which is to be collected from 
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the general object of the Act and from the particular words used in it” 73. 
Therefore, the objection of the court is to protect the intention of the legislation 
rather than simply follow the requirements of the legislation. 
 
Another circumstance in which the intention of the law may provide a defence for 
the assured is that the court is obliged to find out which punishment the law 
intends to impose upon the guilty assured, namely whether the consequence of 
illegality is the void of contract or simply a penalty. In the case Redmond v Smith 
and Another, after analysis of the facts of the case, even though the illegality of 
the assured was confirmed, the court rejected the plea of the insurer which 
requested the invalidity of the policy. As cited by the court “the object of the 
legislature was to protect seaman from imposition74”. And even though the 
illegality sustained according to the law “he (the master) shall be liable to a 
penalty; but there is nowhere said that such non-compliance shall make the 
voyage illegal75”. Thus, despite the illegality that existed in the voyage, it was not 
severe enough to make the voyage illegal and vitiated the insurance upon it.  
 
According to these two cases, it seems that the court has developed a reliable 
defence for the assured in illegality cases, which has not been covered by s41. 
However, in order to achieve the correct application of this defence the function 
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and character of the law shall be considered. Namely, whether the character of 
the law is suitable for the court to rely upon in order to forbid an insurance 
contract and vitiate the policy. Not every violation of any legislation can render 
an insurance contract illegal. This is because, firstly, the assured is not obliged 
to be familiar with every piece of UK law, for some law is of little use or clearly 
unfair; secondly, even though the legality is not necessarily closely connected 
with the loss, the law which the courts use to determine the illegality needs to 
demonstrate an illegal act, otherwise this may provide an improper defence for 
the insurer.  
For instance, in the case Toulmin v Anderson which was wrongfully decided, the 
loss of the vessel and goods on board was because of the barratry of three 
Spaniards on board. Neither the goods on board nor the voyage was illegal 
according to the law of that time. Even though the first objection of the insurer 
was that the voyage was illegal according to statute 15 Car.2, c.7, s.6, the court 
did not deliver a legal opinion upon that subject76. The second objection raised 
by the insurer which the judgment relied upon was that the vessel did not obtain 
a licence from the south-sea company before the initiation of the voyage and the 
policy was subsequently rendered void by the court because of this objection. 
Nevertheless, this judgment was clearly inequitable because of two points. 
Firstly, as stated by the judge, the statute relied upon was “the almost forgotten 
charter of the South Sea Company”77 therefore, whether the legislation is still 
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valid and suitable to be applied on such a specific case was a question need to 
be clarified by the court. According to the argument of the plaintiff, two recent 
acts of parliament tended to legalize such voyage, however this had been 
ignored by the court78. Thus, not only might the assured not be familiar with the 
statute but also such statute might not be appropriate to be applied on such 
voyage. Secondly, the judgment was not fair to the assured because of the 
legislation the court relied upon had no connection with the illegality. The 
function of the statute as stated by court is “gives to the South Sea Company in 
the strongest terms possible an exclusive right to trade in the South Seas”. 
According to the facts of the case, it was clear that the assured did not intend to 
violate this exclusive right of trade, therefore the legislation the court relied upon 
cannot properly demonstrate such illegality which existed in this case. 
Consequently, even though the objective of the law had been considered by the 
court, the legislation the court applied was incorrect which led to an incorrect 
judgment. 
 
Fourthly, another insufficiency which has not been mentioned before is that in 
some cases the breach of warranty of legality has no connection with the losses. 
It is well known that under current marine insurance law, to establish a breach of 
warranty there is no need for a connection between the breach and the loss, 
which has been demonstrated by numerous cases. However, in illegality cases it 
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may not be appropriate to adopt the same rule. Since firstly, it was cited that the 
object of legislation shall be taken into consideration, therefore if the illegality 
does not contravene what the law intends to protect and does not result in loss, it 
is clear that such illegality will not be supported by the court79. Secondly, based 
upon the analysis of exceptions in s41, the objective of this section is to protect 
the insurer from losses caused by illegality on the part of the assured rather than 
to preclude any illegality in an adventure, otherwise there will be no exceptions. 
Therefore, if the illegality of an adventure has no connection with the losses or 
the illegality which causes the losses is not committed by the assured, then there 
is no need to trigger this piece of law. Furthermore, under common law illegality 
rules, there is a causation requirement between the losses and the illegality 
which has been proved by several cases and the Law Commission report80. 
 
Therefore it can be summarized from this part that, firstly, the s41 of 1906 Act 
does not reflect the judgments of former cases well; secondly, the 1906 Act and 
common law impose a severe consequence on the assured when in breach of 
such warranty and only provide limited defences for the assured, this is clearly 
unconscionable and is the reason to discuss whether section 41 should be 
regulated as a warranty issue. 
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2.4.1 Should the warranty of legality be regulated as an implied warranty in 
section 41? 
 
According to the authorities and cases which have been listed before, it can be 
established that marine insurance contracts which involve illegality will be 
regarded as void. Based on the analysis before, it can be concluded that s41 of 
1906 Act does not reflect the former case law properly. Therefore a question 
may arise, why is the legality rule of marine insurance regulated as an implied 
warranty in MIA 1906 rather than condition, innominate terms or express 
warranty in marine insurance? The phrase “implied warranty” used in the 
judgment of some cases is not enough to answer this question. This is a 
question which the drafter of the Act, Sir Mckenzie Chalmers, himself did not 
answer. And another question is whether this classification is reasonable. To 
answer these two questions is another way to resolve the question, whether s41 
has reflected former case law properly. To answer these two questions, the 
different kinds of terms in ordinary contract law and insurance law shall be 
introduced first. 
 
In general contract law, contract terms can be divided into three classes: 
condition, breach of which entitles the innocent party to repudiate the contract; 
warranty, breach of which enables the innocent party to claim for damage only; 
innominate terms, the breach of innominate terms may entitle the innocent party 
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to repudiate the contract or claim for damages, which mainly depends on the 
seriousness of that breach. 
 
However, the concepts of condition and warranty in insurance contracts have 
different meanings. According to the Clinvaux’s Law of Insurance, an insurance 
condition is “either an obligation on the assured to act in a particular way, or a 
contingency –which may be outside the control of the assured-upon which the 
validity of the policy or of any claim may depend.”81 And the insurance warranty 
is “a pre-contractual promise by the assured that a given fact is true, or that a 
given fact will remain true, or that he will behave or refrain from behaving in a 
particular way.”82 
 
The consequences of breach of condition and warranty terms in insurance law 
are different from the consequences in ordinary contract law as well. The 
consequence of breach of condition in insurance law is more like the breach of 
innominate terms in ordinary contract law although some special circumstances 
may exist; and the consequence of breach of warranty in insurance contract is 
basically automatic termination of the insurance contract83. 
 
One of the minor differences between the non-marine insurance contracts and 
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marine insurance contracts is that the implied warranty is unique to marine 
insurance and all the warranties in non-marine insurance must be expressed84. 
Therefore as one of the two implied warranties which has been regulated by MIA 
190685, it is necessary to answer the question why the warranty of legality is an 
implied warranty. 
 
According to former judgments, the reasons why warranty of legality is regulated 
as an implied one in s41 can be concluded into the following two points. 
 
Firstly, this is the foundation of marine insurance contract. Other kinds of 
warranties may not be required in every marine insurance contract; however the 
warranty of legality must be fulfilled before the inception of the adventure and 
maintained during the adventure in order to make the legislation effective. This 
requirement originates from a fundamental principle which has been long 
decided in English law: “the courts will not permit a person to enforce his rights 
under a contract of any kind if it is tainted by illegality”86, which is a general 
principle first cited in the case Holman v Johnson by Lord Mansfield. This is a 
case related to smuggling of tea into England, in the judgment Lord Mansfield 
cited that “The principle of public policy is this; ex dolo malo non oritur actio. No 
Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral 
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or an illegal act.”87 Later it was also decided in the marine insurance case Morck 
and Another v Abel that “no man can come into a British court of justice to seek 
the assistance of the law who founds his claim upon a contravention of the 
British laws”88 and no man shall benefit from his own criminal conduct. In the 
absence of Marine Insurance Act in the 19th century this is the public policy 
which many cases were based on and it is common sense in the insurance 
market. Therefore there is no need to express the legality of adventure and 
performance in marine insurance contract, since all the prohibitions have been 
clearly cited by statutes and public policy. 
 
Secondly, the main function for the warranty to be expressed in insurance policy 
is to make clear the intention of the parties to the court, which enables the court 
to decide the consequences of the breach of that specific term easily. However, 
in practice the court can hardly ignore the illegality issues. In the case Gedge 
and others v Royal Exchange Assurance corporation89the judgment of that case 
stated that “the court cannot properly ignore the illegality or give effect to the 
claim even if the illegality be not pleaded or relied on by the defendants”. In this 
case the court did not ignore the illegal transaction even if there is no express 
prohibition in the insurance contract. Therefore there is no necessity for the 
legality requirement to be expressed. 
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The legality requirement can be regulated as an implied one because of the two 
points mentioned; however whether the legality requirement should be regulated 
as a warranty is another question, since there are five differences between the 
warranty of legality and other ordinary warranties.  
 
(1) Compared with other kinds of warranties, warranty of legality cannot be 
waived either by agreement or by estoppel, for such waiver will negate the effect 
of legislation and such act will be contrary to public policy as stated in the first 
point. And it is also because the court will not ignore the illegality which exists in 
a contract.  
 
(2) The most important principle in warranty is the strict compliance principle as 
stated in s.33 of the 1906 Act: once a warranty is breached, the insurance 
contract is automatically terminated regardless of whether the assured can 
control or is aware of the matter or not. However as clearly stated in s.41 “so far 
as the assured can control the matter”, it indicates that if the adventure which is 
performed illegally is out of the control of the assured, such circumstance will not 
be considered as a breach of this implied warranty. In the warranty of legal 
adventure cases, as has been stated before there are several circumstances 
where illegal adventure may not be rendered as a breach of warranty as well. 
Thus, these regulations clearly contradict the well-known principle in warranty.  
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(3) The difference also exists in the doctrine of divisibility of warranty. It is clear 
that in most cases if a warranty has been breached then the loss of the whole 
cargo under the same policy cannot be covered. However, in some special 
occasions of the legality cases, the cargo under the same policy can be divided. 
In the case Hagedorn v Bazett, a license on a voyage to the Baltic had been 
granted, however part of the cargo on the ship belonged to Russia which was 
regarded as an enemy by England at that time, therefore a question arose on the 
trial, whether this license could be extended to protect the whole property or only 
a part of it, because at that time trade with enemy was regarded as illegal by 
English court. By deciding the insurance policy only did not cover the goods of 
Russia (which was illegal), Lord Ellenborough C.J. stated that “the mere 
accidental circumstance of several persons having employed one common 
agent, does not communicate to the others the vice belonging to the property of 
one of the assured; but that the contract may be distributed”90. Therefore, in this 
case, even though part of the goods was illegal such illegality did not taint the 
whole insurance policy. However, this was a very special case, if it can be 
established that the subject matter insured is covered by the same policy, 
belongs to the same assured, the partial illegality may taint the whole policy91. 
However, the former case law on this issue contradicted with each other, in the 
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case Keir v Andrade92, even though all of the gunpowder was covered under the 
same policy and belonged to the same assured, the illegality of half of the goods 
did not render the lawful part of the goods illegal.  
 
(4) The issue on return of premium is different as well between the warranty of 
legality and other kinds of warranties. Under insurance law, premiums paid by 
the assured are recoverable either on the present warranty or continuing 
warranty, because the insurer will not face any liabilities for losses since the 
insurance contract has come to an end after the breach. There are no clear 
words related to the return of premium in s.41 of 1906 Act; however in the early 
judgments which relate to illegality prior to the 1906 Act, the premium paid on an 
illegal insurance cannot be recovered. In the case Vandyck and Others v Hewitt, 
the insurance policy which was to cover trading with the enemy was considered 
as illegal and the premium paid on it could not be recovered, the judge stated 
that “where it was considered that money deposited upon an illegal wager, and 
paid over to the winner, could not be recovered back from him93”. Furthermore, it 
was later decided in the case Morck and Another v Abel that "a foreigner cannot 
recover back the premium paid by him upon a policy of insurance, if the voyage 
be in contravention of the British laws.94" This judgment has been supported by a 
number of cases such as Chalmers and Another v Bell95 and Lubbock and 
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Another v Potts96. This is also the reason why the section 84 (3) of Marine 
Insurance Act indicates that there is no return of premium  if there has been 
illegality on the part of the assured, which is clearly not a happy one. 
 
(5) The last point is the difference which exists in the consequence of breach 
between the warranty of legality and other ordinary warranties. It can be 
established by numerous cases prior to the 1906 Act that, the consequence of 
an insurance which is tainted by illegality is that the insurance contract is void 
rather than merely unenforceable after the breach, therefore not only the losses 
which happen after that breach are unrecoverable but also the losses which 
happen before that breach. However, this is clearly not the case in breach of 
ordinary warranties. Under ordinary warranty regulations the breach of a 
continuing warranty will not influence the insurer's liabilities which occur prior to 
the date of breach. Therefore the consequence of breach of warranty of legality 
is clearly not the same as other kinds of breach of warranties. 
 
Above are the five differences which exist between the warranty of legality and 
other kinds of warranties. Therefore, based on the analysis above, it is clear that 
s41 in 1906 Act does not reflect the special character which exists in the 
judgment of former cases, and consequently it is not appropriate to regulate the 
requisition of lawful adventure and performance as a warranty in marine 
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insurance law. 
 
2.5 Conclusion on nature of section 41 
 
Based on the analysis of former case law before, it can easily be concluded that 
section 41 in 1906 Marine Insurance Act does not reflect former case law 
properly. And the true scope of legality issue in marine insurance law has more 
abundant meanings. The true scope of legality in marine insurance law is to 
protect the legitimate interests of the insurer and prevent the assured from 
profiting from his own fault. However, section 41 only cited the basic two 
principles in practice and the possible defences for the assured have been 
ignored. Furthermore, based on the severe consequence of breaching legality 
rules, it is inappropriate to regulate these rules as warranty as well. Therefore, 
based on the most recent case The Nancy97, it seems that the application of 
common law illegality rules is a more proper method when dealing with marine 
insurance illegality issues. 
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Part 2 The Background to Common Law Illegality  
Following the introduction to the origins of the warranty of legality in marine 
insurance law, it is commonly agreed that the illegality rules adopted by the court 
when dealing with statutory illegality and the illegality in performance are 
different. 
However, it is clear that the illegality rule in marine insurance law is not the only 
one which has made a difference between statutory illegality and illegality in 
performance. Moreover, the illegality rules in marine insurance also have a 
common law background. From the earliest case, Holman v Johnson, which is 
the origin of the illegality defence in English law, until the latest case, Bilta v 
Nazir, the illegality defence has been commonly used in both tort law and 
contract law to decline the claimant’s compensation, on the ground that the 
claimant’s right to compensation has been barred because of his illegal conduct. 
Unlike the warranty of legality in marine insurance law, the illegality defence in 
common law cannot render the contract void automatically, and the engagement 
of this defence is subject to various factors.  
Furthermore, as will be seen below, the common law illegality defence is 
commonly applied to insurance law, especially motor insurance and liability 
insurance. Since the warranty of legality has been viewed as improper and 
outmoded, it is important to review the origins and the application of the illegality 
defence in common law and non-marine insurance circumstances, to re-analysis 
the original intention of the construction of this defence and how the defence has 
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evolved. This will provide evidence need for the modification of the warranty of 
legality in marine insurance. 
This part will be divided into two chapters. The first chapter will consider the 
illegality defence, namely the ex turpi causa defence, in tort law and in insurance 
law, and the second chapter will consider the illegality in contract law and 
insurance contracts. At the end of the second chapter, there will be a comparison 
between the two kinds of illegality and an exploration of the differences between 
them. This chapter will begin with an examination of the origins of the illegality 
defence in tort law. 
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Chapter three: The illegality defence in tort law and the ex turpi causa defence in 
insurance 
3.1 The illegality defence in tort law 
3.1.1 The origin of the illegality defence in tort law 
The illegality defence, or illegality rules, in tort law in England and Wales often 
refer to the defence which is used by the defendant (who maybe the tortfeasor) 
to bar the claimant who has acted in an unlawful manner from claiming loss or 
compensation from him. And it may also bar the guilty claimant from claiming 
compensation for his loss or claiming a penalty from the third party. The claimant 
may be a victim purely because of the conduct of the defendant or because of 
his own conduct; or he may be a victim because of the illegal act which was 
committed by both the defendant and himself. In both circumstances, the 
illegality of the act committed by the claimant, no matter how trivial or severe, 
may provide a defence for the defendant and the third party.  
 
The Latin word ex turpi causâ, which is commonly used to refer to the illegality 
defence in tort law, is also known as ex turpi causâ non oritur actio. The origin of 
such a maxim in tort law derived from the case of Holman v Johnson, cited by 
Lord Mansfield in 1775, which concerned the smuggling of tea into England 
during the performance of a sale contract. In this case it was decided that the 
court would: 
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“not lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
immoral or an illegal act if, from the plaintiff's own stating or 
otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causâ, … 
there the court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that 
ground the court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but 
because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff.”98  
However, whether the decision can be viewed as the origin of the illegality 
defence in tort law99 has been implicitly argued by former authorities since this 
principle was decided in a contract law case and the relationship between the 
defendant and claimant in contract law and tort law is not the same.  
Firstly, it was contended that there is a limited application of the defence in tort. 
With regard to the National Coal Board v England case, a tort law case related to 
the compensation to the claimant which involved his illegality, according to Lord 
Porter, although the maxim is generally applied to contract cases, it could 
equally be applied to tort cases100. Furthermore, according to Lord Asquith, 
although “The vast majority of cases in which the maxim has been applied have 
been cases where, there being an illegal agreement between A and B either 
seeks to sue the other for its enforcement or for damages for its breach. That, of 
course, is not this case”101 and “Cases where an action in tort has been 
defeated by the maxim are exceedingly rare”, Lord Asquith finally agreed that 
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“the plaintiff cannot be precluded from suing simply because the wrongful act is 
committed after the illegal agreement is made and during the period involved in 
its execution”102.  
 
However, it was finally agreed in the case Clunis v Camden and Islington HA that 
the public policy that the court will not lend its aid to the litigant who relies on his 
own criminal or immoral act is not confined to particular causes of action103. In 
this case, the defendant submitted that “the rule of policy embraced by the Latin 
maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio does not apply to causes of action founded 
in tort104”. However, by referring to several former judgments, the Court of 
Appeal finally cited: “… whether a claim brought is founded in contract or in tort, 
public policy only requires the court to deny its assistance to a plaintiff seeking to 
enforce a cause of action if he was implicated in the illegality and in putting 
forward his case he seeks to rely upon the illegal acts”105. In other words, this 
public policy should be applied to tort law cases as it is to contract law cases. 
Although this judgment was questioned by Buxton LJ - “The limits of this defence 
are very difficult to state or rationalize, it being recognized as sitting more easily 
in the law of contract than of tort”106- it was finally agreed in the case Hewison v 
Meridian Shipping Services PTE Ltd and others that “One thing at least is clear: 
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the defence of illegality is available in the case of tort”107. In the case, Gray v 
Thames Train Ltd, the judge also confirmed that “The principle derives originally 
from the judgment of Lord Mansfield in Holman v Johnson”108. In the most recent 
case Les Laboratoires Servier & Anor v Apotex Inc & Ors, Lord Mansfield’s 
judgment is still seen as the origin of the ex turpi causa defence in tort, however, 
it is also indicated that “it does not provide a simple measuring rod for 
determining the boundaries of the principle”109. 
 
3.1.2 Which kinds of claimant’s illegality may trigger the illegality defence? 
There are various kinds of illegal conduct which may bar the claimant from 
claiming compensation from the defendant. These types of conduct fall into 
several categories and can be analyzed from two points of view: firstly, the 
illegality of an act conducted by the claimant subjectively, which also includes 
the joint enterprise context; and secondly, the illegality of an act conducted by 
the claimant as a consequence of a former tort committed by the defendant. This 
part will only discuss the categories of the claimants’ illegal acts; the rationales 
for these acts will be considered later. 
 
3.1.2.1The illegal act conducted by the claimant subjectively 
This category covers the illegality of an act committed by the claimant in the 
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course of an illegal joint venture with the defendant, as well as the illegal 
activities which are committed by the claimant only. 
(i)In the first circumstance, it is clear that when both the claimant and the 
defendant have been involved in the illegality, it will be impossible for the court to 
determine the standard of care in some certain circumstances. Thus, if the 
claimant is seeking compensation as a consequence of the joint illegal conduct 
with the defendant, such a claim may be dismissed on the basis that the 
claimant’s own criminal conduct precludes him from recovering damages. This 
rule was first introduced by Lord Asquith in the case National Coal Board v 
England: at the end of his judgment, he made an example of the illegal joint 
venture: “If two burglars, A and B, agree to open a safe by means of explosives, 
and A so negligently handles the explosive charge as to injure B, B might find 
some difficulty in maintaining an action for negligence against A”110. In a latter 
case, Ashton v Turner, after three young men had spent an evening drinking, two 
of them committed a burglary and sought to escape in the second defendant’s 
car while the first defendant was driving it. The claimant plaintiff was badly 
injured in the ensuing car accident because of the reckless and illegal driving of 
the first defendant; the plaintiff subsequently claimed damages from the first 
defendant and the second defendant, who was alleged to have permitted the 
first defendant to use the car in a dangerous way and without insurance. The 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that “as a matter of public 
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policy, the law might not recognize that a duty of care was owed by one 
participant in a crime to another in relation to an act done in the course of the 
commission of the crime and that, on the facts, the defendants did not owe a 
duty of care to the plaintiff during the burglary or the subsequent flight from the 
scene of the crime”111. This rationale was upheld in a subsequent case, Pitts v 
Hunt. The facts of this case were similar to those in Ashton v Turner: both the 
defendant and the claimant were drunk before driving and the claimant had even 
encouraged the drunken defendant to drive in the reckless way which caused 
the accident, so the plaintiff’s claim for compensation was dismissed on that 
ground. Firstly, “the plaintiff's action arose directly ex turpi causa and not from his 
having suffered a genuine wrong to which unlawful conduct was incidental”112; 
and secondly, “there being a distinction between joint illegal enterprises where 
on the facts the court could determine the appropriate standard of care and 
those where it could not”113. And clearly this case the defendant did not owe the 
claimant that duty of care. 
However, one possible exception may occur if the conduct of the claimant is so 
trivial that the court might not take it into account; the seriousness of the illegal 
conduct, will be considered later. In the case Lane v Holloway, it was decided 
that the insult to the defendant’s wife by the claimant was not a matter which the 
court may take into account “when awarding him compensatory damages for 
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physical injuries which he has sustained as the result of the wrong which has 
been unlawfully inflicted on him114”. And such conduct did not amount to 
contributory negligence. (The abandoning of the duty of care test will be 
considered in the ‘duty of care’ section later.) 
(ii) The second claim concerns a tort claim arising purely because of the illegal 
conduct of the claimant.  
The reason for loss in this circumstance is purely because of the illegality of an 
act of the claimant and the claimant’s claim for compensation can be dismissed 
because of that. 
One typical case which relates to this issue is Cross v Kirkby115. In that case, the 
claimant tried to attack the defendant hunter with a broken baseball bat but was 
seriously injured by the defendant during the struggle afterwards. By overruling 
the former court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal finally decided that the 
self-defence of the defendant stood and the claimant was therefore precluded 
from recovering his own losses because of his own illegal and criminal act. 
However, this principle is bard in various situations. Not every illegal act which 
originates from the claimant may bar him from compensation. The first exception 
is that, there must be sufficient illegal conduct by the claimant; the mere 
knowledge of the intention to commit an illegal act is not enough. In the case 
Revill v Newbery116, which was also discussed in the Cross case, the defendant 
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discharged a loaded shot-gun in the direction of the claimant who he thought 
was attempting to break in. The claimant was injured and his claim for 
compensation was allowed based on the fact that the claimant did not display 
any intention of resorting to violence with the defendant. 
Secondly, the claimant’s illegal conduct must be serious enough. If the illegality 
of the act of the claimant is so trivial, as in the case of Lane v Holloway117, even 
though the tort claim against the defendant is because of the claimant’s civil 
wrong, the defendant’s illegality defence may also fail as well. 
3.1.2.2 The illegality of the act committed by the claimant because of the 
defendant’s former “tort”. 
The plaintiffs under this circumstance always allege that their illegal conducts 
because of the defendant’s former tort conduct and seek to claim compensation 
from the defendant based on this. They allege that but for the defendant’s “tort” 
they would not have committed the crime. The most significant cases are Meah v 
McCreamer118 and Meah v McCreamer and others (No.2). 
The two cases are based on the same fact. The plaintiff suffered a head injury 
and a personality disorder because of the defendant’s negligent driving which 
was the reason for his sexually assault and rape conviction four years later. In 
the first judgment, the plaintiff was entitled to damages for injuries causing a 
personality change which resulted in his imprisonment. However, in the second 
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judgment, the plaintiff’s seeking to recover damages from the defendant which 
he had paid to his victims as compensation was dismissed by the court, on the 
grounds that, first, the victims of the plaintiff could not have claimed against the 
defendant because of remoteness and because there was no duty of care which 
the defendant owed them and, secondly, on the ground that it would be contrary 
to public policy for the claimant’s damage to be allowed. 
The second judgment is easy to comprehend and is uncontroverted. However, 
the first judgment was the subject of a great deal of criticism. According to the 
law commission report 160, “it is widely thought that, had the illegality point been 
argued, the claim would have been disallowed”119. However, as had been 
decided in former cases, the court should have taken the illegality issue into 
consideration, whether the defendant had raised such a defence or not. Thus, 
cases of such character should not be allowed from the very beginning.  
A similar case which relates to this issue is Clunis v Camden and Islington HA120. 
In this case, the plaintiff who suffered a mental disease stabbed a stranger to 
death after he left a hospital and was receiving post-care treatment in the 
community. After he had been found guilty of manslaughter and detained in a 
secure hospital, he brought an action against the local hospital for negligence 
under tort. One of the grounds for dismissing the claimant’s appeal was that the 
claim was based on the plaintiff’s own illegal act. However, this decision was not 
that simple as it appears. The policy underlying this kind of case, namely the 
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reliance principle, is that the claimant cannot rely on his own illegality; this will be 
discussed later. 
Thus, based on the former three cases, the defendant is not responsible either 
for the loss because of detention or indemnity to the third party because of the 
illegality of the act committed by the claimant. Therefore, when dealing with 
circumstances where the claimant has committed an illegal act because of the 
defendant’s former tort action, there is no need to consider the seriousness of 
the defendant’s tort or the causation link between the illegality and the losses; as 
long as the claimant needs to rely on his illegality to plead for compensation, 
such an application will be denied, although, such a decision is subjected to 
several exceptions which will be introduced later. 
3.1.3 The principle based on which the claimant’s claim is barred because of 
illegality  
3.1.3.1 Tendencies in the development of public policy and the abolishment of 
the public conscience test 
It seems that the court of England has adopted increasingly strict principles 
which underlie the illegality defence.  
With regard to the first of these principles, the maxim of ex turpi causa, this only 
regulates that no cause of action may be founded upon an immoral or illegal act. 
However, the test is too loose when deciding tort cases. In the early judgments, 
the principles adopted by the court were always too general and the phrase 
82 
 
public policy was commonly used. 
In the case Gray and Another v Barr121, the defendant who killed the plaintiff’s 
husband by accident sought an indemnity from his insurer under his insurance 
policy because of the tort claim brought against him by the plaintiff. It was 
decided by the court that the defendant’s claim should not be allowed under the 
insurance policy, because allowing this claim would be contrary to public policy. 
However, the boundary of the concept of public policy was not clear under tort 
law. Because of the unsteady and unpredictable nature of illegal conduct, the 
court used to rely on the flexibility of the application of public policy, and the 
well-known public conscience test was introduced when dealing with illegality 
cases. According to Hutchison J in the case Thackwell v Barclays Bank Ltd122, 
the conscience test  “involved the court looking at the quality of the illegality 
relied on by the defendant and all the surrounding circumstances, without fine 
distinctions, and seeking to answer two questions: first, whether there had been 
illegality of which the court should take notice and, second, whether in all the 
circumstances it would be an affront to the public conscience if by affording him 
the relief sought, the court was seen to be indirectly assisting or encouraging the 
plaintiff in his criminal act.123” 
The essence of this judgment was to give the court discretion when dealing with 
illegality cases. It is not only that the courts have to decide whether there is an 
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illegality which the courts should not lend its aid to, but also to decide whether 
such a refusal is fair to the claimant.. This test was supported by several later 
cases and it was considered by Lord Nicholls in the case Saunders v Edwards 
that “the test is a useful and valuable one”. The use of this test required the court 
to “weigh, or balance, the adverse consequences of granting relief against the 
adverse consequences of refusing relief. The ultimate decision calls for a value 
judgment”124.  
However, this adoption seems to leave a great deal to the discretion of the court. 
As has been analyzed in the case Tinsley v Milligan the essence of this test “was 
no more than the assumption of a judicial discretion as to whether or not in any 
particular case, despite the illegality or immorality, to grant or refuse relief”125. 
This test was finally rejected in the judgment of the case Tinsley v Milligan. It was 
held in the case that, “[a]although the public conscience may be the underlying 
reason for the principle that is not to say that 'affront to the public conscience' is 
either a desirable or indeed a workable test. A clear and strict rule maximizes the 
deterrent effect, whilst flexibility gives hope. The 'public conscience' test is 
inherently uncertain in its application. The very uncertainty of this test will serve 
only to encourage more protracted and uncertain litigation in future cases. 
Moreover, it is particularly important for property law to be clear and not 
dependent upon unpredictable judicial decision making”126. The court decided 
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that “he (the “guilty” claimant) is entitled to recover the losses if he is not forced 
to plead or rely on the illegality, even if it emerges that the title on which he relied 
was acquired in the course of carrying through an illegal transaction” 127 . 
Therefore the mere existence of illegality does not necessarily bar the claimant’s 
claim for compensation. 
Later, in the judgment of Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens and another, by 
supporting the House of Lords’ decision, Rimer LJ further decided that the 
statement of the principle is not confined to property disputes “[b]ut it is one I 
regard as applying generally and which Langley J conveniently described as a 
“reliance” test”128. Thus, for tort and contract claims, the public conscience test is 
no longer used. 
However, even though the public conscience test has been rejected, more 
specific formulations have found favor. These include the duty of care principle, 
the reliance principle, the causation principle, the protection of the integrity of 
court (the non-condonation and consistency), the seriousness of illegality 
principle, the proportionality principle and the intention of statute principle, and 
will be introduced later. 
3.1.3.2 Should the ‘no duty of care’ principle be applied? 
The duty of care principle was introduced when dealing with the joint enterprise 
circumstances before. However, whether the duty of care should be recognized 
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as a principle which underlies the illegality defence is an unresolved question. 
Nevertheless, no matter whether this principle will be used any longer, it used to 
be one of the principles adopted by the English courts.  
The duty of care principle is a principle in tort law. In tort law circumstances, one 
party owes a duty of care to the other party; therefore, if the claimant’s loss has 
been caused by the negligence of the defendant, then the claimant can sue the 
defendant for damages on this ground. In the circumstances where there is 
illegality, this means that, because of the illegal conduct of the claimant, the 
defendant owes no duty of care to the claimant and the claimant cannot sue for 
damages on this ground. The no duty of care principle was first created in an 
Australian case. In the case Godbolt v. Fittock, the judge held that, "In my 
opinion, when co-adventurers in a joint criminal venture of a nature comparable 
with that in question in the present appeal use a motor vehicle in the pursuit of 
their common purpose, damages are not recoverable by one, being a passenger, 
against another, being the driver, in respect of injuries suffered as a result of 
want of due care in driving on a journey which is directly connected with the 
execution of the criminal purpose”129. In another case, Smith v. Jenkins, the 
judge decided that the dismissal of the action of the plaintiff was based on “a 
refusal of the law to erect a duty of care as between persons jointly participating 
in the performance of an act contrary to the provisions of a statute making their 
act a crime punishable by imprisonment”130. 
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This principle was further discussed in the Australian case Jackson v Harrison: 
“A more secure foundation for denying relief, though more limited in its 
application – and for that reason fairer in its operation – is to say that the 
[claimant] must fail when the character of the enterprise in which the parties are 
engaged is such that it is impossible for the court to determine the standard of 
care which is appropriate to be observed”131. Moreover, there are also resources 
in English law, like the judgment in the early case, National Coal Board v. 
England, which was discussed above. 
There are two main English cases which have adopted this rationale - the 
Ashton v Turner and the Pitts v Hunt cases132, which have already been 
discussed. In the Ashton case, the no duty of care is the only principle applied; 
however, in the Pitts case, although the court unanimously agreed that the 
illegality defence was triggered, the judges’ decision had a different basis. In 
Lord Balcombe’s view, the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of care. However, 
Lord Beldam reached the same decision on the basis that the claimant and the 
defendant’s conduct had violated the statute’s intention to promote road safety 
and he criticized the no duty of care test as follow: “As this ground is also based 
on public policy, it is not I think in the circumstances of this case significant. That 
both the plaintiff and rider owed a duty to other road users to exercise 
reasonable care is clear. I am not convinced of the wisdom of a policy which 
                                                             
131 Jackson v Harrison (1977-1978) 138 CLR 438, 455 
132 For a more detail analysis on this issue, please see Charles Debattista Ex Turpi 
Causa Returns to the English Law of Torts: Taking Advantage of a Wrong Way Out 13 
Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 15 1984, although some arguments are out of date from today’s view. 
87 
 
might encourage a belief that the duty to behave responsibly in driving motor 
vehicles is diminished even to the limited extent that they may in some 
circumstances not owe a duty to each other, particularly when those 
circumstances involve conduct which is highly dangerous to others”133. 
Although the no duty approach, according to the law commission report 160, “… 
has found considerable support in Australia, it has found little further judicial 
support in England and Wales, and has been subject to academic criticism”134. 
The criticisms include: (I) the burden of proof may shift from the defendant to 
prove the defence established to the claimant to prove why the claim should not 
fail. If such a principle was applied, it would change the character of the illegality 
defence; (II) This approach would raise unnecessary complexity in a law which is 
already uncertain enough; (III) This approach could not be applied to other fields 
of tort and it seems insufficient to explain all the relevant authorities; and (IV) 
There are no obvious criteria by which one can determine precisely when the 
court finds it impossible to set a standard of care135. 
However, it cannot be assumed that this principle has been abandoned by the 
English courts. In the most recent case, Joyce v Obrien, both the claimant and 
the defendant committed a crime together and during the escape from the scene, 
the claimant was injured by the defendant when he secured the stolen ladder, 
because of the careless driving of the defendant. The claimant sought to recover 
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damages for injuries sustained in the course of criminal behavior. Although, his 
claim was rejected on the ground of the wider rule cited in the case Gray v 
Thames, the judge still recognized the ground that “The law will not recognize 
the existence of a duty of care owed by one participant in a crime to another 
participant in the same crime in relation to an act done in connection with the 
commission of that crime”136. 
However, it is clear from this case that there is a limited use of this principle since 
this principle can be seen as merely one specific application of the wider rule in 
Gray v Thames137, and according to this case, the courts should focus on the 
causation rule rather than the duty of care one. 
3.1.3.3 The reliance principle 
The reliance principle is an old and commonly used principle in tort as well as in 
contract law. However, there is always a dispute as to whether this principle has 
the same effect in tort cases as in contract and property cases138. 
The most general and early judgment related to this principle is the sentence 
“the court will not lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
immoral or an illegal act” in the case of Holman v Johnson. Therefore, if a 
claimant tries to recover losses against the defendant which relies on his own 
criminal or immoral act then the illegality defence for the defendant will be 
triggered and the claimant’s action will fail. Following the Holman case, the 
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reliance principle was further recognized in Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments 
Ltd. In this case, the plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the defendant for the 
damages to the conversion of the property which belonged to the plaintiffs. The 
defendant raised the illegality of the contract as a defence. The principle laid 
down by the Court of Appeal is that “No claim founded on an illegal contract will 
be enforced by the court, but as a general rule a man's right to possession of his 
own chattels will be enforced ……provided that the plaintiff does not seek, and is 
not forced, either to found his claim on the illegal contract, or to plead its illegality 
in order to support his claim”139. Therefore, even if there was illegality involved in 
this case, as long as the claimant did not rely on it to find the claim, the illegality 
defence would not work. However, one exception stated by the judge is that it 
cannot be prohibited to deal with the goods in question: “An exception to this 
general rule arises in cases in which the goods claimed are of such a kind that it 
is unlawful to deal in them at all”140. 
This principle was upheld by the House of Lords in the case Tinsley v Milligan, 
which was introduced above. According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson: “In my 
judgment the time has come to decide clearly that the rule is the same whether a 
plaintiff founds himself on a legal or equitable title: he is entitled to recover if he 
is not forced to plead or rely on the illegality, even if it emerges that the title on 
which he relied was acquired in the course of carrying through an illegal 
                                                             
139 Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] K.B. 65 
140 Ibid at 70 
90 
 
transaction.141” 
As concluded by the law commission report, “it seems that a claim in tort will fail 
if, in order to make out such case, the claimant must rely on an illegal act. It 
might seem that, conversely, the claim will not fail if the claimant does not have 
to rely on the illegal act”142. 
The second circumstance of the reliance principle was proved in the case Webb 
v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police. In this case, the police argued that the 
return to the claimant of the money which had been seized - which was 
suspected of having been used in a drug transaction - may constitute the 
completion by him of a claim. The judge in this case admitted that the court 
“should not make an order which facilitates a criminal to complete his crime”143. 
However, as long as the claimant was not reliant upon the money to complete a 
crime, the court would not deny such a claim. 
However, it should be remembered that the reliance principle is not a conclusive 
test; the judgment of Tinsley does not mean that if the claimant does not rely on 
his illegality to plead his claim, the illegality defence will not be triggered, since 
there are also other rationales which underlie the principle. 
3.1.3.4 The causation principle 
Compared with the reliance principle, the causation principle can be seen as a 
more general and widely used principle. This principle requires a causation link 
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between the illegal conduct and the loss which the claimant intends to recover. 
The principle can be viewed as a special type of the reliance principle; it is not 
only important for the claimant to rely on the illegal conduct principle, but it is 
also important that the claimant’s loss should be caused by such illegality. This 
difference was indicated by Lord Asquith in the case National Coal Board v 
England: “But if A and B are proceeding to the premises which they intend 
burglarious to enter, and before they enter them, B picks A's pocket and steals 
his watch, I cannot prevail on myself to believe that A could not sue in tort 
(provided he had first prosecuted B for larceny). The theft is totally unconnected 
with the burglary144”. Therefore, even if under such circumstances the guilty 
claimant’s need to sue for his loss relies on the burglary fact, since the illegal fact 
has no connection with the loss he suffered, the illegality defence is not 
sustained. 
The basis of this principle is that, for the illegality defence to work, the claimant’s 
conduct must in some category connect to the illegality; thus, if the claimant’s 
loss links with his illegal or criminal act, the illegality defence maybe triggered. In 
other words, the illegality which the defendant uses as a defence must be 
committed by the claimant or be connected to the claimant’s act. 
The first category of the causation principle emerges in cases which relate to 
assault or criminal cases. In the case Murphy v Culhane, the plaintiff’s husband 
was killed by the defendant during a criminal affray which was initiated by the 
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deceased against the defendant. The plaintiff claimed damages against the 
defendant. The defendant’s appeal, based on the maxim of ex turpi causa, was 
allowed because, firstly, “(1) … by taking part in a criminal affray the deceased 
might have deprived himself of a cause of action arising from its 
consequences”145 ; and secondly, “That even if the plaintiff was entitled to 
damages they might fall to be reduced because the deceased's death might 
have been partly the result of his own "fault".146” As Lord Denning concluded, “If 
Murphy was one of a gang which set out to beat up Culhane, it may well be that 
he could not sue for damages if he got more than he bargained for. A man who 
takes part in a criminal affray may well be said to have been guilty of such a 
wicked act as to deprive himself of a cause of action, or, alternatively, to have 
had taken upon himself the risk”147. 
Another case which shares a similar fact is Cross v. Kirkby, the facts of which 
were analyzed above. In this case, Judge LJ formulated the test of “inextricably 
linked” which was afterwards adopted by Sir Murray Stuart-Smith in Vellino v 
Chief Constable of the Greater Manchester Police. In the judgment of the Lord 
Justice, he concluded that “In my judgment, where the claimant is behaving 
unlawfully, or criminally, on the occasion when his cause of action in tort arises, 
his claim is not liable to be defeated ex turpi causa unless it is also established 
that the facts which give rise to it are inextricably linked with his criminal 
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conduct”148. It was also in this case that Beldam LJ said, “I do not believe that 
there is any general principle that the claimant must plead, give evidence of or 
rely on his own illegality for the principle to apply. Such a technical approach is 
entirely absent from Lord Mansfield's exposition of the principle. I would, 
however, accept that for the principle to operate the claim made by the claimant 
must arise out of criminal or illegal conduct on his part.……In my view the 
principle applies when the claimant's claim is so closely connected or 
inextricably bound up with his own criminal or illegal conduct that the court could 
not permit him to recover without appearing to condone that conduct”149. 
One of the more recent cases which applied this principle is Gray v Thames 
Trains Ltd and another. In this case, the claimant suffered a disorder because of 
the train accident which was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The 
claimant killed a man because of this disorder and was detained in a hospital. 
The claimant then claimed for loss of earnings since the date of the accident. 
The House of Lords dismissed the claimant’s appeal on the ground of 
consistency as well as on the ground that the loss of the claimant was the 
consequence of the claimant’s own unlawful act. Moreover, in this case, it was 
decided by Lord Hoffmann that there are wider principles and narrow principles 
in the illegality cases: “In its wider form, it is that you cannot recover 
compensation for loss which you have suffered in consequence of your own 
criminal act. In its narrower and more specific form, it is that you cannot recover 
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for damage which flows from loss of liberty, a fine or other punishment lawfully 
imposed upon you in consequence of your own unlawful act”150. It is clear that 
the causation principle was applied in both the wider and narrow rule, since, as 
observed by Lord Hoffmann “the wider rule may raise problems of causation, 
which cannot arise in connection with the narrower rule. The sentence of the 
court is plainly a consequence of the criminality for which the Claimant was 
responsible. But other forms of damage may give rise to questions about 
whether they can properly be said to have been caused by his criminal 
conduct”151. 
The causation principle has also been applied in joint adventure cases; it seems 
that when dealing with such cases, the crucial question to ask is whether the 
cause of the claimant’s loss is illegal. Therefore, in the case Delaney v Pickett, 
when packs of drugs were found on the claimant and the defendant in a motor 
car accident caused by the negligent driving of the defendant, when dealing with 
whether the defendant’s illegality defence was sustained against the claimant’s 
plea for loss caused by injury, the Judges decided that “Viewed as a matter of 
causation, the damage suffered by the claimant was not caused by his or their 
criminal activity. It was caused by the tortious act of the defendant in the 
negligent way in which he drove his motor car. In those circumstances the illegal 
acts are incidental and the claimant is entitled to recover his loss152”. 
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This decision was followed in the case Joyce v Obrien. In this case, the judge 
dealt with a circumstance where both of the parties had knowledge of the 
illegality and the increase in the risk of injury because of this illegality. The judge 
decided that “where the character of the joint criminal enterprise is such that it is 
foreseeable that a party or parties may be subject to unusual or increased risks 
of harm as a consequence of the activities of the parties in pursuance of their 
criminal objectives, and the risk materializes, the injury can properly be said to 
be caused by the criminal act of the claimant even if it results from the negligent 
or intentional act of another party to the illegal enterprise”153. Therefore, it can be 
seen that the causation principle has been more commonly used, and the use of 
this principle is combined with other factors such as the intention and knowledge 
of the parties.  
3.1.3.5 The consistency principle 
The consistency principle is also known as a part of the integrity of the legal 
system test. This principle is not recognized as one of the main principles in 
English tort law either by the Law Commission Paper 160 or 189. This rationale 
is mainly adopted by Canadian court and requires the law to aspire to be a 
unified institution. As delivered in the judgment of Hall v Hebert by the Canadian 
Supreme Court: “the parts of which contract tort the criminal law must be in 
essential harmony. For the court to punish conduct with the one hand while 
rewarding it with the other would be to create an intolerable fissure in the law’s 
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conceptually seamless web”154. 
However, this consistency test was unanimously recognized as a good law by 
the House of Lords in the case Gray v Thames Trains. In the judgment of this 
case, it was concluded that “allowing the appeal, that, by reason of the need to 
avoid inconsistency in the justice system, as a manifestation of the public policy 
expressed by the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio a civil court would not 
award damages to compensate a claimant for an injury or disadvantage which 
the criminal courts had imposed on him by way of punishment for a criminal act 
for which he was responsible”155.  
This rationale was explained by Lord Hoffmann in the narrower rule of the public 
policy which relates to the illegality defence in tort: “In its narrower and more 
specific form, it is that you cannot recover for damage which flows from loss of 
liberty, a fine or other punishment lawfully imposed upon you in consequence of 
your own unlawful act. In such a case it is the law which, as a matter of penal 
policy, causes the damage and it would be inconsistent for the law to require you 
to be compensated for that damage”156. The Mummery LJ’s judgment in Clunis's 
case was also referred to by Lord Hoffmann, who concluded that: “The 
reasoning of Mummery LJ reflects the narrower version of the rule. The 
inconsistency is between the criminal law, which authorizes the damage suffered 
by the plaintiff in the form of loss of liberty because of his own personal 
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responsibility for the crimes he committed, and the claim that the civil law should 
require someone else to compensate him for that loss of liberty”157. 
Thus, according to Lord Hoffmann, even though the consistency principle was 
not recognized by the law commission paper, this test was already being used in 
English courts when deciding illegality cases. In fact, this is the case in various 
English cases: the claimant who has committed a kind of illegal act recognized 
by the court is highly unlikely to recover damages from the defendant. This is the 
case in Clunis’s case and this is also the case in Cross v. Kirkby158. Moreover, if 
the claimant has been penalized because of his illegal conduct, he is unlikely to 
recover damages in insurance law as well. 
Another part of the integrity of the legal system test, referred to in the law 
commission report, is the condonation test, which basically states that the court 
could not permit the illegal claimant to recover without appearing to condone or 
indirectly assist and encourage the claimant’s illegal conduct. 
However, this test has raised the question of when it would apply and what the 
effect on the claimant’s other cause of action if this principle is applied would be, 
especially with regard to the claimant’s insurance right against his insurer. 
However, this principle is unlikely to be considered by the courts as the primary 
principle when dealing with illegality cases, since this principle is mainly to be 
applied when dealing with whether compensation or insurance should be paid to 
the guilty party, rather than to decide whether the party is guilty or not. 
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3.1.3.6 The seriousness of illegal conduct 
It has long been decided in English law that, for the illegality defence to be 
sustained, there is a requirement that the claimant’s illegality should be 
sufficiently turpitudinous and reprehensive. In the case Vellino v Chief Constable 
of Greater Manchester, it was decided that a case of criminal conduct has to be 
sufficiently serious to merit the application of the illegality defence159; and in the 
case Hewison v Meridian shipping, it was also decided that for the defence to be 
applied, the claimant’s conduct must be clearly reprehensible160.  
In the case Lilly v 8PM both Lord Phillips and Rodger suggest that the 
seriousness of the illegality, or at least the culpability of the claimant, is a 
relevant factor in determining when the rule should apply161. Furthermore, in the 
case Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens, Lord Phillips concluded that one of 
the three requirements to trigger the illegality defence is that “The illegality must 
involve turpitude. The defence may not apply where the claimant's illegality 
consists of an offence of strict liability of which he is unaware”162. 
Knowledge is another factor which may influence the seriousness of illegality. In 
the case Burrows v Rhodes, it was decided that “if an act is manifestly unlawful, 
or the doer of it knows it to be unlawful, as constituting either a civil wrong or a 
criminal offence, he cannot maintain an action for contribution or for indemnity 
against the liability which results to him therefrom”; it was further decided that “… 
                                                             
159 Vellino v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2002] 1 W.L.R. 218 
160 Hewison v Meridian shipping [2003] I.C.R. 766 
161 Lilly v 8PM [2009] EWHC 1905 
162 Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore Stephens [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 
99 
 
it can never, in my judgment, be successfully contended that a claim for 
indemnity can be maintained where the doer of the act knew at the time, or must 
be presumed to know, of circumstances which make the act either a private 
wrong or a public crime”163.  
This rationale was adopted by the Safeway Stores case. In the first judgment of 
the case Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger and others, it was decided that “that the 
ex turpi causa principle was not restricted to cases where the claimant relied on 
his own criminal conduct in bringing the claim but applied to non-criminal 
conduct where there was a sufficient element of moral turpitude or 
reprehensibility”164. 
However, the application of seriousness principle is vague on several points. 
Firstly, it is difficult to decide which kind of conduct is serious enough to trigger 
the defence, as was pointed out in the case Hewison v Meridian shipping: 
“where to draw the line between what is serious and what is trivial is not always 
easy”165. Secondly, since the discretion of the courts on the illegality issue was 
denied in Tinsley, will the court be entitled to consider the seriousness of 
illegality according to the facts of each individual case? Thirdly, even if the 
claimant’s illegal conduct is trivial, if the claimant commits such illegality 
intentionally, then will such conduct triggers the ex turpi causa defence? 
The most recent authority which considered all these three questions is Les 
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Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc. In this case the claimant argued that it was 
contrary to public policy for the defendant to recover damages for being 
prevented from selling a product whose manufacture in Canada would have 
been illegal there as an infringement of claimant’s Canadian patent. In its first 
instance, judgment of which was delivered by Arnold J, it was decided that, the 
illegality defence which was raised by the claimant sustained, as according to 
Arnold J “……what degree of seriousness is sufficient will depend on the 
circumstances of the case. In my view the key factor in most cases is likely to be 
the claimant's state of knowledge at the time of committing the act in question. If 
the claimant knew the material facts, and particularly if he committed the act in 
question intentionally, then the rule is likely to apply”166. 
This case was later appealed. And in the judgment of Court of Appeal which was 
delivered by Etherton LJ, he decided that, the illegality defence in this case 
should not sustain, firstly because the defendant “honestly and reasonably 
believed the Canadian patent to be invalid167” and secondly because Etherton LJ 
had not been satisfied that the infringement of the Canadian patent was a 
relevant illegality. Therefore, the defendant’s appeal was approved. It is clear 
that, in this judgment, not only the knowledge of the illegality was considered, 
whether the illegality is severe enough to trigger the illegality defence was 
considered as well. And the criteria to decide whether an act is turpitude or not 
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will all depends on the precise circumstances168.   
However, Servier appealed again, in its latest judgment which has been 
delivered by Supreme Court, Lord Sumption reviewed the development of the 
common law rules on illegality defence, again, he criticized the public 
conscience rule and proportionate rule, and decided that, these two rules should 
be abolished since the uncertainty these two rules may result in. He upheld the 
wider and narrow rule, since these two rules did not contradict with the judgment 
of Tinsley. He concluded that, the most essential question which need to be 
answered before the application of ex turpi causa defence is what kinds of acts 
contribute to turpitude, namely, what kinds of acts can be seen as not only 
criminal but also immoral and illegal. By reviewing former authorities, the 
resolution which has been proposed by Lord Sumption is that: for an act to be 
immoral or illegal, it must be “contrary to the public law of the state and engage 
the public interest”169. And the act should be criminal or quasi-criminal engage 
the public interest in the same way, because public interest is the foundation of 
illegality defence. Lord Sumption clearly stated that, Torts, breaches of contract, 
statutory and other civil wrongs should not trigger the illegality defence and 
deprive the “guilty parties’” ordinary remedies, since all these acts offend against 
interests which are essentially private, not public170. Furthermore, an exception 
has been added by Lord Sumption: in the circumstances where the claimant is 
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not privy to the facts making his act unlawful, his act cannot be seen as turpitude. 
For example, if the claimant has no knowledge of the facts which are making his 
conduct unlawful171. 
Lord Toulson, on the other hand delivered a wider rule, that is, all tort of strict 
liability are not severe enough to trigger the illegality defence. According to Lord 
Toulson “There are very few reported cases in which the doctrine of illegality has 
been applied to tort”172. The only contrary case he cited in his judgment is Brown 
Jenkinson & Co Ltd v Percy Dalton (London) Ltd and the reason why judges in 
this case decided the plaintiff’s tort triggered the illegality defence is because the 
plaintiff was fraudulently minded, otherwise, the plaintiff would not be failed as 
according to former authorities. In Lord Toulson’s view, ex turpi causa is not a 
fixed rule or policy, on the other hand it is a defence which is based on public 
policies173, and policies which need to be considered varies from case to case. 
He quoted three recent authorities to support his view, Gray v Thames Trains 
Ltd174, Stone & Rolls Ltd v Moore175 Stephens and Hounga v Allen176. All these 
three authorities support one argument that ex turpi causa is not based upon a 
single justification but on a group of reasons, which vary in different situations, 
namely the public conscience or/and proportionate test (this will be introduced 
later). And indeed, at the end of his Lord’s judgment, Lord Toulson suggested 
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that the rule which has been cited by Tinsley v Milligan should be detailed 
re-analyzed. 
It is clear from former analysis of the case that, although the two judges came to 
the same conclusion, the rationales which underlie their judgment are different. 
From Lord Sumption's view, the principle which launched by Tinsley is still a 
good law, although he quoted the same phrase from Gray case as Lord Toulson 
did, they explain Lord Hoffman’s phrase from different prospects. In Lord 
Sumption’s view, Lord Hoffman dealt with the dilemma by defining as a matter of 
law when the illegality defence applied and when it did not, and the narrow and 
wider rule which cited in Gray “did not seek to deal with the dilemma by leaving 
the court to make a value judgment about the seriousness of the illegality and 
the impact on the parties of allowing the defence”177. And this is the reason why 
he held the disposition of this case by Etherton LJ is incorrect. In fact, by Lord 
Sumption’s judgment, there is no existence of seriousness test, there are only 
two kinds of immoral conducts, and in any case which may involve such 
conducts, the defence would be triggered. 
However, in Lord Toulson’s opinion, the policies which underlie the ex turpi 
causa principle can be and should be expanded and modified as according to 
facts of each individual case. That means there is no fix rule on which kind of act 
is turpitude, it will based on the analysis of the fact of each individual case. And 
he held Etherton LJ’s approach is a good law. However, which kinds of factor 
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shall be taken into consideration when deciding whether an act is serious 
enough or not have not been considered by Lord Toulson. 
Although, both judgments are valuable to current law and each of them has its 
own merit, Lord Sumption’s test is more practical. The aim to consider 
seriousness factor is to decide which kind of conduct is severe enough to trigger 
the defence, Lord Sumption clearly defines the boundary of this issue. It brings 
certainty to this aspect and resolves the dilemmas of former authorities, as can 
be seen from the beginning of this section. Although there still will be discussion 
on the judgment of Tinsley, one thing is for sure, that is, tort which is committed 
with no contravention of public interest and unintentionally will not trigger the 
defence.  
3.1.3.7 The proportionality principle 
This principle was first raised in the case Saunders v. Edwards. It was concluded 
by Bingham LJ that, when the illegality issue is raised, the court should avoid two 
unacceptable situations: “On the one hand it is unacceptable that any court of 
law should aid or lend its authority to a party seeking to pursue or enforce an 
object or agreement which the law prohibits. On the other hand, it is 
unacceptable that the court should, on the first indication of unlawfulness 
affecting any aspect of a transaction, draw up its skirts and refuse all assistance 
to the plaintiff, no matter how serious his loss nor how disproportionate his loss 
to the unlawfulness of his conduct.178” 
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There are basically two kinds of the principle of proportionality. Firstly, the court 
will balance the actions of the defendant and secondly, the court may need to 
refer to the illegality conduct of the claimant and the amount of loss the claimant 
will suffer if the claimant’s claim is disallowed. 
As to the first kind of proportionality principle, if the conduct of the defendant is 
far more culpable than the claimant’s then it is unlikely that the illegality defence 
will be applied. The most typical case with regard to this issue is the Revill v 
Newbery one, introduced previously. It is clear that the defendant’s conduct of 
discharging the gun is far more culpable than the claimant’s intention of breaking 
in. Thus, the claimant’s claim for compensation of injury was allowed. 
The second kind of proportionality principle was raised by Ward LJ in the case 
Hewison v Meridian Shipping Ltd179. In this case, the claimant seaman suffered 
from epilepsy, which should have prohibited him from working as a seafarer. 
However, by concealing his disease, he worked for the defendant employer for 
several years until 1997, when he suffered an epileptic seizure while at work 
which resulted in his being dismissed by the defendants. The claimant claimed 
damages on two grounds: first, on the ground of the negligence and breach of 
statutory obligation of the defendant and secondly, on the ground of earnings 
which he would receive until his retirement age but for the accident. 
Both in the first judgment and the second judgment, the first claim of the claimant 
was allowed and the second was rejected. The reason for this kind of decision, 
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as concluded by Clarke LJ, is that “… an English court should not deprive a 
claimant of part of the damages to which he would otherwise be entitled because 
of the defendant's negligence or breach of duty by reason only of some collateral 
illegality or unlawful act”180. However, “It is common ground that there are cases 
in which public policy will prevent a claimant from recovering the whole of the 
damages which, but for the rule of public policy, he would otherwise have 
recovered”181. Therefore, it is clear that the court weighed the seriousness of the 
illegality of the claimant and the loss which he suffered, and although he could 
not rely upon his illegality to claim more damages, his damage because of the 
negligence of the employer was allowed despite his unlawful conduct. In Ward 
LJ’s decision, he noted that this kind of proportionality is not quite the same as 
the first one. 
However, the limitation of this principle, especially the first type of the principle, 
was also noted by the court. As pointed out by Beldam LJ, it is not permissible in 
every case for the court to weigh up the degree of illegality by the claimant on 
the one hand and the defendant on the other hand to decide which one of them 
should be allowed to recover182; and it was also noted in the Hewison case that 
applying the first type would be “reintroducing through the back door the public 
conscience test which we are not allowed to apply”183. Therefore, as applied in 
this case, the proportionality rule is subject to many other kinds of principles 
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such as the reliance principle and the causation principle. 
However, as the public conscience test has been overruled and the discretion of 
the courts has been reduced, it seems that the proportionate test would very 
rarely be applied if the other principles have been considered first. In the case 
Joyce v Obrien, the judge overruled the claimant’s appeal, which was based on 
the proportionality principle. Since in this case, what the claimant committed was 
a real crime with real moral culpability, and even though the proportionality 
principle still existed, the learned judge concluded that this doctrine will only be 
applied in minor traffic offences184. And furthermore, in the most recent judgment 
of the case Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc, it was considered by Lord 
Sumption that, the proportionate test contradict with the intention of Lord 
Mansfield in the Holman case and application of this test will only cause 
uncertain in this area of law185. 
3.1.3.8 The intention of the statute principle 
The essence of this principle is that, when deciding whether the claimant is 
barred by the illegality defence, the intention of the statute and the parliament 
should be taken into consideration. The court will need to examine the intention 
of an Act when claimants commit some illegality which is recognized by statute. 
Therefore, in the case Cakebread v Hopping Brothers, which dealt with 
contributory negligence during work, and the court, when overruling the 
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employer’s argument that the negligence was solely caused by the workman, 
stated that “The policy of the Factories Act makes it plain that such a defence as 
that put forward here would be inconsistent with the intention of Parliament.186” 
In a later case, National Coal Board v England, when dealing with whether the 
plaintiff’s damages as a result of injury could be compensated, the House of Lord 
held that even though the plaintiff had committed an unlawful act under the 
statute, there was nothing “in the statute which creates the obligation indicating 
the intention that no action shall be brought at common law in respect of its 
breach, the ordinary rules of the common law of tort are applicable, including the 
doctrine respondent superior.187” 
This was also the case in the Revill case, as one of the grounds the court relied 
on when rejecting the defendant’s illegal defence was that “Parliament has 
decided that an occupier cannot treat a burglar as an outlaw and has defined the 
scope of the duty owed to him”188. 
3.2 The application of the tort illegality defence to insurance law 
The essence of this section is that, since the illegality defence ex turpi causa is 
applied in tort law, then: firstly, this defence will also be applied in insurance law; 
secondly, if this defence is applied in a tort case, then this application will affect 
the claimant’s right against his insurer, and the insurer can use the illegality 
defence in tort to deny the insurance claimant; and thirdly, if the illegality rule can 
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be applied, then the extent to which this rule influences the insurance 
compensation and the existence of any exceptions in this circumstance, needs 
to be considered. 
The illegality defence is always used by the insurer against the assured. This 
section will examine two kinds of situations in insurance law when the illegality 
defence in tort law has been applied: firstly, if the claimant under the tort case is 
the insured under an insurance policy and has committed some kind of illegal act, 
then the illegality defence will influence the claimant assured’s right under the 
insurance policy; and secondly, if the defendant under the tort is the assured 
under an insurance contract and involved in some kind of illegality, particularly in 
the circumstances of liability insurance, then the role of illegality in this insurance 
contract needs to be considered as does the question as to whether, if the 
defendant is denied compensation under the insurance contract, this would be 
fair to the claimant and would there be any other method for the claimant to be 
compensated in this circumstance. This sub chapter will examine how the 
illegality defence in tort works in insurance law and whether the restrictions 
which apply in tort also have the same effect in insurance law. Furthermore, the 
law commission’s suggestions regarding this point will be introduced. 
3.2.1 Why the ex turpi causa defence is important in insurance 
The existence of the ex turpi causa principle in tort law does not mean that this 
rule can be applied automatically in insurance law. Therefore, for the ex turpi 
causa defence to be applied in insurance cases, the rationale underlying this 
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application should be analyzed. 
Firstly, the illegality defence is important because of the nature of the insurance. 
As indicated by authorities, in the early development of insurance law, insurance, 
especially liability insurance, was considered to be immoral. For example, life 
insurance can be viewed as an encouragement to suicide and murder and fire 
insurance may encourage people to gamble with their own interests; as 
concluded by Mary Coate McNeely, “throughout its history the insurance device 
has been alternately hailed as a promoter of communal welfare and damned as 
a generator of evil”189. Thus, illegality in insurance law is strictly forbidden in 
order to avoid such situations and to protect the interests of the insurer, 
especially in marine insurance, as has been explained before. It is an ordinary 
principle of insurance law that an assured cannot by his own deliberate act 
cause the event upon which the insurance money is payable190. This decision 
clearly shares the same character as Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Holman. 
Secondly, such defence is important because of the shortage of laws on the 
illegality issue in insurance law. Except in regard to marine insurance law, there 
is no implied warranty of legality in general insurance law, which means that the 
assured’s right cannot be denied as soon as an illegality emerges. Besides the 
Motor Insurance Act and the Insurance Industry Act, there is no general rule 
which relates to insurance illegality, since the illegality issues in insurance law 
arise mainly because of contract claims and tort claims, and thus both the 
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consequence of the illegality under tort and contract should be taken into 
consideration. Thus, it is clear that whether the insurer is liable to the assured 
will largely depend on whether the illegality defence will be sustained under tort 
rules. 
Thirdly, the reason why there is an illegality defence in insurance law is also 
because of the consistency of law. The consistency test in tort law has already 
been discussed; by applying that test it would be very difficult for judges to grant 
the guilty assured’s claim when such conduct is barred in a tort case. As to the 
defendant’s liability insurance, whether the insurer is liable to loss will totally 
depend on the tort conduct committed by the defendant. If the defendant has 
been held as having committed a crime, then insurers will deny their liabilities 
under the insurance contract, even though such a decision would leave the third 
party in a difficult situation. 
Fourthly, if the claimant’s illegal conduct has been judged as immoral or 
reprehensible under tort law, then such illegality will be rendered as not an 
adventure which the insurance intends to cover, and therefore the claimant’s 
compensation will be denied. 
The fifth possible ground for this application is deterrence. As explained in 
Thackwell v Barclays Bank Ltd, the illegality defence is available for deterrence 
purpose “where the court, in finding for the plaintiff, would be indirectly assisting 
or encouraging the plaintiff in his criminal, fraudulent or illegal activity” 191 . 
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However, this rationale was questioned by the Law Commission as whether this 
rationale which is of limited function in tort will also be apply to insurance, since 
the tort and insurance claims are often concerned as isolate and the effect of 
deterrence on the claimant under compensation is of course limited since “a 
person who is not deterred from these activities by the threat of criminal sanction 
will be deterred by the possibility that he or she may not receive compensation 
for any loss suffered in the course of or as a result of committing the offence”192. 
There used to be an argument that, by applying the illegality defence in 
insurance law, this would have a deterrence effect on the assured, since every 
time the assured may plan to commit some kind of illegal act, the assured would 
be afraid of losing the insurance compensation. However, this argument has 
been the target of criticism, since in life injury cases, the criminal activity 
committed by the assured is always an offence in criminal law, and it would not 
be believable that the assured would be afraid of the loss of recovery rights 
under the insurance policy.   
However, if the assured buy an insurance policy with the clear objective of 
benefitting from the insurance, then the deterrence rationale would clearly have 
an effect on him since deterrence will prevent other people from entering into the 
same arrangement or performing the same illegal act. This was the case in 
Beresford; since suicide was a crime at that time, the denial of compensation 
under the insurance policy would clearly act as a deterrent to other policy 
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holders who wanted to benefit from their life insurance policy.  
3.2.2 General principles under insurance law which relate to the illegality 
defence in tort 
3.2.2.1 The narrow and wider rule in insurance law 
When dealing with insurance cases which involve the claimant’s conduct having 
been tainted by illegality in tort, courts mainly reach the same result as the 
illegality cases in tort. As has been discussed before, there are three main rules 
indicated by former cases and it is not appropriate to apply any of these rules 
individually. The duty of care test has clearly come under criticism in English law 
and it is still uncertain whether it has the same effect as in Australian law; the 
public conscience test which was widely used has been overruled by the House 
of Lords; and even though the reliance principle is one of the oldest principles in 
English law, it is clear that its rigid character requires this principle to be applied 
in conjunction with several restrictions. Therefore, it is clear that none of these 
three principles are suitable apply when dealing with insurance cases 
individually. Furthermore, the consequences of illegality when applying these 
rules is quite unclear. 
Thus, compared with former tests, the narrow and wider rules cited in the Gray 
case have clearly take different kinds of restrictions into account and are more 
suitable for general application. Therefore, the assured cannot be compensated 
under an insurance contract with regard to losses caused by his own criminal act 
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under wider rules or the fines and punishment imposed on him under narrow 
rules. However, it seems that the narrow rules will rarely be applied since fines or 
punishment do not constitute a proper adventure for an insurance policy to 
cover. 
Thus, when applying the narrow and wide rule, it is clear that the insurance 
policy which covers the claimant’s loss and the claimant’s fine and punishment is 
unrecoverable under insurance law. For instance, in the case Hardy v Motor 
Insurers' Bureau, the judge held that the guilty driver could not force the 
insurance policy to release compensation because of his intention to commit a 
criminal act, even though this does not mean that the innocent third party is not 
left uncovered. This was also the case in Marcel Beller v Hayden, where the 
assured was killed in a road accident because of his own drinking and driving a 
vehicle at a speed which was dangerous to the public, both of which acts were 
contrary to statute and therefore illegal. By deciding this, the courts finally 
decided that the guilty claimant could not recover losses under the insurance 
policy.  
However, it seems that applying the narrow rule in insurance law is not always 
the same as in tort, because there are more factors to consider because of the 
character of insurance law; therefore, it is not in every case in which the assured 
has committed a crime that the insurance policy is unrecoverable. 
However, there are three exceptions that need to be considered when applying 
the narrow and wider rule: firstly, whether the illegal conduct is committed 
115 
 
intentionally, which is mainly in the case with motor insurance cases; secondly, 
the function of the Forfeiture Act 1982; thirdly, the claimant’s compensation will 
not be barred if the cause of his illegality is the negligence of the insurer or third 
party. 
As to the first exception, it seems both the mind of the claimant when committing 
such illegality and the causation link between the illegality and the loss should be 
considered. With regard to considering the claimant’s mind, this is a matter of 
deciding whether the claimant committed the illegal act deliberately. This is very 
clear in the judgment of Gray v Barr, when both Lord Denning and Salmon LJ 
consented that if the claimant had committed the illegality intentionally he was 
barred from recovering damages under the insurance policy since such illegality 
amounted to an exception in the terms of the insurance policy; this kind of action 
clearly did not amount to accident under insurance law. 
Furthermore, whether the illegal conduct of the claimant is intentional or not also 
relates to whether public policy should have an effect on the illegality issue. This 
is another of the inconsistencies between illegality in insurance law and tort law 
if the narrow rule is applied in insurance cases. The inconsistency lies in motor 
insurance and suggests that in motor insurance cases, although conduct which 
is clearly illegal under tort law will bar the defendant from recovering from the 
insurer, it will not bar an innocent third party from recovering damages under the 
insurance policy. 
In the case Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association, the claimant with the 
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insurance policy committed the serious crime of manslaughter, causing two 
people to die by driving a motor car negligently. When the claimant claimed 
indemnity under the insurance policy, the insurer used the illegality as a defence 
since the insurance is contrary to public policy if the claimant is entitled to be 
indemnified against his criminal act. By overruling the insurer’s argument, the 
learned judge raised two main points, the first of which is that, by construing the 
words and intentions of the insurance policy, the judge held that the intention of 
such insurance is to cover such an accident caused by the negligence of the 
assured and without such cover there is no need for the existence of such an 
insurance policy. Therefore, the claimant’s illegal conduct fell within the scope of 
accident in the policy. The second point is that, although generally speaking it is 
true that “it is against public policy to indemnify a man against the consequences 
of a crime which he knowingly commits”193, if the claimant commits such a crime 
purely because of negligence rather than intentionally, then the difference may 
be drawn between intentional illegality and negligent illegality, and intentional 
illegality clearly should not be covered194. 
Another case dealing with illegality in motor insurance is Marles v. Philip Trant & 
Sons Ltd195. It was decided in this case that “a motorist can rely on his policy of 
insurance to indemnify him in respect of his liability for any injuries which he has 
caused otherwise than on purpose”196. Thus, at least in motor insurance cases 
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when the intention of the claimant is considered, the narrow rule is not 
applicable. 
Another exception exists in the Forfeiture Act 1982, section 2, which deals with 
the discretion of the court when dealing with such cases. Section 2 of this Act 
authorizes the court to make an order under this section modifying the effect of 
the rule of forfeiture when dealing with illegal killing other than murder cases. A 
typical example of this discretion is the case Dunbar v Plant. In this case, both 
the defendant and her fiancé agreed to commit suicide together but the 
defendant failed and her fiancé succeeded; the defendant, who has been found 
guilty of aiding and abetting her fiancé’s suicide, claimed ownership of their 
shared house, their joint bank account and especially two insurance policies - 
“one on the deceased's life for the benefit of the defendant and the other 
charged to the building society which held the mortgage of the house”197. On the 
first judgment, the judge deprived the defendant’s right to ownership of the 
house and the insurance policy for it, but denied her right to the life insurance 
policy. On the second judgment, the learned judge found that the excise of 
discretion of court should be based on the conduct of the offender and the 
material circumstances rather than on reaching justice between the two parties. 
Since the defendant had intended to commit suicide with her fiancé rather than 
kill him and the defendant had no intention of benefitting from the insurance and 
the suicide, and since it was also the deceased’s family’s will not to oppose the 
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defendant’s right to obtain ownership of the house and the money of the 
insurance, the court finally exercised the discretion to grant the defendant full 
relief from the forfeiture and the right to be compensated under the life insurance 
policy. However, an exception of this kind has limited use in insurance cases, 
except for those cases in which the claimant has no intention of causing the 
death of the defendant and has no intention of benefiting from the death. Since 
Lord Denning in Gray v Barr ruled that “In manslaughter of every kind there must 
be a guilty mind. Without it, the accused must be acquitted”198, therefore, cases 
for which such an exception can be applied should be very rare. 
The third kind of exception of wider rule in insurance cases is that if the loss or 
fine upon an assured is simply because of the insurer’s negligence which has 
caused the assured to commit a strict liability criminal offence under the 
circumstance, then the narrow rule will not bar the claimant assured from 
claiming indemnity against the insurer defendant. In the case Osman v. J. Ralph 
Moss Ltd, the plaintiff assured was fined for driving without insurance which the 
defendant broker had failed to obtain for him; the plaintiff sued the defendant for 
compensation of the fine and his claim was allowed since in this case the 
claimant was not in himself guilty of gross negligence, unlike in the Askey case. 
However, this exception is largely because of the principles in tort law, since 
when sustaining the illegality defence, there is a requirement for causation and 
the turpitude of the claimant’s conduct. Therefore, it is clear that, when dealing 
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with insurance cases which relate to illegality under tort law, there is also a 
requirement for causation. 
3.2.2.2 The benefit principle in insurance: whether this is the proper rationale 
when illegality relates to tort. 
The benefit principle is a fundamental principle in insurance law, although the 
word “benefit” is not always correct, as indicated by Malcolm Clarke, since it is 
difficult to measure whether the guilty assured benefits from the illegality or 
not199. Therefore, this principle is sometimes explained thus: “a person (or those 
that stand in the shoes of such a person) may not stand to gain an advantage 
arising from the consequences of his own iniquity”200. This is not one of the 
fundamental principles which constitute the illegality rule in tort law, although 
there is one rationale that states that no man can rely on his own criminal act. 
The claimant’s situation in tort law is always that, rather than seeking to profit 
from his own criminal act, the claimants always claim for compensation from the 
defendant. However, the principle that no man shall profit from his own wrong is 
a long established rule in insurance contract, and this principle has been applied 
in illegality cases which relate to tort.  
In the case Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, the husband was 
poisoned to death by his wife, but the husband had taken out an insurance 
contract to the benefit of his wife. When dealing with whether the executor of the 
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husband was eligible to claim under the insurance policy or not, Lord Esher 
stated:: “That the person who commits murder, or any person claiming under him 
or her, should be allowed to benefit by his or her criminal act, would no doubt be 
contrary to public policy”201. However, the court finally cited that the executor of 
the insurance policy maintained an action on the insurance policy 
notwithstanding the illegality of the wife. This no-benefit principle was also 
recognized in the Beresford case; in this case, as mentioned above, the court 
held that the insurance contract which promised the assured to pay his executor 
and assignee the full amount of money insured, even if the assured killed himself 
in full possession of his senses, was void since, quoting the judgment of Cleaver, 
“It appears to me that no system of jurisprudence can with reason include 
amongst the rights which it enforces rights directly resulting to the person 
asserting them from the crime of that person”202. 
However, there are some exceptions to this principle. Firstly, this no-benefit rule 
only restrains the guilty claimant from seeking compensation from the insurance 
policy and does not extend to the innocent third party involved in this. Therefore, 
in the Cleaver case, the illegality of the wife did not bar the right of the executor 
of the husband to enforce the insurance policy even though this was for her 
benefit, as concluded by FRY, L.J: “In a word, it appears to me that the crime of 
one person may prevent that person from the assertion of what would otherwise 
be a right, and may accelerate or beneficially affect the rights of third persons, 
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but can never prejudice or injuriously affect those rights”203. This exception is 
widely applied in motor insurance cases. In the motor insurance case Gardner v 
Moore for example, the guilty first defendant injured the claimant intentionally by 
driving an uninsured car; however, when the innocent claimant claimed 
compensation against the MIB, the House of Lords contended that the 
wrongdoer’s illegality would not bar the innocent third party from claiming under 
the insurance policy and the no-profit principle should have no effect on innocent 
third parties, even though the defendant had not paid the compensation he 
should have paid, which could be seen as a profit for the defendant. 
Secondly, it is clear that in common law, there needs to be some connection 
between the illegality committed by the assured and the insurance. This used to 
be a controversial topic since the connection is difficult to define; however, since 
the judgment of Tinsley v Milligan, it is now clear that recovery is precluded only 
if the claimant must rely upon his own criminal act. 
3.2.2.3 How the other rationales apply in insurance 
The third issue concerns how other rationales for dealing with illegality in tort law 
are applied in insurance illegality issues; and whether such applications are 
suitable for resolving the illegality issue in insurance law. 
As has been discussed before, the connection principle is clearly adopted by 
English courts when dealing with illegality tort cases, which is to say that if the 
injury or loss suffered is unrelated to the criminal act then the ex turpi causa 
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defence is not applicable. However, whether this rule should be applied in 
insurance cases dealing with illegality is controversial; that is to say, whether the 
insurance is still enforceable if the assured’s illegality has no connection with the 
loss incurred? In other fields of insurance law, it seems that English courts 
incline to establishing some connection between the loss and the assured’s act. 
For example, when dealing with insurance warranties, English courts are 
inclined to contend that for the breach of warranty to be sustained, there should 
be some connection between the breach and the loss which the assured 
suffered. 
However, compared with the connection rule in tort and the law in other fields of 
insurance, English courts seem to adopt another method when dealing with 
insurance policies which involve illegality. In the latest Court of Appeal case 
Delaney v Pickett204, which dealt with a road traffic accident, the claimant who 
was injured by the first defendant’s car because of a collision sought to recover 
from both the uninsured first defendant and the second defendant, the Motor 
Insurer’s Bureau. In its first judgment, the claims against both the first defendant 
and the second defendant were denied since a package containing herbal 
cannabis, which was clearly illegal, was found concealed in the claimant's jacket. 
By appealing to the Court of Appeal, the claimant’s claim against the first 
defendant was allowed since “the injury suffered by the claimant had been 
caused not by his criminal activity but by the tortious act of the first defendant in 
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the negligent way in which he had driven the car”205. However, the claimant’s 
appeal against the MIB was dismissed since the judge found that “the vehicle 
was being used in the … furtherance of a crime, if not also in the course … of a 
crime”, which fell in the exclusion clause of the 6(1) (e) (iii) of the 1999 
Agreement. From the second judgment, it is clear that there is inconsistency 
between the tort law decision and the insurance decision and it seems that the 
wide rule which has been used in tort cases cannot be applied in insurance law, 
since in tort cases, as analyzed above, for the wide rule to be applied not only 
should the illegality be in connection with the loss but it should also be serious 
enough for judicial intervention. However, with regard to the facts in this case, 
neither of the two requirements were fulfilled; therefore, from the tort law’s 
position, the claimant’s illegality should not prevent him from claiming damages 
from the MIB. The main obstacle to the tort rule being applied in this case may 
be that there is an express exception in the agreement and for this exception to 
be applied there is no requirement for a causal link between the damage the 
claimant suffered and the illegality he committed. Therefore, since the first 
defendant was not insured, this particular scenario falls into this exception. 
However, there is a mere reference on this issue, since it is clear that, in this 
case, the injury which the claimant suffered was caused purely by the negligent 
driving of the defendant. Because of the vague language of this clause, as the 
judge found, there is no requirement for the seriousness of the illegality and the 
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causation link between the illegality and loss for this exception to be applied; 
illegal conduct is sufficient. It seems that if the causation principle can be fully 
applied in insurance law, then the Agreement which the court relied upon should 
be ignored, even though it has been argued that if the defendant has been 
insured then the consequence will be different. 
However, there are some obstacles to the causation principle being applied in 
insurance cases. Firstly, even though the illegal conduct may not cause the loss 
directly, it will cause the aggravation of risk and the insurer clearly has an 
interest in risk management and loss prevention. For example, in the Delaney 
case, even though the carrying of herbal cannabis was not the direct cause of 
the loss, it was difficult for the court or the insurer to ascertain the influence of 
the illegality on the negligence of the driving. It is probable that the defendant 
and the claimant were eager to trade the drugs with someone or it is probable 
that the judgment of the defendant had been influenced by earlier consumption 
of the drugs, both of which circumstances clearly create an aggressive of the 
risk. 
Secondly, even though the illegality may not directly cause aggravation of the 
risk, it may enable the insurer to assess what sort of people the insurer is dealing 
with and moral hazards206. However, it is clear that, as a result of the Road 
Traffic Act 1981, as long as the driver is insured, the illegality will not influence 
his insurance claim against the third party. 
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Thus, these two reasons have resulted in the exclusion clause in an insurance 
policy possibly expressly excluding the application of the causation principle. For 
example, the exclusion clause in Marcel Beller Ltd. v Hayden excludes the 
insurer’s liability if “directly or indirectly resulting from ... deliberate exposure to 
exceptional danger ... or the insured person's own criminal act”207. 
When applying the seriousness of illegality exception in insurance cases, it 
seems that there is no such rule in insurance law that states that if the illegality 
committed by the assured is trivial, then the assured can be indemnified. When 
dealing with insurance illegality cases, courts tend to pay more attention to the 
mind of the assured. Thus, it is clear that no public policy may prevent a man 
from insuring his negligence and if the loss is caused by the negligence of the 
assured, even though such illegality may have caused series injury, the 
insurance policy is still enforceable. This is especially the case with motor 
insurance.  
Furthermore, it is clear that, when dealing with the seriousness issue in 
insurance law, the knowledge and the intention of the assured when committing 
the illegal conduct are still key factors. Therefore, if the assured commits a crime 
intentionally then even if the crime may not have severe consequences or lead 
to an unintentional loss, the insurance contract is still unenforceable since such 
conduct contradict to the basic principle of insurance208. Therefore, it is clear that 
the seriousness of the illegality factor only will not affect the validity of the 
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insurance policy. 
However, an exception can be found in the case Marcel Beller v Hayden209. In 
this case, the claimant died because he was drunk when driving. Although the 
judge decided that the claimant did not cause the crash deliberately or 
intentionally, he concluded that the dangerous driving of the claimant was still a 
matter of culpability or turpitude and was sufficient to be a criminal act. 
The proportionality principle in tort law is not the same as the proportionality 
principle in insurance law. As discussed previously, the proportionality principle 
in tort is firstly a comparison between the claimant’s illegal conduct and the 
seriousness of consequence he will suffer if his claim is refused because of such 
conduct; and secondly, comparison between the illegal conduct of the defendant 
and the illegal conduct of the claimant. Compared with illegality cases in tort law, 
where it seems that if the assured is induced into an insurance policy because of 
the illegality of the insurer such as if the insurer is not eligible to issue insurance 
in UK, then the assured is able to be fully compensated; if the assured on the 
other hand has committed a crime or tort because of the illegality of the insurer, 
such as with life insurance, if the assured commits suicide because of the 
inducement of the insurer, it is clear that the court will not weigh the illegality 
between the assured and insurer and that, since the inducement is less serious 
than the suicide then the insurer can deny his liability. Therefore, the second kind 
of tort proportionality principle in insurance law is not applicable. 
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As opposed to tort law, the proportionality principle adopted in insurance law can 
be construed like this: “The court has to weigh the gravity of the anti-social act 
and the extent to which it will be encouraged by enforcing the right sought to be 
asserted against the social harm which will be caused if the right is not 
enforceable”210. This is one of the dictums adopted in the case Hardy. In other 
words, “enforcement of a contract should not be refused unless the potential 
benefit in deterring misconduct or avoiding a misuse of the judicial process 
outweighs the factors favoring enforceability”211. Therefore, unlike in tort law, in 
the circumstance where both the defendant and the claimant shall be blamed, 
the court will not refuse to enforce the insurance simply because of the illegality 
which has been committed by the assured; the court will weigh the illegality of 
the claimant against the effect on public policy if the claimant’s insurance is 
enforced in spite of such illegality. The most typical example is in motoring cases, 
as indicated before; the claimant’s motor insurance is enforceable either 
because the claimant has caused injury to the third party negligently or 
intentionally, as in Gardner v Moore. Therefore, in insurance cases, the court 
seems to consider the intention of statutes and the construction of the policy, as 
well as the effect of enforcement more. 
However, the issue of whether the court will consider the seriousness of the 
assured’s illegality and the seriousness of the loss the assured will incur if the 
enforcement of the insurance policy is disallowed is not clear. At least one point 
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which relates to this issue is clear, which is that if the enforcement of the 
insurance relates to the compensation of an innocent third party, then the court 
will consider the disallowed effect. If, on the other hand, the insurance being 
enforceable or not will not influence the compensation to the third party, will the 
court then enforce the insurance policy despite the trivial illegality of the assured? 
It seems that if the illegality committed by the assured is slight, negligent and has 
no connection with the loss, then the insurance policy is still enforceable unless 
the illegal act is not covered by the insurance policy. It may seem that compared 
with the illegal act which has been committed by the assured, the refusal to grant 
the insurance is far more severe.  
It is clear from the authorities that, if the illegality is committed by the assured 
deliberately, then even though such illegality may be trivial, the insurance will not 
cover such conduct and accordingly, the proportionality rule will not be applied. 
The last exception which exists in tort law is to examine the intention of the 
statute. This is also an exception in insurance cases although is only used 
occasionally. In the Hardy case, when dealing with whether the motor insurance 
policy covered the intentional criminal act, Lord Denning held that: “The policy of 
insurance which a motorist is required by statute to take out must cover any 
liability which may be incurred by him arising out of the use of the vehicle by 
him”212. This argument was further affirmed by the House of Lords in the 
Gardener case later. Therefore, the third party in this circumstance is entitled to 
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recover damages in spite of the assured’s illegality, for this is the statute’s 
requirement. 
This exception also exists in other insurance cases; if the intention of parliament 
does not preclude such recovery, then the illegality should not be an obstacle. 
It is quite clear from the above that when dealing with insurance cases which are 
tainted by the claimant assured’s illegality, the English court tends to adopt an 
approach which is different from that in tort cases. It seems that more severe 
consequences for the assured may emerge when dealing with such cases.  
This may be the case firstly because, as stated before, society and insurers 
have an interest in loss prevention and risk management and therefore the 
insurer tends to manage the risk as small as possible, since illegal conduct of the 
assured, no matter of which kind, may significantly result in aggravation of the 
risk, which means that this conduct has changed the character of the subject 
matter insured.  
Secondly, the illegal conduct of the assured, no matter how trivial, always falls 
into the exception clause of the insurance policy; therefore, even in cases where 
there is no causal link or the deny of the assured’s claim is disproportionate, the 
court has to follow the words of the insurance policy. For example, in the case 
Charlton v Fisher213, the injury to the claimant happened in a car park even 
though the driver had been insured according to the Road Traffic Act 1988, and it 
had been established that the defendant had no intention of injuring the claimant, 
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his recovery against the MIB under the insurance policy was denied, as was the 
claimant’s request under the insurance policy. The only reason was that the 
accident happened in a car park rather than on a road regulated by the Act and 
therefore the accident was not covered by the insurance policy, which was 
clearly unfair to the innocent third party.  
Thirdly, the assured’s criminal act could not be considered as a risk in insurance 
law. It is clear that the insurance policy only covers risks and no more, and 
therefore whether the criminal activity performed by the assured is an accident 
that falls within the cover offered in an insurance policy is not clear, especially 
when this conduct is executed by the assured intentionally. It has always been 
decided by the authorities that the intentional illegal conduct of the assured is not 
an accident under the insurance policy, as in the case Gray v Barr214. According 
to the judgment of this case, the deliberate act of holding a gun and going 
upstairs was the dominant cause of the loss and this conduct was not covered 
by the wording of the insurance policy. However, a negligent act of the assured, 
such as the speeding cases in motor insurance, as in the case Marcel Beller v 
Hayden215, may be recognized as an accident and covered. However, if the 
negligent speeding is caused by some intentional act which the assured should 
have foreseen would cause the danger and injury to life, then this conduct would 
not be treated as an accident either. Just as Rix LJ cited in Charlton v Fisher: “A 
                                                             
214 Gray v Barr [1971] 2 QB 554 
215 Marcel Beller v Hayden [1978] Q.B. 694 It has long been established and was 
accepted by counsel that the assured's negligence does not deprive a happening of the 
character of accidental. 
131 
 
distinction should be drawn between damage caused by a deliberate criminal act 
and damage intentionally caused”216. However, this judgment is still subject to 
public policy.  
3.2.2.4 What is the proper way of dealing with tort illegality in insurance law?  
Based on the former analysis, it can be concluded that, when dealing with 
insurance cases in which tort illegality has been involved, it is improper to apply 
the narrow and wider rules in Gray v Thames commonly and that the other 
rationales which underlie the illegality defence in tort have limitations as well 
since the circumstances in insurance law are far more complex than in tort law. 
Instead of using one or two general rules in all circumstances concerning 
illegality, different rules or different factors should be considered with different 
modes of illegality. 
Based on former common law cases, there are basically four kinds of illegality 
mode in tort law and each illegality mode may include a corresponding insurance 
illegality mode. The first mode of illegality in tort law is the simplest one, namely 
that A has done nothing wrong and B is the tortfeasor; therefore, any loss which 
B suffers during or after the illegal conduct cannot be recovered from A. With 
regard to the insurance policy, if B has insured against such behavior, this 
means that B cannot recover any losses or compensation for any punishment 
from his insurer. Under these circumstances, both the narrow and wider rules 
can be applied. One typical example of this mode is Gray v Barr. However, one 
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exception may exist in motor insurance: A can recover the loss suffered from B’s 
insurer as long as the loss is covered by the insurance policy.  
The second illegality mode in tort law is when C suffers loss as a result of B’s 
illegal conduct which is caused by or contributed to by A’s former tortious act. In 
other words, but for A’s former tortious act, B would not be a tortfeasor to C, 
which was the situation in Gray v Thames and Clunis v Camden. Based on the 
court’s decision it seems that, as long as B does not rely on his own criminal act 
in a claim for compensation, his loss prior to his criminal act should be covered 
by A; therefore, in this circumstance, if B is insured by D against any loss to the 
third party caused by B then this insurance will be unenforceable because of the 
wider rule and any insurance which covers B’s punishment will also be 
unenforceable if there is any insurance of this kind, since any insurance which 
insured against B’s criminal act will be void from the beginning. However, if A is 
insured under these circumstance, can A recover from his insurer against B’s 
loss prior to his criminal act? It seems that as long as it can be decided that the 
loss was caused by A’s negligence rather than intention, then the loss can be 
recovered and the recovery will not be tainted by B’s later illegality since such 
illegality has no causal link with A’s former tortious conduct and B can even bring 
a claim against A’s insurer directly. Therefore, in these circumstances, the court 
should take the exceptions in narrow and wider rules into consideration and 
should not deny B’s interest under insurance rigidly; however, if the situation falls 
into the exclusion clause, then B’s interest will be excluded. 
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The third illegality mode in tort law is that A suffers loss caused by B’s illegal 
conduct as a result of A’s former threat or tortious conduct. In other words, the 
situation is that B overreacts to A’s tortious conduct and commits a crime or 
causes significant loss to A, which is greater than that A caused to B. A similar 
case can be found in Revill v Newbery where the defendant shot a suspicious 
trespasser and in this case the plaintiff was not debarred from claiming damages 
from the defendant. However, the trespassing case is a special one, because the 
Act intends to protect the right of the intruder, and thus, according to Revill, “by 
enacting section 1 of the Act of 1984, Parliament has decided that an occupier 
cannot treat a burglar as an outlaw”217. Thus, if the intruder has been insured 
against such injury then the insurance policy shall be enforceable. However, 
except for this particular situation, it seems that in other similar circumstances 
both A and B cannot be covered by their insurers. Since firstly, according to the 
current causation rule in insurance law, the reason for A’s loss is purely his 
tortious conduct at the beginning, A cannot rely on his own illegal act to plead 
this claim. In B’s situation, though, B’s illegal act is caused by A’s tortious 
conduct, his conduct is also illegal and is also precluded by common law. Thus, 
both the narrow rule and the wider rule will be applied in this situation. 
The fourth illegality mode is that A and B commit a crime or engage in tortious 
conduct together and cause loss to C or to A and B. If A and B have caused loss 
to C, then it is clear that both A and B cannot recover losses under the insurance 
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policy as long as the crime was committed intentionally. However, the difficult 
question is whether, if A and B have caused damages to themselves, A/B can 
recover losses (1) under respective insurance policies or (2) against the other’s 
insurance policy. As long as the first scenario is considered, neither A nor B can 
recover losses under their insurance policy provided that both of them are 
involved in the illegality irrespective of whether the illegality has a connection 
with the loss which they suffered. However, if B is innocent and the damage 
which B suffers is purely because of A’s negligence or intention, then will B’s 
rights under the insurance policy survive? For example, in a road accident case, 
if B sits on a motor cycle which is driven by drunk A and suffers loss, will this loss 
be covered by B’s insurer? It seems that B cannot recover his insurance policy 
either, since the insurer will argue that if knowledge was aware that A has drunk 
and is willing to get on his motor cycle, then he willingly takes this risk and this 
clearly results in the aggravation of the risk, as has been discussed previously. 
This is the difference between the insurance law and tort law; in tort law as long 
as there is no connection between the illegality and the loss, the claimant can 
still recover from the defendant, as in the case of NCB v England.  
However, the consequence will be quite different if the second scenario is 
considered. In the road accident example, if A is insured according to the Road 
Traffic Act 1988 then even though B cannot recover under his own insurance, he 
can clearly recover against A’s insurer. Even if A is not insured, so long as certain 
conditions are fulfilled, B can still recover from MIB provided that B is not 
135 
 
involved in A’s illegality. 
3.2.2.5 The specificity of the illegality issue in motor insurance 
The situation with motor insurance is quite different from other kinds of liability 
insurance since motor insurance against the third party is compulsory because 
of statute. In light of the decision in the Hardy case, the specificity of illegality 
rules in motor insurance can be summarized in two points: firstly, “The policy of 
insurance which a motorist is required by statute to take out must cover any 
liability which may be incurred by him arising out of the use of the vehicle by him. 
It must, I think, be wide enough to cover, in general terms, any use by him of the 
vehicle, be it an innocent use or a criminal use, or be it a murderous use or a 
playful use.218"; and secondly, “But if he does not pay the damages, then the 
injured third party can recover against the insurers under section 207 of the 
Road Traffic Act 1960; for it is a liability which the motorist, under the statute, is 
required to cover”219. Other than the requirements of the Road Traffic Act and the 
insurance policy, there are two rationales which are behind the exception of 
motor insurance: the first one, according to the judgment of Charlton v Fisher, is  
“… the principle of statute, that innocent third parties should be protected so far 
as money can do it from the harm—sometimes fatal—that may be inflicted by 
careless, dangerous and criminal drivers on the public roads: a protection not 
sufficiently given by the private law of insurance”220; and the second one is that, 
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the aim of the exception is to protect the potential victim rather than compensate 
the guilty assured. 
The exceptional rules for motor insurance clearly contradict general illegality 
rules both in contract and in tort law. Therefore, two questions may arise: firstly, 
what is the boundary of the exception - are there any elements which will limit 
this exceptional rule? Secondly, can the mode of motor insurance be applied in 
other areas of liability insurance? 
So far as the first question is concerned, there are several elements which 
clearly limit the application of motor insurance rules. It is clear from the 
authorities that the causation link between the loss and the vehicle and the 
words and the coverage of policies will all be considered when the courts are 
dealing with motor insurance cases. 
The first limitation is that, if there is an expressed exception in statute then the 
motor insurance rule will not be applied. One typical example of this limitation 
can be seen in the case of Delaney v Pickett, which was discussed before; the 
only obstacle which prevented the claimant from recovering from the second 
defendant, the MIB, was the exclusion clause in the 1999 Agreement. Therefore, 
even though the illegality did not bar the claimant from recovering against the 
first defendant, it barred the claimant from recovering against the MIB. 
Compared with the Hardy case, both the vehicles were uninsured and both the 
defendants used the vehicle to commit a crime intentionally; the sole difference 
between the two cases is the exclusion clause in the 1999 Agreement. However, 
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it should be noted that, if the defendant in this case had been insured, then the 
consequence would have been totally different. 
The second limitation is that, for the claim against the MIB to be successful, the 
risk needs to be covered under the Road Traffic Act 1988. In the case Charlton v 
Fisher, Kennedy LJ admitted the authorities in the Hardy case, the only obstacle 
in the Charlton case was that the accident did not happen on a road defined in 
the Road Traffic Act 1988 section 143(1) and section 145(3). And since “the 
incident in fact occurred off the road, the claimant has no such redress”221. 
Another example of this kind is the case AXN v John Worboys and Inceptum 
Insurance Co Ltd222. In this case, a taxi driver raped several women in his car, 
and ten of his victims brought a claim against him and his insurer since his car 
had been insured. A preliminary issue when deciding this case is whether the 
“law goes as far as to require insurance under section 145(3) (a) RTA 1988 not 
for deliberate and intentional dangerous driving, but for the acts of administering 
substances as well as for actual and attempted sexual assaults”223. However, 
since the injuries suffered by the claimants were not arising out of the use of 
vehicle, the judge decided that there was neither an expressed nor an implied 
requirement in the Act that sexual assaults should be covered, and therefore the 
claim failed. 
The third limitation that exists in English law is that there is a requirement for a 
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causal link between the loss that the claimant suffered and the use of the insured 
or uninsured vehicle, since it is the requirement of the RTA 1988 that “……to any 
person or damage to property caused by, or arising out of, the use of the vehicle 
on a road [or other public place] in Great Britain”224. This issue was also 
considered in the AXN v John Worboys case since the court needed to consider 
whether the loss arose out of the use of the vehicle or not. Silber J examined 
both the English law authorities and the Commonwealth authorities and 
concluded that the true meaning of section 145(3) (a) RTA 1988 is that: firstly, 
“The term ‘arising out of’ encompasses more remote consequences than those 
envisaged by the words ‘caused by’225”, and does not mean a proximately cause 
or effective cause; secondly, the words ‘arising out of’ describe the relationship 
between the injuries suffered and the use of the vehicle when the injuries were 
suffered; thirdly, “The application of the words ‘bodily injury … arising out of the 
use of a vehicle’ entails considering all the material circumstances.226”; and 
fourthly, “the purpose of the user of the motor vehicle is relevant in deciding 
whether what occurred and in particular the bodily injuries arose out of the use of 
his motor car”227. These rules can be concluded as the causal link requirement in 
motor insurance cases, and with the application of these rules, Silber J 
concluded that the sexual assaults were not causally connected with the use of 
the vehicle on the road and therefore the claimants’ claim was defeated. 
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Thus, so far as the first question of this section is concerned, there are 
limitations related to motor insurance illegality rules. However, whether or not 
these limitations are applied does not change the position that, so long as the 
statutory and common law requirements are fulfilled, there is no obstacle to an 
innocent third party claiming damages from the guilty assured’s insurer. 
Thus, the next question which relates to this issue is whether the mode of 
compensation in motor insurance should be applied in other kinds of liability 
insurance against injury to a third party; that is,, whether an innocent third party 
in every type of liability insurance has the right to claim damages against the 
defendant’s insurer no matter how severe the crime of the defendant is. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter the illegality issue under common law which relates to tort claims 
has been discussed. It can be seen that the illegality in tort does not 
automatically render the claimant without protection. The key point which should 
be remembered is that for the illegality defence to be sustained, the mere fact of 
illegality is not enough; several other factors, particularly the causal link between 
the loss and illegal conduct, should be considered. The last part of this chapter 
shows how tort law rules can be applied on motor insurance cases, and this 
analysis can show a great value to the extent of how to reform section 41 in 
marine insurance law. 
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Chapter 4: The illegality defence in contract law and its application in insurance 
contracts 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the illegality defence in tort law was considered and it is 
clear that the application of this defence in insurance law is closely connected to 
common law rationales and that the illegality rules in tort law have been modified 
in order to cope with the specialty of insurance law. In this chapter, the illegality 
defence in contract law will be examined. Unlike the illegality defence in tort law, 
the illegality issue in contract law is far more complex, since in tort 
circumstances only the performance of the contract can be included, but when 
dealing with the illegality issue in contract law, both the construction and 
performance of the contract are involved and both statutory illegality and 
common law illegality are considered. This chapter will consider the origins of 
the illegality defence under contract law and both statutory and common law 
illegality. Furthermore, reasons for the differences between statutory illegality 
and common law illegality and the impact of the division on insurance law will 
also be examined, since it is obvious that the factors considered by the courts 
may be different when dealing with different kinds of illegalities.  
4.2 Contracts rendered illegal by statute 
Besides the illegality defence in tort law, there are also several illegality rules in 
contract law. There are basically two kinds of illegality in contract law: firstly, a 
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contract may be expressly or implicitly prohibited by statute; and secondly, a 
contract may be forbidden because it violates common law and public policy. 
Statutes may influence the legality of a contract in two ways, with regard to either 
the formation of the contract or to the performance of the contract. In the first 
category, statutes may expressly or implicitly state the requirements of the 
formation of a contract and if such requirements have not been complied with, 
then the contract is illegal. For example, a licence of parliament was needed in 
the early 19th century in order to carry out trade with another country and an 
insurer had to be authorized before carrying out any business in the UK. With 
regard to the second category, if statutes have expressly or implicitly stated how 
to perform a contract then these regulations should be complied with. Thus, if a 
statute requires the seller to give the buyer a specific invoice, then if there is no 
invoice, the contract has been executed illegally. Similarly, if a transport vehicle 
is over-loaded and this is prohibited by the statute, then the transport contract 
becomes illegal. The difference between the two kinds of illegality is that, in the 
first category, the courts intend to render the contract unenforceable and in the 
second category, there is debate as to whether what has been forbidden by 
statute should influence the forcibility of the contract. 
When deciding whether a contract is illegal or not, it is easier if the statute 
provided clear instructions and stated the consequences of a violation. For 
example, section 2 of the Insurance Companies Act 1974 regulates that “(1) No 
person shall carry on in Great Britain insurance business of a class relevant for 
142 
 
the purposes of this Part of this Act, other than industrial assurance business”; 
and section 11 regulates that “(1) A person who carries on business in 
contravention of this Part of this Act shall be guilty of an offence... (3) A person 
guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable – (a)… (b)…”228. Section 83 
of this act also regulates that the ambit of the insurance business regulated by 
the act involves “the business of effecting and carrying out contracts of 
insurance”229. Therefore, if the insurer is not entitled to write an insurance policy 
and he has done so negligently, then not surprisingly, even though this Act is to 
protect the assured’s interest, the insurance contract is void and unenforceable. 
However, difficulties exist in circumstances where statutes ignore this point or 
there is no clear instruction regarding the consequences of a violation. When 
dealing with cases like this, courts have considered both the purpose of the 
legislation and all the relevant facts. Therefore, it is clear that not every violation 
of statute renders a contract void and unenforceable. 
The purpose of the legislation is for the court to examine the terms of the 
legislation and meaning of words in the legislation and to examine what is 
implicitly forbidden by the statute and whether the contract or the performance of 
contract falls within the ambit of the legislation. The most significant case on this 
subject is Archbolds Ltd v S Spanglett Ltd230. In this case, the plaintiff used the 
defendant’s unlicenced vehicle to transfer goods, the goods were stolen during 
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the journey and the plaintiff claimed damages against the defendant. When 
refusing to compensate, the defendant alleged that the contract was illegal since 
the vehicle used for transporting was unlicenced, according to the 1933 Road 
Traffic Act. After examining the facts of this case and the language of the 
legislation, the court decided that there was no illegality with regard to the 
performance of the plaintiff according to the Act since, firstly, the performance of 
the plaintiff did not constitute the definition of “use” of the vehicle under the Act, 
and furthermore, the object of the Act was to control the person who provided 
the transport service rather than to interfere with the owner of the goods. 
Besides examination of the specific words of an Act to decide whether the act of 
the party falls within the statute’s ambit, another, more simple method is to 
decide what the statute aims to protect. In the case Victorian Daylesford 
Syndicate v Dott, after a financial transaction between the defendant and the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff alleged that the whole transaction was illegal since the 
defendant had not registered himself according to the Money-Lender’s Act 1900 
and thus had not made the loan of money in his registered name, as required by 
the Act. When deciding whether the Act was so worded that the contract of loan 
was to be rendered illegal because of the illegality of the defendant, Buckley J 
decided that “statutes may be grouped under two headings—those in which a 
penalty is imposed against doing an act for the purposes only of the protection of 
the revenue, and those in which a penalty is imposed upon an act not merely for 
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revenue purposes, but also for the protection of the public”231. Therefore, if a 
statute is there to protect the interests of the public, then a violation of this Act 
will render the contract illegal and unenforceable and the defendant would not be 
able to sue under the terms of the contract. 
In addition, if the Act, instead of clearly stating whether the contract is void or not, 
imposes a penalty on the illegal party, this regulation does not necessarily mean 
that the contract is not unenforceable under the Act. For instance, if the Act aims 
to protect the public interest, then contracts of this kind can still be construed as 
unenforceable and prohibited by the statute232. Furthermore, deciding whether 
an act is prohibited by the statute or not means seeing “… whether the penalty in 
the Act is imposed once and for all, or whether it is a recurrent penalty imposed 
as often as the act is done”233. This means that there is a difference between 
statutes which are intended to penalize specific commercial activity and those 
which are intended to penalise the contracts in relation to illegal conduct. If it is 
the latter case, then such act will be prohibited. 
Besides the examination of the intention and the word of the statute, the nature 
of the contract may also influence the consequences of illegality in implied 
prohibition circumstances. Therefore, for instance, if a contract requires the 
performance of only one party and the other party has no involvement in the 
illegality, then the prohibition of statutes falls on the guilty party only and the 
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innocent third party can be protected. For example, in a carriage of goods 
contract in a case such as the Archbolds, the absence of a licence made the 
carrier a guilty party who could not recover under the terms of the illegal contract, 
but the owner of the goods, who had no involvement in the illegality, could. 
However, on the other hand, if the performance of the contract needs the 
involvement of both parties, then both parties are under the restriction of the 
implied obligation and a violation of the obligation may result in the contract 
being unenforceable234. 
However, there are some exceptions in statutory illegality circumstances. The 
first is the possibility of evasion of statutes and the second is a waiver of 
statutory rights. As far as the first exception is concerned, in the case Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Bhagwan235, where a commonwealth citizen from India 
tried to commit an evasion at immigration control, when deciding whether the 
respondent had committed an offence under the Commonwealth Immigration 
Act 1962, the House of Lords stated that, so far as the Act was concerned: firstly, 
there were no restrictions on commonwealth citizens coming into Britain; 
secondly, “The appellant's entry into the United Kingdom could not have been 
regarded as injurious to the public interest before, or apart from, the Act of 1962, 
and it was not prohibited by that Act.236”; and thirdly, the intention of the Act of 
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1962 was not to control the immigration of commonwealth citizens into Britain 
but to treat commonwealth citizens far less rigidly than aliens. Therefore, “It is no 
offence under the law of England to do or to agree with others to do acts which, 
though not prohibited by legislation neither criminal nor tortious at common law, 
are considered by a judge or by a jury to be calculated to defeat, frustrate or 
evade the purpose or intention of an Act of Parliament”237. Thus, so long as the 
former three requirements are fulfilled, the contract cannot be said to be illegal 
under statute. 
Except for this kind of evasion of statute, the “innocent” party of an illegal 
contract can also evade the consequences of the illegality if the other party has 
committed some kind of immoral or illegal act, unrelated to the contract, which 
has caused losses to the “innocent” party. In the case Close v Wilson, the 
plaintiff and defendant had a written agreement on betting and the plaintiff paid 
20,000 pounds for betting purposes; however, this money was used for his own 
benefit and he alleged that it was lost because of unsuccessful betting on horses. 
The plaintiff required the return of the money; however, his application was 
barred because this kind of gaming contract was made illegal under the 1892 
and 1845 Gaming Act. The Court of Appeal upheld that the agreement between 
the plaintiff and defendant - that the defendant should repay the money 
irrespective of which was spent on betting, - was illegal, since such an 
agreement was forbidden by the Act. However, the judges agreed that “The 
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unenforceable nature of the agreement itself would be no bar to the Mr Close's 
restitutionary claim if the money was used for a purpose extraneous to the 
agreement” 238 . Thus, since the losses which the plaintiff suffered had no 
connection with the illegality of the contract, then his right to recover was still 
enforceable. 
The second exception in statutory illegality is whether a party can waive a 
statutory right through a contract. It is clear that, if the contract aims to waive a 
statutory obligation of the parties, then the waiver will be void; and if the waiving 
of statutory rights would undermine the public interest, then the waiver would 
also be void; for example, the implied warranties in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 cannot be waived through contracts. Other than these two circumstances, 
the possibility of waiver will depend on whether the waiver contradicts the 
intention of the statute, in which case it would also be void. Since as cited by 
Lord Hailsham in Johnson v Moreton, the “whole purpose of consolidation would 
be defeated if they were not observed and rigidly adhered to or if endeavours 
were made to split the various components of the consolidation Act apart and 
construe them by reference to their individual histories”239. 
Except for the two exceptions which have been discussed, knowledge of the 
illegality of the parties also plays an important part in dealing with statutory 
illegality cases. The courts also consider the knowledge of both parties to decide 
whether one of them is innocent or both are. This test was used in the Archbolds 
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case when deciding that “If they were aware of the true facts they would, of 
course, be guilty of aiding and abetting the defendants, but if they acted in good 
faith they would not be guilty of any offence under the statute”240. Therefore, in 
this case, since the plaintiff had no knowledge of the illegal purpose and act of 
the defendant he was not precluded from suing the defendant according to the 
contract. 
However, if one of the contract parties holds the knowledge that the other party 
has committed an illegality or plans to perform an illegal act, or that both the 
parties has the same illegal intention to enter the contract or perform the contract 
illegally, then neither of them will be innocent under the contract. This was 
exactly the case in Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co. Ltd. v A. V. Dawson Ltd241. In 
this case, both the defendant transport manager and the plaintiff’s servant held 
the knowledge that the lorry was overloaded, which was in breach of the Road 
Traffic Act. During the transit, the plaintiff’s goods were damaged due to the load; 
the plaintiff subsequently brought an action against the defendant and the 
defendant used the illegality defence. It was decided by the court to sustain the 
illegality defence and the plaintiff was not able then to recover from the 
defendant, since the defendant’s illegality was known to the plaintiff, who had 
even participated in it. However, it has long been decided in English law that an 
illegal act committed after the formation of the contract will not render the 
contract unenforceable; therefore, for the contract to be unenforceable, the 
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parties need to enter into it with the purpose of acting unlawfully242.  
Nevertheless, if a party has taken reasonable precautions to prevent the 
commission of the illegality, then he will be not guilty of aiding and abetting243. 
However, if one party to the contract has no knowledge of the illegality of the 
contract or the illegality of his own action, then it seems that his rights under the 
contract will not be entirely deprived. One exception to this concerns ignorance 
of the law on the part of both parties. According to the case Waugh v Morris, 
“where a contract is to do a thing which cannot be performed without a violation 
of the law, it is void, whether the parties knew the law or not”244.  
Thus, when the courts are deciding whether one of the parties or both parties are 
involved in illegality or not, both the intention of the parties when entering into the 
contract and the knowledge of illegality of the parties when performing the 
contract will be considered. 
There used to be an argument that “failure to comply with the statute makes the 
contract void if the requirement is obligatory but not if it is only directory”245. 
However, the meaning of the words “obligatory” and “directory” and the criterion 
adopted in this sentence is not clear. It seems that the requirements of 
performance on the part of the contractual parties may be regulated as 
obligatory and the requirement for formalities in the statute seems directive, the 
violation of which will not render the contract void. The objective of this 
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distinction is to relieve the harsh consequence on the guilty party However, not 
every formality requirement in statutes does not go to the core of a contract; if 
there is an obligation on the contractual party to obtain some kind of license for 
the contract to become valid, then the violation of this requirement will still be 
viewed as a breach of an obligatory requirement, thereby making the contract 
void. Therefore, the fundamental issue when dealing with such cases is still the 
meaning and intention of the statute. 
 
4.3 Contracts rendered illegal by common law 
Another kind of illegality in contract law which differs from statutory illegality is 
the illegality of contract in common law and public policy. This form of illegality is 
more complex than statutory illegality and there are no defined rules on it. Both 
the relevant aspects of the origin and development of the illegality of contract in 
common law and the general rules which underlie the illegality defence will be 
discussed below. 
4.3.1 The origin and development of contract illegality in common law and public 
policy 
The origins of the fundamental rules of contractual illegality can be traced back 
to the 18th century, when the judges laid down some basic principles based on 
specific cases they had encountered. At that time, contracts which were injurious 
to the fundamental interests of society, such as a contract which is a restraint of 
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marriage246, would not be tolerated, The fundamental principle in public policy, 
that is “ex dolo malo non oritur action, was founded in the case Holman v 
Johnson, which was discussed earlier,: “No Court will lend its aid to a man who 
founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act”247. Thus, it can be 
said that both the illegality rule in contract and the illegality rule in tort share the 
same origin. 
However, the public policy cited in this case is only a vague one and cannot be 
applied directly in other cases, since: firstly, the general principle of public policy 
may vary from generation to generation and therefore, some policies which were 
vital in the19th century, such as the licence to trade with foreign countries, are 
unnecessary nowadays; and secondly, the seriousness of the illegality in 
contract is not taken into account in this principle, a limitation which led to later 
developments in the illegality rule in contract law. Courts have adopted different 
rules when dealing with different levels of severity of illegality and the 
consequences of different kinds of violation of the law are clearly different248. 
Besides the lack of clarity in public policy, the unstable character of public policy 
also came under criticism during the development of the illegality doctrine in 
contract.   
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Just as indicated in the case Bennett v Bennett249, the case in which illegality in 
the contract is criminal clearly cannot be treated in the same way as where only 
one provision of the contract is illegal, such as in a trade contract where only the 
purchase price of the goods is too low and this may have violated the 
competition regulation. Therefore, in the former case, the entire contract will be 
rendered void and unenforceable and in the latter case, only the illegal section 
will not be executed and the other parts are not influenced. 
However, there are still some difficulties when courts distinguish the severity of 
the illegality. Both the conduct of the parties and the consequences of their 
illegality are taken into account. Thus, if their illegality has not lead to any serious 
consequence and their conduct cannot be classified as contrary to public 
interest, then the illegality will be considered trivial, and normally this will not 
result in the entire contract being made void. 
This kind of development leads to a discussion of whether the word “illegal” is 
properly used to describe all kinds of illegality in contract law. There is an 
argument that when describing this issue, the word “illegal” should be used for 
more serious types of illegal contract, - such as a contract to commit a crime - 
and that contracts which involve trivial illegality should be described as void and 
unenforceable. There is also an argument that a contract is void and 
unenforceable with regard to public policy when there is only a possible rather 
than a probable potential for it to not be in the public interest. 
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4.3.2 General principles of illegality under common law 
The key question when deciding illegality issues under common law is to decide 
whether the contract is rendered illegal or unenforceable by public policy. In 
contrast with illegality under statute, public policy is more unstable and flexible, 
and it is agreed that this characteristic has made the illegality issue of contracts 
under common law more complex. 
According to Chitty On Contracts, public policy can be classified into five 
categories: “first, objects which are illegal by common law or by legislation; 
secondly, objects injurious to good government either in the field of domestic or 
foreign affairs; thirdly, objects which interfere with the proper working of the 
machinery of justice; fourthly, objects injurious to marriage and morality; and, 
fifthly, objects economically against the public interest”250. However, it is clear 
that not all of them relate to marine insurance law and therefore, there is no need 
to clarify every category of illegality. According to law commission reports, 
illegality under common law can be summarised under three headings: the first 
one is that the content of the contract requires the parties to commit a legal 
wrong; secondly, the intent of the contract is to facilitate the commission of a 
legal wrong; thirdly, the contract itself is legal but the legal contract has been 
performed illegally251. The following section will critically consider these three 
headings.    
So far as the first and third categories are concerned, because of the differences 
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between them - and because these differences may require the courts to 
consider different factors when deciding cases and may result in different 
consequences – they will be considered separately. Both the categories may 
involve the performance of contractual parties, the difference being that, in the 
first category, the conduct of the parties is not a requirement when deciding 
whether the contract is illegal or not - the mere agreement to commit a crime is 
enough; however, in the third category, the conduct of the contractual parties is a 
necessary condition, and the illegality is based on this conduct. 
However, the first category of illegality may also involve the conduct of a 
contractual party, so that even though the illegality resides in the conduct of the 
parties, it still falls into the first category. For example, a case concerning a 
contract for the carriage of goods by road, where the goods can only be loaded 
by parking the van illegally for a while, would be regulated in the first category 
rather than the third one since, compared with the third one, the illegal conduct in 
this case is the same as an implied term in the contract, without which the 
contract could not be fulfilled and there is no way for the parties to choose a legal 
method. However, in the third category, there is no such restriction; the contract 
in the third category is legal and can be performed legally, and the contractual 
parties choose to act illegally for profit or for illegal purposes. Therefore, even 
though both categories may involve the performance of contracts, they should 
be viewed differently. 
This category of illegal conduct may involve statutory illegality; for instance, if the 
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contract requires the parties to commit a crime like murder, then it is clearly 
unenforceable. However, this scenario is very rare, and in most illegality cases, 
the legal wrong the parties perform, which is in the terms of the contract,, is 
venial, as in the example raised before; the terms of a carriage of goods contract 
requires the loading of the goods which can only performed by parking illegally, 
and the question is whether this illegality deprives the carrier’s right for freight or 
discharges the carrier’s liability under this contract? According to the statutory 
illegality issue discussed earlier, it seems that if there is a clear prohibition in 
statute then the conduct will be rendered illegal and the consequence of the 
illegality will be decided according to the statutory law. That is to say that, if the 
illegality is not a serious crime under statute or the punishment for the illegality is 
minor, then the illegality may not result in the contract being unenforceable.  
However, if the legal wrong is not a crime which has been specified in statute 
then the illegality will be decided according to the criteria of common law. 
Although this principle may seem rigid and unfair to the contractual parties, it is 
based upon two powerful points: firstly, according to the judgment of Archbolds, 
discussed earlier, if both the contractual parties know the contract cannot be 
carried out without the commission of an illegal act then the contract will be 
unenforceable; secondly, as was discussed previously, the ignorance of the law 
on the part of the contractual parties does not make any difference. 
Therefore, in this category, where the contractual parties make an agreement to 
commit an act which is prohibited by law, the general principle can be 
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summarised thus: firstly, where there is an express or implied prohibition of 
forming the contract in statute, then the contract which contains the illegality will 
be unenforceable, no matter whether the parties are aware of the law or not; 
secondly, where the statute only prohibits the act which the terms of the contract 
requires to be carried out, then this requirement does not entail the contract 
becoming automatically unenforceable. In this situation, the validity of the 
contract is a question under common law, and the knowledge of parties will be 
considered, as was discussed above: if both parties have knowledge of the 
illegality, then both parties shall be denied relief from the contract; if only one 
party has knowledge of the illegality and the other party does not, then the 
innocent party should not be affected by the legal wrong; however, if both parties 
have no knowledge of the illegality, then the intention and interpretation of 
statute will be considered, and if the intention of the statute is to forbid contracts 
which contains such illegalities, then the contract will be unenforceable 
regardless of whether the parties have knowledge of the law or not. Furthermore 
the seriousness of the legal wrong would be considered as well. 
The second category of illegal contract, as summarised in the law commission 
report, is that where the intention of the contract is to commit a legal wrong. The 
first question is whether the purpose of the contract is equal to the intention of 
the parties? Firstly, it should be stated that if the parties enter the contract with 
an illegal purpose, such as an intention to defraud the insurer when entering an 
insurance contract, then the purpose of the contract will also be illegal and in this 
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situation, the insurance contract will be unenforceable. However, in a situation 
where the purpose of the contract is illegal but the contractual parties have no 
knowledge of that illegality and have no intention of breaking the law, would the 
contract then be rendered unenforceable also? It seems that the answer is no, 
under such a circumstance - if the parties have no intention of violating the law 
then even though the purpose of the contract is illegal, the contractual parties 
can still enforce the contract. In the case Waugh v Morris 252 , where the 
defendant chartered the plaintiff’s vessel to import hay from France to England, 
however, neither party was aware that it was illegal for hay from a French port to 
be landed in the UK. After the defendant charterer became aware of the illegality, 
he transferred the hay alongside the ship, which caused some demurrage; the 
plaintiff requested the payment of the demurrage and the defendant refused by 
claiming that the contract was illegal. In this case, the purpose of the contract (to 
land the hay in the UK) was clearly illegal, but the court decided that the contract 
was not void since the parties had no knowledge of the law and therefore had no 
intention of acting illegally. Therefore, in circumstances in which the parties have 
no intention of breaking the law and have no knowledge of the illegal purpose 
implied in the contract, then so long as the contract can be performed legally, it is 
still enforceable. Under these circumstances, the intention of the parties is not 
equal to the purpose of the contract. 
Another issue which relates to the knowledge of contractual parties is that the 
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different knowledge of illegality of contractual parties will lead to different 
consequences. This principle in common law is almost the same as the principle 
in statutory illegality cases, discussed earlier. Where only one party has the 
intention of breaking the law when entering into the contract and the innocent 
party has no awareness of that, then the contract is only unenforceable on the 
guilty party. This principle was decided in the Fielding & Platt Ltd. v Selim 
Najjar253 case, in which the defendant buyer used the invoice issued by the 
seller to deceive the Lebanese authorities, but because the seller had no 
knowledge of the illegal intention, the illegality defence raised by the defendant 
failed. Furthermore, Lord Denning’s judgment of this case made the 
requirements for the illegality defence workable: firstly, the seller should have 
knowledge of the illegality and secondly, the seller should actively participate in it. 
This raised the question of what amounts to participation in an illegal purpose. 
According to Lord Denning, mere knowledge of the other party’s unlawful 
purpose does not amount to participation: in the case Foster v. Driscoll254, 
quoted by Lord Denning, the judgment stated that “In my view the present 
position of the law is that the mere fact that a vendor of goods knows that the 
purchaser proposes to run them into a country where they are prohibited by 
some revenue law is not sufficient to render the contract of sale illegal, but if 
beyond mere knowledge the vendor actively engages in an adventure to get the 
goods into such country, the Court will not assist the parties to the adventure by 
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entertaining or settling any dispute between the parties arising out of the 
contract”255. Thus the active engagement of the other party is needed. 
However, how active that engagement should be so that the “innocent party” will 
be deprived of the contractual relief is still uncertain. It seems that this question, 
in fact does not require a great deal of attention. If one party of the contract 
knows of the other party’s illegal purpose and participates to facilitate that 
unlawful purpose then no matter how trivial that participation is, if it can be 
proved that the contractual parties share the unlawful purpose during the 
performance of the contract, and then the contract is unenforceable. 
Another issue which is unclear in the Law Commission Report is the closeness 
between the illegal intentions of the contract or the contractual parties and the 
contract which the parties intend to enforce. Two cases were raised in the report 
to demonstrate this uncertainty: 21St Century Logistic Solutions Limited v 
Madysen Limited256 and Alexander v Rayson257. 
In the first case, the liquidator of the 21St Century Logistic Solutions Limited 
sued on behalf of the company for the price of goods against the buyer, the 
buyer refuse to pay for the goods because they have been imported illegally, 
since the purpose objective of 21St Century Logistic Solutions Limited in trading 
was to avoid payment of VAT on imported goods and to profit from the VAT, 
which is clearly an illegal objective. Based on this, the buyer of the goods 
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claimed that the contract of sale was illegal and therefore, that the contract was 
unenforceable; the buyer therefore refused to pay. Both the contractual parties 
and the judges agreed that the contract to defraud the Revenue was illegal; 
however, the judge contended that “……there must come a point when the 
connection with the plaintiff's intention to the contract is too remote for the 
contract to be held to be unenforceable. In other words, not every contract 
entered into with the intention of committing an illegal act is illegal and 
unenforceable”258. The judge came to this conclusion based on various reasons, 
the most important two being that: firstly, the fraud of the HMCE intended by the 
21st Century company was not finally carried out; and secondly, the plaintiff’s 
illegal purpose had no connection with the contract which the defendant 
intended to defeat. 
It seems that when deciding whether the illegal purpose is close enough to 
render the contract unenforceable, simply having proof of the existence of the 
illegal purpose is not sufficient and neither is the mere connection that the “guilty 
party” has the illegal intention and enters a contract with the other party. The 
important issue is that the illegal purpose should also have been fulfilled or 
nearly fulfilled by the “guilty party” and the illegal purpose should not be 
collaterally connected with the contract. 
The second case discussed by the law commission report was Alexander v 
Rayson, which was decided before the 21st century case. The two contradictive 
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decisions were used by the law commission to demonstrate the uncertainty of 
the closeness of the contract to the unlawful purpose. The Alexander case was 
decided in 1936 and the facts of the case are simple: the claimant rented a flat to 
the defendant for GBP 1200 per year, and the claimant planned to defraud the 
local Assessment Committee by using two documents which stated different 
amounts of rent to reduce the value of the flat. However, the valuation authority 
was aware of this conduct and restored the original value of the flat. Later, the 
claimant sued for arrears of rent and the defendant used illegality as a defence. 
In the first trial of this case, it was decided that the illegality in this case was too 
remote from the rent contract itself to render it illegal and unenforceable, since 
the contract between the two parties had been performed lawfully and there was 
no evidence that the claimant had entered this contract with the intention of 
performing it unlawfully. However, in the second judgment, the Court of Appeal 
reversed this decision and decided that the contract had been tainted by illegality 
and was unenforceable; this decision was based on the public policy that “the 
contract is unenforceable if it intended that the subject matter of the contract was 
to be used for an unlawful purpose”259. This general rule was cited in the Pearce 
v Brooks case, in which a brougham was rented to a prostitute with the purpose 
of facilitating illegality; it was cited that “One who makes a contract for sale or 
hire with the knowledge that the other contracting party intends to apply the 
subject matter of the contract to an immoral purpose cannot recover upon the 
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contract”260. However, it was recognised by the judges of the Alexander case 
that, in this case, the two documents which had been used for illegal purposes 
were not the subject matter of the rent contract. However, by quoting the case 
Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co the court decided that “in the present case, 
it was the formulation of the transaction in a particular way by means of the lease 
and agreement, and not the subject-matter of the transaction, of which an illegal 
use was to be made”261. Therefore, it makes no difference if it is the subject 
matter of the contract which is intended to be used unlawfully. The court came to 
the conclusion that “In the present case, however, the documents themselves 
were dangerous in the sense that they could be and were intended to be used 
for a fraudulent purpose, without alteration, and the splitting of the transaction 
into the two documents was an overt step in carrying out the fraud. We cannot 
think that the plaintiff is entitled to bring these documents into a court of justice 
and ask the Court to assist him in carrying them into effect”262. 
It seems that the judgments of the two cases contradict each other, since by 
applying the rule in the 21st Century case, the claimant’s illegal purpose, 
although it had been performed, had no connection with the payment of the rent 
and the judgment of Alexander seems too strict, a view implied by the judgement 
of the 21st Century case when it was agreed by Professor Furmston that “The 
decision is understandable but it goes near to the limit of the law”263, and that, 
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“The Court of Appeal disagreed but it is clear that there must come a point when 
the connection with the plaintiff's intention is too remote”264. 
However, in the Alexander case, the court did not deny the existence of the 
remote principle; otherwise there would be no need to distinguish whether it is 
the subject matter of the contract which is intended to be used illegally. The true 
reason is that the court treated the two documents used by the claimant to 
defraud the authorities as a device which originated from the contract. Another 
difference between the two cases is that, in the Alexander case, the illegal 
purpose had been performed by the claimant for a while and the claimant might 
have profited from the illegality; however, in the latter case, it was found by the 
court that, there was only illegal intention on the part of claimant, and the 
illegality could not be performed until the end of the accounting year, so all the 
facts which the defendant raised to demonstrate the illegality of the claimant 
were rendered as not sufficient. Therefore, although the judgments on these two 
cases seemed contradictory, this is because of the differences in the facts of the 
two cases and it seems that the principle cited in the 21st Century case was more 
reasonable. 
Besides the closeness between illegal intention and the performance of the 
contractual party, there is also a requirement for knowledge on the part of the 
contractual party of the illegal intention, as decided recently in the case 
ParkingEye Ltd v Somerfield Stores Ltd265. For illegal intentions to become a 
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factor underlying the illegality defence, the courts should be particularly 
concerned about whether the party was aware that the intended mode of 
performance was illegal and if this was not the case, then clearly such illegal 
intention would not vitiate claims under the contract266. 
The third kind of illegal contract in common law is where the contract is legal and 
there is no intention to use the contract to commit an illegal action but the 
contract is performed by one or both of the contractual parties in a manner which 
is contrary to public policy. 
This area of law is complex since there are several scenarios of this kind of 
illegality and the differences between the facts of each scenario and the law 
which has been violated will result in different consequences on the contract 
which has been tainted by the illegality. Similarly to statutory illegality, in this area 
both the knowledge and the intention of the parties play an important role. This 
section will begin with the origin of this test. 
It has been generally agreed that an illegal action which occurs during the 
performance of a contract does not automatically makes the contract 
unenforceable. This principle can be traced back to the 19th century. In the case 
Wetherell v Jones267, the claimant himself made an illegal delivery which was 
prohibited by statute; however, the contract itself was not illegal. It was decided 
by the court that: “irregularity of the permit, though it arises from the plaintiff's 
own fault, and is a violation of the law by him, does not deprive him of the right of 
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suing upon a contract which is in itself perfectly legal; there having been no 
agreement, express or implied, in that contract, that the law should be violated 
by such improper delivery”268. Therefore, even though there was an illegality 
during the performance of contract, it was not influenced by this illegality. 
The most significant case which relates to this issue is the St. John Shipping 
Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd269. The claimant shipowner sued the defendant 
English charterer for part of the freight, but the English charterer refused to pay 
the freight on the ground that the shipowner had overloaded the vessel during 
the voyage, which was prohibited by statute. However, their illegality defence 
was rendered failed by the court, which decided that “the infringement of a 
statute in the performance of a contract which was legal when made did not 
render the contract illegal unless the contract, as performed, was one which the 
statute meant to prohibit”270. Furthermore, the performance of the contract of the 
carriage of goods had no connection with the illegality of what happened during 
the voyage and there was no need for the plaintiff to disclose it; the plaintiff could 
bring the right of freight into existence without relying upon the illegality. 
Therefore, as long as these three requirements can be fulfilled, the contract will 
not be rendered unenforceable. 
This judgment was confirmed in another employment case, Coral Leisure Group 
Ltd. v Barnett271. In that case, it was also decided that by the virtue of Wetherell v 
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Jones and St. John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd “The fact that a 
party has in the course of performing a contract committed an unlawful or 
immoral act will not by itself prevent him from further enforcing that contract 
unless the contract was entered into with the purpose of doing that unlawful or 
immoral act or the contract itself (as opposed to the mode of his performance) is 
prohibited by law”272. 
Clearly, according to this judgment, there is an exception to the St. John 
Shipping principle, that when the contractual parties plan to perform the contract 
in an unlawful way, either one of them or both of them, the whole contract should 
not be enforced. The illegality rules which relate to the intention of the parties 
were explained previously: if there is one party intending to perform the contract 
illegally, then the contract is unenforceable on this party as long as it can be 
proved that the other party had no knowledge of the illegality and had no 
involvement in it, whereas if both parties had knowledge of the illegality and 
intended to act illegally, then the contract is unenforceable on both parties. 
However, as was proved in the case Waugh v Morris, if neither party had 
knowledge of the change in the law and intended to perform the contract in a 
way which they thought was legal, but is illegal because of the law, then the 
validity of the contract will not be influenced. 
However, there is discussion as to whether the principle that a minor illegality will 
result in the forfeiture of contractual remedies is appropriate. It is argued by R.A. 
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Buckley that the origin of this problem lies in the judgment of the St. John 
Shipping case. In that case, there were basically two issues which needed to be 
resolved by the court, the first being whether the statute expressly or impliedly 
prohibited the shipowner from enforcing the contract because of the illegality 
which had been committed, and the second being whether, if there is no 
prohibition in the statute the contract is unenforceable under common law 
because of the illegality committed during the performance of the contract. In 
Buckley’s opinion, it seems that the court answered the first question correctly 
but failed to answer the second one properly, although the court came to the 
right decision. In the judgement which relates to the second question, the court 
failed to divide between statutory illegality and common law illegality, and used a 
statutory method to resolve a common law illegality issue, deciding that “… 
whether it is the terms of the contract or the performance of it that is called in 
question, the test is just the same: is the contract, as made or as performed, a 
contract that is prohibited by the statute?273”. Buckley contended that, based on 
this logic, Judge Devlin J came to the absurd conclusion that “any infringement 
of a statute, however inadvertent, committed in the course of performing a 
contract, rendered it unenforceable by the party responsible”274. In other words, 
according to this passage, no matter whether the illegality committed is trivial or 
not, as long as it renders the contract as a kind which is expressly or implicitly 
prohibited by statute, then the contract is unenforceable on the guilty party. 
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However, this decision overlooked common law factors and was unfair to the 
“guilty” party. 
In Buckley’s opinion, according to common law rules, when dealing with illegality 
committed during the performance of contract, the decisive factor is neither the 
seriousness of the illegality nor the regulation of statute. He argues that all 
connective factors, especially the degree of knowledge and deliberation on the 
“guilty” party, should be taken into account in order to avoid absurd decisions. 
This argument has been proved in two cases. In the Australian case Fitzgerald v 
F J Leonhardt Pty Ltd where a contract was performed illegally under statute, 
Kirby J, when deciding whether the illegality rendered the contract 
unenforceable, decided that “It would be absurd if a trivial breach of a statutory 
provision constituting illegality, connected in some way with a contract or 
contracting parties, could be held to justify the total withdrawal of the facilities of 
the courts. It would be doubly absurd if the courts closed their doors to a party 
seeking to enforce its contractual rights without having regard to the degree of 
that party's transgression, the deliberateness or otherwise of its breach of the 
law and its state of mind generally relevant to the illegality. Similarly, it would be 
absurd if a court were permitted, or required, to consider the refusal of relief 
without careful regard to the relationship between the prohibited conduct and the 
impugned contract”275. Therefore, based on this case, it is clear that trivial 
breach of statute did not render the contract unenforceable because it was 
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proved that the illegality had not been committed deliberately and had no 
connection with the contract. A similar case in English law is the case Colen and 
Another v Cebrian (UK) Ltd 276 , when the applicants sued the defendant 
company for unfair dismissal, breach of contract and unlawful deduction of 
wages. The defendant alleged that the employment contract had been 
performed illegally since the company paid the wages to the applicants with the 
intention to defraud revenue. However, the court dismissed the company’s 
appeal on the ground that it was intended that the contract be lawfully 
performed. 
Another factor which needs to be considered is the knowledge of illegality. In the 
case Cunard v Hyde, the insurance policy which covered the cargo and freight 
was avoided not only because the cargo that had been loaded was carried in a 
way which was contrary to the statute but also because “the insured knew of the 
master’s act, in the sense of consenting to it and wanting it to be done”277. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the seriousness of the illegality is not the only 
criteria that needs to be considered when dealing with the illegal performance of 
contract issues; as long as a trivial illegality was not committed knowingly or 
deliberately, then it should not render the contract unenforceable. The function of 
this test is that “The formidable task of proving the necessary degree of 
knowledge and deliberation should deter the majority of parties from seeking to 
escape from their contractual obligations by relying upon the other parties’ 
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unlawful performance”278. 
As to the knowledge of the contractual parties at this stage, is similar to statutory 
illegality. There is a requirement for participation as well. This issue was decided 
in the case Ashmore, Benson, Pease & Co. Ltd. v A. V. Dawson Ltd. In this case, 
a carriage of goods contract was made between the plaintiff and the defendant 
and during the performance of the contract, the defendant’s driver overloaded 
the lorries in a way which was illegal. The manager of the plaintiff company had 
watched the loading process of the goods without objection. During the 
transportation, one of the Lorries toppled over and the goods were damaged. At 
the trial, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for the damages, 
but the court decided that the damages were not recoverable since Lord 
Denning found that, “Not only did Mr. Bulmer (the plaintiff) know of the illegality. 
He participated in it by sanctioning the loading of the vehicle with a load in 
excess of the regulations. That participation in the illegal performance of the 
contract debars Ashmores from suing Dawsons on it or suing Dawsons for 
negligence”279. 
Other than the intention and knowledge factors, it was raised in this case that 
more factors should be considered when dealing with the issue of “whether the 
common law would say that a contract has by its illegal performance been 
turned into an illegal contract”280.  
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It was cited by Waller LJ that “If at the date of the contract the contract was 
perfectly lawful and it was intended to perform it lawfully, the effect of some act of 
illegal performance is not automatically to render the contract unenforceable. If 
the contract is ultimately performed illegally and the party seeking to enforce 
takes part in the illegality that may render the contract unenforceable at his 
instigation. But not every act of illegality in performance, even participated in by 
the enforcer, will have that effect. If the person seeking to enforce the contract 
has to rely on his illegal action in order to succeed, then the court will not assist 
him. But if he does not have to do so, then in my view the question is whether the 
method of performance chosen and the degree of participation in that illegal 
performance is such as to “turn the contract into an illegal contract”281. 
The third factor is the reliance principle. In the expression of this principle, a 
person cannot rely on his own illegality to enforce the contract; otherwise the 
illegal performance of the contract will not influence the validity of the contract. 
This principle is based on the judgment of the House of Lords case Tinsley v 
Milligan. Both Miss Tinsley and Miss Milligan contributed to the purchase of a 
house, but the house was registered solely in Miss Tinsley’s name in order for 
Miss Milligan to defraud the Department of Social Society; both of them had 
knowledge of the illegality and participated in it. Later, Miss Milligan moved out 
and claimed her legal title to the house and Miss Tinsley used the illegality 
defence. However, the House of Lords contended that “a claimant to an interest 
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in property, whether based on a legal or equitable title, was entitled to recover if 
he was not forced to plead or rely on an illegality; even although it transpired that 
the title on which he relied was acquired in the course of carrying through an 
illegal transaction”282. However, it was indicated by the House of Lords that this 
principle only applied to property claims, although not explicitly. Other than this, 
the scope of this principle is not clear, since in contractual illegality cases, if the 
parties need to enforce the contract or to get remedies from the contract, the 
parties will always be relying on the illegality. Therefore, it seems that the 
reliance principle is not a proper exception to the common law rule. 
4.3.3 The rationales behind the public policy which renders the contract illegal 
 
This section will consider the rationales which underlie contractual illegality rules 
and discuss whether these rationales are appropriate. The rationales are the 
foundation of the illegality defence and are used to demonstrate the requirement 
for the existence of such a law. And such rationales can also be applied in the 
judgments of illegality cases. 
1 The first rationale recognised by the Law Commission is that of “furthering the 
purpose of the rule which the claimant’s illegal behaviour had infringed283”.  
The fundamental aim of the rationale is to protect the purpose of the law which 
has been infringed by disallowing the guilty party’s claim; the law which has been 
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infringed contains both statute and common law and public policy. However, the 
application of this rationale is complex due to the vague language of the law. 
The first vague point which needs to be clarified is what the rule contains. It can 
be demonstrated that the “rule” in this rationale contains not only statute, but 
also common law. One example is the case Cope v Rowlands in which the 
plaintiff broker acted as a stockbroker who was not duly licensed, authorized, 
and empowered according to the statute. The court decided that “It is perfectly 
settled, that where the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce, be it express 
or implied, is expressly or by implication forbidden by the common or statute law, 
no court will lend its assistance to give it effect”284. Even though the statute only 
inflicts a penalty, this penalty shows that the objective of the statute is to prohibit 
such conduct, and the plaintiff’s claim was declined since the court needed to 
protect the purpose of the statute. Another kind of violation exists in the violation 
of common law, as expressed in the judgment of Cope v Rowlands. In Awwad v 
Geraghty, this dealt with the unjust enrichment of a lawyer. In this case, the 
defendant’s claim for quantum meruit was declined since the judge found that 
“what public policy seeks to prevent is a solicitor continuing to act for a client 
under a conditional normal fee arrangement”285 and to allow the defendant’s 
claimant would have been contrary to the purpose of the rule. 
From the judgments of the two cases, it can be seen that, when dealing with 
illegality cases based on this rationale, the object of the law needs to be clarified 
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first, then as far as the true purpose of the law is concerned, if it has not been 
infringed or the purpose of the law is not to render the contract unenforceable, 
then these circumstances will be exceptions to the rationale. 
The first exception is that, so far as the function of the penalty is concerned, the 
penalty inflicted by the statute does not necessarily mean the contract is illegal 
and unenforceable; the true intention of the statute needs to be considered, 
whether it is to forbid the contract or just to impose a fine upon it. This principle 
has been decided by several cases, including the St. John Shipping Corporation 
case.  
The second exception is when the illegality which the parties have committed is 
not what the law is intending to prohibit. In the case Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. 
v S. Spanglett Ltd, both the defendant and the plaintiff had no knowledge that 
the defendant’s van was not eligible to transport goods for reward. The 
defendant and the plaintiff’s company made a contract for the carriage of goods 
and the goods were stolen due to the carelessness of the defendant’s driver; the 
plaintiff claimed damages for the goods and the defendant used the illegality 
defence which is that, by using a vehicle which was not licenced to transport 
goods for reward, as regulated by the statute, the contract had been tainted by 
such illegality and was unenforceable. In this case, although there was a clear 
infringement of statute, the court decided that: firstly, “The plaintiffs' part of the 
contract could not constitute an illegal use of the vehicle by them since they were 
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not "using" the vehicle286” (that is, the plaintiff’s use of the vehicle was not 
covered by the contract); and secondly, “The object of the Road and Rail Traffic 
Act, 1933 , was not (in this connection) to interfere with the owner of goods or his 
facilities for transport, but to control those who provided the transport, with a 
view to promoting its efficiency287”and therefore, to render the carriage contract 
unenforceable was not the object of the statute. Thus neither the conduct of the 
defendant nor the conduct of the plaintiff could be rendered illegal based on the 
object of the statute. 
The third exception is that, even if one or both of the contractual parties have 
committed an illegality, either in the formation of the contract or the performance 
of the contract, based on the protection of the purpose of the law, the court may 
reject the illegality defence. In the European Union case Courage Ltd v 
Crehan288, the defendant tenant rented a house from the claimant, a brewery, 
and concluded with an agreement that all tied tenants were to be obliged to buy 
their beer exclusively from the claimant and at specified prices. The claimant 
required the recovery of a sum for unpaid deliveries of beer, but the defendant 
denied the claim on the ground that their agreement was contrary to the 
prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and practices in article 81 EC 1 and 
therefore unenforceable. However, the court, based on EU law, decided that: 
firstly, “article 81 EC is to be interpreted as meaning that a party to a prohibited 
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lease of a public house containing an exclusive purchase clause may rely on the 
nullity of that lease before the courts 289 ”; and secondly, “Community law 
precludes a rule of national law which prevents a party subject to a clause in a 
contract which infringes article 81 EC from recovering damages for the loss 
suffered by it on the sole ground that it is a party to that contract290” although 
Community law does not preclude “a rule of national law which provides that 
courts should not allow a person to plead and/or rely on his own illegal actions 
as a necessary step to recovery of damages”291. The rationale behind these, 
which seem absurd in regard to English illegality rules, is that the purpose of 
article 81 is to maintain effective competition in the community and to protect “a 
party to the agreement where that party bears no significant responsibility for the 
distortion of competition292” and if the defendant’s right was denied because of 
illegality then the purpose would be frustrated. However, this decision is contrary 
to some basic principles underlying the illegality defence which will be 
considered later. 
2 The second rationale concerns the consistency test.  
This test was explained in the chapter which relates to illegality in tort law. This 
test originates from tort law: in the Canadian tort case Hall v Hebert, it was 
concluded that “there is a need in the law of tort for a principle which permits 
judges to deny recovery to a plaintiff on the ground that to do so would 
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undermine the integrity of the justice system. The power is a limited one. Its use 
is justified where allowing the plaintiff’s claim would introduce inconsistency into 
the fabric of the law, either by permitting the plaintiff to profit from an illegal or 
wrongful act, or to evade a penalty prescribed by criminal law”293. 
However, this rationale is similar to the previous policy which was discussed 
before, and similar to the policy that maintains the integrity of the legal system, 
which will be discussed later. Therefore, if the contract is inconsistent with 
statutory requirements, then the contractual parties’ rights under the contract will 
not be allowed, since the consistency principle applies. However, this principle 
cannot be applied on its own. 
3 The third principle which underlies the illegality defence is that no one can 
profit from his or her own illegality.  
This is the most fundamental principle underlying the illegality defence and was 
first decided in the case Hall v. Knight where a woman had killed a testator in 
circumstances which amounted to (involuntary) manslaughter. It was decided by 
Swinfen Eady L.J. that “The estate of the testator must go in the same way as if 
there were no benefit given to Jean Baxter by the will and that she cannot in any 
way benefit from the crime which she has committed. I see no reason for 
restricting the rule to cases of murder”294. Therefore, it was decided in this case 
that whether a party can profit from his illegality or not is vital when deciding 
whether the illegality defence can be sustained.  
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This was further confirmed in the case Beresford v Royal Insurance Company295. 
This case was discussed in the tort illegality chapter and concerned an assured 
who had shot himself in order to recover on his life insurance policy, which the 
assured had taken out with the defendant insurer. Although the life insurance 
policy was not illegal, the contract had been performed illegally since suicide 
was a crime; therefore, the assured’s claim for recovery was denied on the 
ground that to allow the claim would permit the assured to benefit from his 
suicide. As Lord Atkin concluded, “I think that the principle is that a man is not to 
be allowed to have recourse to a Court of Justice to claim a benefit from his 
crime whether under a contract or a gift296” and “the absolute rule is that the 
Courts will not recognize a benefit accruing to a criminal from his crime”297. 
However, there are clear limitations to the application of this principle. In the 
case Strongman Ltd v Sincock, it was decided by Lord Denning that “It is, of 
course, a settled principle that a man cannot recover for the consequences of his 
own unlawful act, but this has always been confined to cases where the doer of 
the act knows it to be unlawful or is himself in some way morally culpable. It does 
not apply when he is an entirely innocent party”298.  For this principle to be 
applied, therefore, the claimant must be a true wrongdoer and the illegality 
committed should be serious enough; mere illegality is not enough for this 
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principle to be applied. 
4 The fourth principle is to deter unlawful or immoral conduct.  
This principle is the one most frequently cited by the courts. It was decided in the 
case Taylor v Bhail that “it is time that a clear message was sent to the 
commercial community. Let it be clearly understood if a builder or a garage or 
other suppliers agrees to provide a false estimate for word in order to enable its 
customer to obtain payment from his insurers to which he is not entitled, then it 
will be unable to recover payment from its customer and the customer will be 
unable to claim on his insurers even if he has paid for the work”299. However, the 
function of the principle is difficult to evaluate. Firstly, both contractual parties 
when entering the contract or performing the contract may not be aware of the 
law, so, other than in cases in which both parties intend to carry out the contract 
illegally, the judgment of the cases may not have an impact on the parties. 
Secondly, in a situation where both the contractual parties have knowledge of 
the illegality and enter the contract with the intention to act illegally, if the 
deterrence principle is applied to one party then this may result in an unmerited 
windfall: as Lord Lowry cited in the case Tinsley v Milligan, “I am not impressed 
by the argument that the wide principle acts as a deterrent to persons in A's 
position. In the first place, they may not be aware of the principle and are unlikely 
to consult a reputable solicitor. Secondly, if they commit a fraud, they will not 
have been deterred by the possibility of being found out and prosecuted. 
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Furthermore, the wide principle could be a positive encouragement to B, if he is 
aware of the principle, because by means of his complicity, he may become not 
only the legal owner but the beneficial owner”300. There is a discussion on the 
function of the deterrence rule in criminal law and commercial law: it used to be 
believed that the deterrence principle had more influence in criminal and tort 
cases, but it was proposed by the Law Commission that deterrence is an 
important policy behind the illegality doctrine301. 
5 The fifth principle is to maintain the integrity of the courts 
The general expression of this principle can be summarised as stating that the 
proper rule of the court is not to provide an arena in which wrongdoers may fight 
over their spoils302. This principle was concluded in the case Thackwell v 
Barclays Bank plc and proposes that the court would refuse to assist the 
claimant claim if allowing the claim would be an “affront to the public conscience 
if by affording him the relief sought the court was seen to be indirectly assisting 
or encouraging the plaintiff in his criminal act”303. This principle was cited in three 
cases. In the case Everet v Williams, the plaintiff’s claims were denied since the 
court needed to reflect on the “indignity to the court”. In the second case, 
Tappenden v Randall, it was decided by judges that “Undoubtedly there may be 
cases where the contract may be of a nature too grossly immoral for the Court to 
enter into any discussion of it; as where one man has paid money by way of hire 
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to another to murder a third person304”. In the third case, Parkinson v College of 
Ambulance Ltd and Harrison, “A person in the position of this plaintiff could claim 
and be awarded damages for the loss of a title or for obtaining one of a less 
degree than that for which he had bargained; a person in the position of these 
defendants could claim and be awarded damages for not receiving the promised 
contribution, although the title had been obtained. No Court could try such an 
action and allow such damages to be awarded with any propriety or decency”305. 
However, this principle can also be applied even when both contractual parties 
do not raise the issue. In the case Re Mahmoud v Ispahani, it was cited that“In 
my view, the Court is bound, once it knows that the contract is illegal, to take 
objection and to refuse to enforce the contract, whether its knowledge comes 
from the statement of the party who was guilty of the illegality, or whether its 
knowledge comes from outside sources. The Court does not sit to enforce illegal 
contracts.306” It was also cited in the case Birkett v Acorn Business Machines Ltd 
that “The principle behind the court’s intervention of its own motion in such a 
case is to ensure that its process is not being abused307”. 
The merit of this principle is obvious: in circumstances where there is no clear 
authorization in the transaction and cannot be rendered illegal according to 
common law, then, if the transaction is morally disputative and the performance 
of the claimant is morally unacceptable, under such circumstances this principle 
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can be applied by the courts. 
However, the limitation of this principle is also clear. The courts will not use the 
principle to deny the relief of the claimant if only a trivial breach of the law has 
been involved. Therefore, for this principle to be applied, the illegality involved in 
the case should be serious enough.  
6 The sixth principle refers to punishments 
This principle is seldom referred to by the courts. It has been suggested by the 
courts that they should “refuse a civil cause of action in cases involving illegal 
transactions in order to punish the plaintiff”308. However, it is agreed that this 
principle has a greater function in criminal law than in civil law; the intention of 
civil law is not to punish wrongdoers; depriving them of their relief and 
contractual rights is enough. This principle was therefore considered by the law 
commission report as not being a principle underlying the illegality doctrine. 
However, it was also argued that if the action of the claimant is serious enough, 
then the punishment should be considered by the courts. 
7 The seventh principle is the proportionate test 
The proportionate test was discussed in the tort law chapter. Regarding the 
decision on the case Jorcy v Obrien 309 , it seems that under tort law 
circumstances, the proportionate test is abolished. However, under contract law, 
the situation is quite different. In the case parkingeye v Somerfield, the fact was 
that most parts of the contract could be performed lawfully and most of the 
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contract had indeed been performed lawfully; however, both the claimant and 
the defendant had participated in a minor illegality and if the contract had been 
rendered unlawful, then the claimant would have lost all the lawful income. In 
deciding this case, Sir Robin Jacob decided that the repudiation of the contract 
by the defendant, which depended on the illegality of the claimant, was wrongful 
and would lead to disproportionate results, namely that “Somerfield's wrongful 
repudiation of the contract left ParkingEye with no remedy for a lost income, 
which would have been wholly lawful”310. The proportionate test was applied in 
this case and the defendant’s illegality defence failed. The reasons for this 
judgement can be analysed: firstly, for the illegality defence to be sustained “it 
must find its justification firmly in one or more of the rationales”. Therefore, even 
though under such cases there was an illegal intention and participation on the 
part of the claimant, the illegality defence could not be sustained only based on 
this. Secondly, although the public conscience test was rejected in Tinsley v 
Milligan, this does not mean that application of the proportionate test is a matter 
of judicial discretion, since “Proportionality as I see it is something rather 
different. It involves the assessment of how far refusal of the remedy furthers 
one or more of the specific policies underlying the defence of illegality”311. Thirdly, 
as has been indicated by the courts in less serious cases, where both of the 
contractual parties are to be blamed, denial of one party's claim on the ground of 
illegality will mean an unjustified benefit being given to the other. 
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Therefore, based on these three points, it seems that the proportionate test is 
more valuable in contract law circumstances. 
4.4 The difference between statutory illegality and common law illegality under 
both tort law and contract law 
4.4.1 The necessity of distinguishing between common law illegality and 
statutory illegality 
Contract under English law can be rendered illegal either by statute or by 
common law. In the law commission report No.189, the law commission agreed 
that this kind of distinction is helpful, However, it has not been explicitly 
explained why this distinction is necessary and to what extent the distinction is 
helpful; this is the aim of this sub-chapter. Compared with illegality in tort law, the 
illegality cases in contract law are far more complex312. 
4.4.2 The distinction between common law illegality and statutory illegality 
To clarify the reason for this distinction is to explain the necessity for this 
distinction as well.  
The first reason for this distinction is that the courts may come to different 
conclusions when dealing with illegality because of the different kinds of law. 
One of the more significant differences between statutory illegality and common 
law illegality is that, when a court is dealing with a former case, judges will be 
constrained by the words of the statute, especially when there is an express 
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prohibition in the statute. In the Gaming Act 1845 and 1892, for example, there is 
an express provision that any contract made in contravention of the Act will be 
void, and therefore, when courts are dealing with illegality based on a violation of 
statutes, in most cases the courts will come to one single conclusion. However, 
in illegality cases based on common law, although the courts will normally take 
precedents into account, they may not necessarily be constrained by the 
judgments of former authorities and the courts will take more factors into account, 
such as, for example, the intention of the parties when entering the contract and 
the circumstances in which the illegality happened. Therefore, by taking the 
unique factors of different cases into consideration, the courts will reach different 
conclusions. 
Secondly, the factors which the courts consider when dealing with illegality 
cases may vary from illegality based on statute and illegality based on common 
law. When the courts are dealing with an illegality which originates from statutes 
the factors which are considered by the courts may be different. Firstly, if there is 
an express prohibition and the consequence of such violation is explicit in the 
statute, then all the courts need to consider is whether the act or the contract 
falls into this scope. 
However, secondly, if there is only a prohibition in the statute and the 
consequence of the violation is not clear, then the courts will take more factors 
into consideration. If in the circumstance where the making of the contract is 
expressly prohibited by the statute, then the contract will be avoided ab initio as 
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was the case with Archbolds Ltd v S. Spanglett313; however, if only the action of 
the parties during the performance of the contract is prohibited by statute, then 
the intention of the statute, namely whether the statute intends to forbidden a 
contract of such class, the seriousness of the illegal conduct and the causal link 
between the loss and illegality will be considered. 
The most significant difference regarding this issue between illegality in common 
law and illegality in statute is that, with regard to illegality in common law cases, 
the intention of the parties when entering into the contract will be considered as 
well. In circumstances in which contracts are rendered illegal by statute if the 
true construction of the statute is to deprive the civil rights of contractual parties, 
then it does not matter whether the parties are aware of the law or not or whether 
the parties intend to break the law or not; as was decided in the case Kiriri 
Cotton Co ltd v Dewani, the contractual parties have a duty to observe the law314. 
Compared with the illegality of statute, the courts, when deciding cases related 
to a violation of common law, see the contractual parties’ intention when entering 
into the contract as being of great importance. Therefore, if the parties when 
entering into the contract had no intention of violating the law, then the illegality 
existing in the contract will not render the contract unenforceable.  
Compared with illegality rendered by statutes, there are basically three 
differences between the common law illegality and statutory illegality: firstly, the 
principles under common law are changeable. The common law rules which 
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underlie public policy are not immutable and are changeable with respect to 
changes in circumstances. As a result of this, as will be illustrated below, an 
illegality principle under common law, when applied to other cases where the 
facts are similar, will sometimes come to different results. When dealing with 
such cases, the courts will keep taking different factors into consideration; 
secondly, under some certain circumstances, the courts can create new heads 
of public policy under common law rather than only applying existing doctrines. 
With regard to this characteristic, there is doubt over whether the courts have 
this kind of authority. In the judgments of earlier cases, it seems that the courts 
were bound by the authorities of former cases and merely applied them with 
caution, as can be seen in the case Egerton v Earl Brownlow, which dealt with 
the restraint of trade. It was argued by the court that “… we are not thereby 
authorized to establish as law everything which we may think for the public good, 
and prohibit everything which we think otherwise”315, and a contract is only illegal 
if it goes against the principle of established law. The reason for this prohibition 
is that this will lead to great uncertainty and confusion. The method which the 
court has adopted when dealing with new cases is that: “……in a new and 
unprecedented case to be afraid of imitating their example. I think I am bound to 
look for the principles of former decisions and not to shrink from applying them 
with firmness and caution to any new and extraordinary case that may arise”316. 
However, on the other hand, it was argued that some authorities support the 
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construction of new public policies; in the case Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and 
Ammunition Co. v. Nordenfelt Bowen L.J stated that ““Rules which rest upon the 
foundation of public policy, not being rules which belong to the fixed or 
customary law, are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or modification. 
Circumstances may change and make a commercial practice expedient, which 
formerly was mischievous to commerce”317. However, the word modification in 
this judgment does not necessarily mean that the courts have the authority to 
create a new public policy and it seems that the core of the debate which relates 
to the authority of the courts is what the new public policy is. It is very difficult to 
create- a completely new public policy since, firstly, the courts are not likely to 
interfere with the freedom of contract and secondly the government has a 
special of law reform; in most cases, a new public policy which is applied is a 
modification of the existing principle according to the new circumstance, and 
therefore, from this perspective, the debate over the authority of creation more 
correctly concerns the authority of modification and application. According to 
authorities in common law, modifications have never been prohibited. Such 
modification of the law clearly does not exist in statute illegality cases. 
Thirdly, the common law doctrine is more flexible and therefore more suitable to 
the unpredictable nature of illegality in contract law; with the development of 
society and the incomplete natures of laws, new modes of illegality in contract 
can be created by contractual parties from time to time, just as discovered by Sir 
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William Holdsworth. In order to maintain the fixed principles created previously, a 
body like common law should be able to suppress practices under new disguises 
which seek to weaken or negate them318. Statutes also have this kind of function; 
however, statutes cannot be modified with respect to every new form of illegality. 
Another difference which can be drawn between illegality under statute and 
illegality under common law is that there is a difference between the acts which 
are rendered illegal by statutes and the contract itself being rendered illegal by 
statutes. In the former case, if the contract is entered into without the objection of 
committing an illegality, then such contract is still illegal under common law; 
however, in the latter case, the contract is clearly illegal because of its violation 
of statute.    
4.5 The application of contract law illegality principles in insurance 
In the first section of this chapter, illegality issues in contract law were 
considered; both the basic principles of statutory illegality and common law 
illegality were covered, and the rationales underlying the illegality principle and 
factors which influence the courts’ judgment when dealing with illegality cases 
were also discussed. The second part of this chapter will explore insurance 
illegality cases when the laws concerning contractual illegality are applied and 
will consider the differences between the two scenarios. 
Additionally, in this section, statutory illegality cases and illegality with regard to 
performance will be considered separately, since as has been demonstrated, the 
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principles which apply in these two kinds of illegality are quite different from each 
other. 
4.5.1 Statutory illegality rules in insurance  
The statutory illegality issues in insurance contracts will be considered first. 
Similarly to statutory illegality in contract law, in insurance law there are two 
situations where an insurance contract can be tainted by statutory illegality. In 
the first situation, the actual formation of the insurance policy can be illegal, 
either by the express prohibition of a statute or by the implied prohibition of a 
statute; in the second situation, it is the act which the assured plans to commit 
that may be illegal as it is prohibited by statute. 
The first situation is where the insurance policy is expressly prohibited and 
rendered unenforceable or void by a statute; however, such cases existed in the 
past when life and fire insurance were rendered as immoral and are rare now. 
There are commonly no such expressly or clearly prohibited areas in statute. In 
most circumstances, for example, the statute may have a requirement regarding 
the qualifications of the insurer or it could be that the conduct which is intended 
to be performed under the insurance policy could be rendered illegal by statutes 
but under such circumstances, since there is no express statement in the statute 
that such an insurance policy should be rendered void or unenforceable, then, 
similarly to situations in contract law, the intention of the statute should be 
considered. When dealing with the intention of the statute in contract law, as was 
discussed earlier, the courts will consider the wording of the statute first in order 
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to decide whether the illegality which the parties have committed fell in the albeit 
of the statute and to decide whether the illegality is what the statute intends to 
prohibit, as was the case in Archbolds Ltd v S Spanglett Ltd. Besides the word 
and the scope of the statute, in situations where there is a penalty for illegal 
conduct on the part of the contractual parties, the courts need to consider the 
function of the penalty and the intention of the penalty, namely, whether the 
penalty is imposed to punish the guilty party or to protect the public interest; if 
the former, then the contract may not be rendered unenforceable, but if the latter, 
it will be. Other than these two rules, the knowledge of the contractual parties is 
crucial as well; if one of the parties has no knowledge of the illegal conduct of the 
other party, then the contract can still be enforced by the innocent party.  
However, as has been demonstrated in a number of cases, the statutory illegality 
rules in insurance law are not the same as they are in contract law. It seems that, 
in different kinds of statutory illegality situations in insurance cases, the courts 
will adopt different methods. 
In the most straightforward situation, that is, when the insurance business is 
carried out by an unauthorized insurer, then the question is whether the 
insurance policy or contract issued by the unauthorized insurer is unenforceable 
or void. Section 2 of the Insurance Companies Act 1974 regulates that: “(1) No 
person shall carry on in Great Britain insurance business of a class relevant for 
the purposes of this Part of this Act, other than industrial assurance business” 
and "(1) A person who carries on business in contravention of this Part of this Act 
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shall be guilty of an offence...”319. With regard to this statute, there are two cases 
in which the judgments contradict each other.  
In the first case, Bedford Insurance Co. v Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil, the 
plaintiff and its agent carried out insurance business in the UK without 
authorization; the plaintiff’s agent issued several marine insurance policies in the 
plaintiff’s name and reinsured these policies with the defendant reinsurer to 
which the plaintiff was party. An assured under the marine insurance policy 
made a claim against the plaintiff and the plaintiff brought an action against the 
defendant to claim an indemnity under the reinsurance policy; however, the 
defendant denied the claim on the ground that both the plaintiff and the agents 
were not authorized according to the statute and therefore the insurance issued 
by them was in contravention of the statute and the plaintiff could not rely upon 
this illegality to establish the cause of action under the reinsurance contract. In 
the judgment of the case, the court regulated that Section 2(1) of the Insurance 
Companies Act 1974 was an express prohibition and concluded that “ an 
express prohibition upon the making of contracts avoided ab initio any contract 
made in contravention of it; and that, accordingly, the original contracts, even if 
they had been made with the plaintiffs' authority, would have been avoided ab 
initio and unenforceable, so that the plaintiffs could therefore not recover in 
respect of them under the reinsurance”320. Therefore, by examining the wording 
of the statute, the court rendered that it signified an express prohibition on the 
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contract violating this statute. However, this decision was criticized by later 
cases; as Leggatt J argued:  “(the judgment of the case) with the probable 
result that the offending insurer may keep premiums paid by an innocent insured 
and yet not be liable to pay claims” is clearly unfair to the assured. 
In contrast, in the case Stewart v Oriental Fire and Marine Insurance Co.321, the 
court adopted a different method when dealing with the circumstances where 
both the insurer and its agents had no knowledge of the unauthorized insurance 
business. In this case, the plaintiff reassured entered into a reinsurance contract 
with the defendant reinsurer to reinsure its primary insurance contract. However, 
the defendant and its agents had no authority to carry out insurance business in 
GB and the plaintiff had no knowledge of this. The plaintiff brought an action 
against the defendant for the compensation of the loss of its primary insurance; 
the key question regarding this compensation is whether the plaintiff had lost its 
right to compensation since, according to the judgement of the Bedford case, the 
court was inclined to render the insurance policy issued by the unauthorized 
unenforceable and void by following the statute. The solution to this is an 
essential question of statutory construction that is, whether the statute expressly 
or implicitly prohibits the contract and intends to render it void and unenforceable. 
In the judgement, Leggatt J quoted the Australia case Yango Pastoral Co. Pty. 
Ltd. v. First Chicago Australia Ltd to explain the principle of construing statute: “it 
is a matter of construing the statute and in construing the statute the court will 
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have regard not only to its language, which may or may not touch upon the 
question, but also to the scope and purpose of the statute from which inferences 
may be drawn as to the legislative intention regarding the extent and the effect of 
the prohibition which the statute contains”322. By applying this principle and 
carefully examining the word of the statute, the court found that: “The express 
prohibition here is against carrying on in Great Britain insurance business of a 
relevant class without authorisation. There is no direct reference to contracts of 
insurance”323. Therefore, the judgment clearly overruled the decision of the 
Bedford case. Later, Leggatt J went to consider the possibility of the implied 
prohibition of the statute. By citing the Australian case, Leggatt J indicated that 
when deciding whether there was an implied prohibition in the statute, the court 
should also consider the intention of the scope of the statute and according to 
Devlin J “in default of a clear implication a court ought to be very slow to hold 
that a statute intends to interfere with the rights and remedies given by the 
ordinary law of contract”324. According to the judgement of the case St. John 
Shipping Corporation, Leggatt J also agreed that the “Authority therefore 
requires the court in the absence of express prohibition to look at the policy of 
the Act and to take account of the commercial effect of construing it in a 
particular way”325. The intention of the statute, as argued by Leggatt J, “is 
not……to leave a person uninsured who has entered into an apparently valid 
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contract of insurance of a relevant class with an insurer who turns out, 
unbeknown to the person seeking insurance, to have effected it without 
authorisation and to be similarly without authorisation to carry it out”326, and the 
“Act of 1974 meant to do no more than penalise the insurer who contravenes the 
prohibition against carrying on business in Great Britain without authorisation: it 
did not intend to go further and prohibit contracts of insurance, the effecting and 
carrying out of which constitute the carrying on of insurance business”327. 
Therefore, using a combination of these three factors, the learned judge came to 
the decision that, “In my judgment, as a matter of commercial practicality 
contracts of insurance such as these should not, except of necessity, be 
rendered unenforceable by an innocent insured”328. 
In the judgment of this case, it is clear that the court had adopted the principles 
which were introduced in contract statutory illegality cases. Both the intention of 
the statute and the intention and knowledge of the contractual parties were 
considered when dealing with the issue of whether the statute intends to forbid 
this kind of contract. It is clear that the mere fact of illegality cannot render the 
insurance contract unenforceable automatically. 
However, developments have been made on the unauthorised insurance area 
after the 1974 Act, although does not contradict with the first category of 
statutory illegality but worth to be introduced here. The 1974 Insurance 
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Company Act has been repealed by the 1982 Insurance Company Act and still 
regulated that, the insurer which can carry out insurance business in UK should 
be authorised. The consequence of violation of this piece of law has been 
expressed in the section 132 of Financial Service Act 1986, which states that “in 
contravention of section 2 of the of s. 2 of Insurance Companies Act 1982 shall 
be unenforceable against Insurance the other party; and that party shall be 
entitled to recover any Companies money or other property paid or transferred 
by him under the contract, together with compensation for any los sustained by 
him as a result of having parted with it”329. Therefore, in the case which the 
insurer is not qualified to carry insurance business in the UK, the assured can 
still recover his losses which is different from early authorities. And furthermore, 
in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, there are two categories of 
illegal activities. In the first category if an authorised insurer does not carry on 
insurance business according to permission, then as stated in section 20 of this 
Act, such contravention of this Act still does not “(a) make a person guilty of an 
offence; (b) make any transaction void or unenforceable; or (c) (subject to 
subsection (3)) give rise to any right of action for breach of statutory duty”330; 
however, if an unauthorised insurer describes him as authorised or indicates 
himself as an authorised person, then such activity is a guilty offence under this 
Act and according to section 24 (3) “A person guilty of an offence under this 
section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
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six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or both”331. 
Therefore, an insurance policy which is made by such guilty party is 
unenforceable against the other party, but “(2) The other party is entitled to 
recover—(a) any money or other property paid or transferred by him under the 
agreement; and (b) compensation for any loss sustained by him as a result of 
having parted with it”332. Therefore, even if the insurance policy is unenforceable, 
the assured can still recover the losses which as a result of entering into this 
contract. However, the Act also give two circumstances where the agreement 
which between the guilty party and the innocent party can be enforced: the first 
circumstance is that “The issue is whether the person carrying on the regulated 
activity concerned reasonably believed that he was not contravening the general 
prohibition by making the agreement”333; and the second one is that “The issue 
is whether the provider knew that the third party was (in carrying on the 
regulated activity) contravening the general prohibition” 334 . Namely, the 
knowledge of the law and the knowledge of the illegal act will be considered by 
the court as have been discussed before. Therefore, as can be seen from the 
latest development of this area of law, the statutes are becoming more generous 
than before, however, the factors which should be considered by the court when 
dealing with unauthorised insurer issue are still identical to former authorities. 
Therefore, even if the statute can be repealed, the common law rules still remain 
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stable when dealing with the first category of statutory illegality. 
The second category of statutory illegality in insurance law is where insurance 
contract intends to act illegally or the parties enter into the contract with the 
intention of acting illegally. 
According to the principle in contract law, as has been explained before, there is 
no decisive authority on this point. It was once argued by the authority that, if 
there is prohibition in statute either expressly or implicitly, then the unlawful 
contract is rendered unenforceable, even on the innocent party. Although this 
judgement was found to be harsh to the innocent party in the Law Commission 
Report 189, there is no clear authority which overrules such a decision. The 
other method adopted by the court is to divide illegality into illegality by formation 
and illegality by performance: if the formation of the contract is rendered illegal 
by statute, then the contract will be unenforceable and void; however, if the 
illegality exists in the performance of the contract then the regulation and 
prohibition in a statute will not be a decisive factor and thus, the innocent party in 
this circumstance may have the right to enforce the contract. 
Similarly, in insurance cases, if the assured enters into an insurance contract 
with the intention to rely on it to compensate his loss, which is a result of 
statutory illegality, or intends to use the insurance contract to commit a statutory 
illegality, then the insurance contract will be rendered unenforceable and void, 
just as the judgement in the Redmond v Smith: “A policy on an illegal voyage 
cannot be enforced; for it would be singular if, the original contract being invalid 
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and therefore incapable to be enforced, a collateral contract found upon it could 
be enforced”335. This was also the case in the Beresford case where the assured 
entered into the insurance with the intention of profiting the beneficiary by 
committing a crime. 
However, if the insurance contract is not entered with that intention and the 
illegality simply occurs during the performance of the insurance contract, then 
according to the authorities of both contract law and insurance law, it is unlikely 
that the contract will be rendered unenforceable automatically. In contract law, 
this principle was settled in the case St John Shipping Corp and it seems there is 
no authority in insurance law which regulates otherwise. In the circumstances 
where there is only one party entering into the contract with the intention of 
committing an illegal act, the other innocent party can sustain its rights under the 
contract as long as it can be proved that the innocent party has not shared the 
illegality purpose with the other party. Besides the principles which have been 
analysed above, according to the judgement of the case Bird v Appleton336 and 
Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst, in insurance law, under some circumstances, there is 
also a requirement for the connection between the illegality and the loss to be 
shown and the assured needs to rely upon its own unlawfulness to plead. In the 
case Euro-Diam Ltd, the assured’s diamonds were stolen in Germany and when 
the assured intended to recover under the insurance contract, the insurer 
contended that there had been a violation of the German tax act when the 
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diamonds were imported into Germany, and the insurer relied upon this illegality 
to reject the assured’s application. However, the Court of Appeal contended that 
the illegality committed by the assured had no connection with the theft of the 
diamonds and that, furthermore, the assured had no need to rely upon that 
illegality337. 
By analysing former authorities, it is clear that the factors which have been 
considered when dealing with statutory illegality in contract law also have an 
effect when dealing with insurance cases. There is also no implied term in 
insurance law that illegality can render the insurance contract unenforceable 
automatically. The tendency when dealing with statutory illegality cases in the 
area of insurance is not to render the whole contract unenforceable, at least on 
the part of the innocent party. 
4.5.2 Insurance illegality under common law 
Similarly to illegality in contract law, the insurance policy can be rendered illegal 
because of the assured’s illegal conduct. As has been discussed before, the 
common rule in contract law is that it does not recognise a situation where a 
contract that is lawful in its inception and can be lawfully performed can become 
illegal as formed simply because one of the parties performs it in an unlawful 
way. Therefore, in most circumstances, the insurer of an insurance policy which 
has been performed illegally will not seek to render the insurance contract 
unenforceable and void, but to use the illegality issue as a defence to decline the 
                                                             
337 Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1990] 1 Q.B. 1 
201 
 
assured’s right to compensation. Therefore, this section will discuss whether the 
illegality rules in contract law can be applied in insurance cases and the 
specialities of illegal performance in insurance law. 
4.5.2.1 Construction of the policy 
In contract law, the contract can be rendered illegal either by statute or by 
performance, but unlike contract law, in insurance law, the insurance policy can 
also be rendered illegal because of the construction of the insurance contract, 
this category being based on the judgement of Lord Atkin in Beresford v Royal 
Insurance Co Ltd: “On ordinary principles of insurance law an assured cannot by 
his own deliberate act cause the event upon which the insurance money is 
payable. The insurers have not agreed to pay on that happening. The fire 
assured cannot recover if he intentionally burns down his house, nor the marine 
assured if he scuttles his ship, nor the life assured if he deliberately ends his own 
life. This is not the result of public policy, but of the correct construction of the 
contract. 338 ” Therefore, according to this judgement, the assured can be 
precluded from recovery either because he has committed a crime or because 
his deliberate act has rendered the subject matter insured not an “accident” 
which the insurance policy intends to cover. 
The first speciality in insurance law is that the assured’s claim can be precluded 
by his deliberate acts, either illegal or legal. This principle can be divided into two: 
the first is where the assured has committed a criminal act intentionally and the 
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second is when the deliberate act committed by the assured is not illegal but 
results in loss. Under both circumstances, the assured’s claim can be denied. 
Firstly, according to the ex turpi causa principle, previously discussed, if the 
assured commits a criminal act deliberately then the assured cannot recover the 
loss or profit from the insurer. This was discussed in the section dealing with 
illegality of tort and, with the exception of motor insurance cases, it seems that 
as long as the assured has committed a crime which results in loss, then the 
assured cannot recover from the insurer, even though there is a debate in 
Australian case law over whether an exclusion for “criminal act” could exclude 
negligent or unintentional criminal acts rather than only intentional criminal acts.  
In the Australia case Australian Aviation Underwriting Pty Limited v Henry, the 
assured died in a traffic accident because the assured failed to pay due attention 
and collided with a vehicle on the other side of the road. There was an exclusion 
clause in the insurance policy which excluded loss resulting from the assured’s 
own criminal act and the insurer used this as a defence. However, “The Court 
construed the word "criminal" as excluding acts of negligence, notwithstanding 
that they were also criminal. Part of the basis of the Court's reasoning was that 
the parties to the agreement must have contemplated that a substantial reason 
for the existence of the cover was an accident arising from the insured's 
negligence and it could not have been intended to exclude that liability by 
reference to criminal acts”339. 
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Later, in the case Rian Lane v Dive Two Pty Ltd, the director of the defendant 
company Mr Todd was in breach of Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) because of 
dangerous navigation, the plaintiff was compensated by the defendant, and 
when the defendant claim compensation against his insurer, the insurer claimed 
that the criminal act was expressly excluded by an exclusion clause in the 
insurance policy, but the court decided that, for this exclusion clause to be 
applied, the criminal act must have been committed intentionally and negligence 
should not be taken into account: “The exclusion clause does not exclude cover 
in the instant case because the criminal act committed by Mr Todd was not 
intentional”340. In fact, in this case, the only obstacle which prevent the defendant 
to be indemnified by his insurance policy is that, the defendant’s broker failed to 
procure a proper insurance policy which should cover private and non-business 
risk for the defendant assured, and in a later judgment on the same case, the 
judge decided that, had there was no such negligence on the part of broker, the 
defendant should be compensated by his insurance policy, and therefore, the 
broker himself should be responsible for the defendant’s losses341. Therefore, 
this is a typical case where by constructing the words of exclusion clause of 
insurance policy to decide whether the insurance policy has been tainted by 
illegality or not. In the judgement of a later appeal which was raised by Horsell, 
the broker in 2013, it was confirmed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
that, although the insurance failed to respond, this is not because the assured’s 
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illegality, this was all because of the broker’s failure to perform his duty. 
Therefore, the broker was still responsible for the losses which suffered by the 
assured342. 
In English law, a case which was similarly decided is Patrick v Ronson 
International Ltd. In this case, Mr Patrick and his friends started a fire in a mill for 
amusement, neither of them having the intention of destroying the mill or of 
destroying the goods stored in the mill; however, the fire destroyed the stock 
which belonged to Ronson the company and caused loss, Mr Patrick and his 
friend were arrested and charged with arson but acquitted. Patrick was insured 
by a home and house insurance policy, and the exclusion clause in the 
insurance policy excluded “(viii) any wilful, malicious or criminal acts ....”. The 
Ronson Company sought compensation against the insurer and the insurer 
denied compensation based upon this exclusion clause. At the core of this case 
is the correct construction of the exclusion clause, based upon a former common 
law decision: the court decided that “So interpreted, as it seems to me, what is 
damage arising from a wilful act is damage deliberately caused, consciously 
intended. On the evidence in the present case it was not even suggested that Mr 
Patrick intended to burn down the Mill. The first ground of defence relied upon on 
behalf of Royal London thus fails”343. Therefore, in English law, for the insurer to 
deny the assured’s compensation based on the exclusion clause, the common 
principle needs the unlawful act to be performed intentionally as well. Therefore, 
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except for in motor insurance law, if a criminal act has been performed by the 
assured negligently, the court will adopt the principle seen in the Patrick case 
and consider the intention of the assured rather than the illegality and the loss as 
a primary factor. 
Besides the situation where it is necessary to distinguish whether the assured 
intends to commit a criminal/non-criminal act or not, there is also a necessity to 
distinguish whether the consequences caused by the assured’s act are 
consequences which the assured intends to achieve. The reason of such 
difference is whether the deliberate act committed by the assured is illegal or not. 
Thus, if the assured commits a crime intentionally, then even though the 
outcome of his criminality is not what the assured has planned, his 
compensation under the insurance policy will be denied, as happened in the 
case Gray v Barr. However, if the deliberate act committed by the assured is not 
illegal, then as long as the deliberate act of the assured is not the direct cause of 
the loss, then the assured can be compensated by the insurer344. 
Another difference which exists between contract law and insurance law in the 
performance of contract is that, in insurance law, because of the illegal 
performance of the assured, the subject matter or risk insured can be transferred 
into a category of “accident” which the insurance policy does not intend to cover. 
There is a connection between this kind of illegality and the wilful misconduct 
discussed above, since it is clear that, if there is no accident, then the assured 
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will be precluded from recovery according to the terms of the insurance policy. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish the circumstance which amount to no 
accident. 
A famous case that discussed this issue is Gray v Barr, which was discussed in 
the chapter dealing with tort. In this case, when deciding whether the shooting by 
the defendant was an accident under insurance law, it was decided by Lord 
Denning that: “… the word 'accidents' does not include injury which is caused 
deliberately or intentionally.”345. This point is agreed by Phillimore LJ, who 
contended that “No doubt the word 'accident' involves something fortuitous or 
unexpected, but the mere fact that a willful and culpable act—which is both 
reckless and unlawful—has a result which the actor did not intend surely does 
not, if that result was one which he ought reasonably to have anticipated, entitle 
him to say that it was an accident”346. 
Therefore, according to early authorities, there are two factors that should be 
considered when deciding whether the conduct of the assured amounts to an 
accident or not: firstly, whether the conduct is intentional and secondly, whether 
the consequence of the intentional conduct is foreseeable. This argument is 
supported by MacGillivray on Insurance Law, in the ninth edition of this book the 
authors proposed that: "For injury or loss to be other than accidental ... it suffices 
that he embarked upon a deliberate course of conduct where the occurrence of 
injury or loss was, objectively viewed, a natural and probable consequence of his 
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actions"347.  
However, the drawback to this solution is obvious, as indicated by Rix LJ with 
regard to the Charlton v Fisher case: “if "accident" was to be construed as 
excluding a deliberate act of damage or injury, then there would be a danger that 
a great number of situations frequently encountered in the context of driving 
would also have to be treated as no accident348”. Rix LJ therefore adopted 
another method of deciding whether a risk is an accident or not, - he contended 
that : “In this connection I would emphasize that it is not every deliberate criminal 
act, such as the deliberate decision to drive while drunk, or the deliberate 
decision to drive at excessive speed, or in contempt of road markings or 
directions or traffic lights, that would mean that any resultant loss/damage or 
injury would be no accident, even if, in a general way, the consequences of such 
conduct can be foreseen. In my opinion, such cases would still be cases of 
accident (see Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association Ltd [1921] 3 KB 327 ), 
just as deliberate but reckless conduct which results in the actor's death is not 
without more suicide. Thus I would for myself draw the distinction between 
damage caused by a deliberate criminal act (cf paragraph 36 of the judgment of 
Laws LJ) and damage intentionally caused. For these purposes it matters not 
that the actor is deliberately committing a crime but that he is deliberately 
causing damage”349. 
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In the case Tinline v White Cross Insurance Association Ltd, which Rix LJ cited, 
the assured knocked down three people while driving excessively; he sought 
compensation from the insurer but the insurer denied liability on the ground that 
“the personal injury did not arise out of an accident, but that it would be against 
public policy to indemnify a person against the civil consequences of his criminal 
act”350 . However, Bailhache J drew a distinction between loss caused by 
negligence, no matter how serious it is, and loss caused by intention, and said 
that: “It must of course be clearly understood that if this occurrence had been 
due to an intentional act on the part of the plaintiff, the policy would not protect 
him. If a man driving a motor car at an excessive speed intentionally runs into 
and kills a man, the result is not manslaughter but murder. Manslaughter is the 
result of an accident and murder is not, and it is against accident and accident 
only that this policy insures”351. 
Therefore, what Rix LJ tried to emphasize is that when deciding whether a risk is 
an accident or not, the mere fact that the assured has committed a criminal or 
non-criminal act intentionally is not enough; it has to be proved that the assured 
commits such conduct with an intention to cause loss. 
As has been previously analyzed, besides the common law principles which 
underlie the illegality defence in contract law, in insurance contracts, the courts 
have raised the construction of policy as a defence; thus, if there is a clear 
exclusion clause in the insurance policy, or the insured subject has been 
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rendered as not an accident because of the assured’s performance, then the 
contract can be rendered unenforceable. However, for this defence to be 
triggered, the courts still need to consider the factors under common law. 
4.5.2.2 Insurance policies rendered illegal by the public policy 
The public policy which underlies the illegality defence in contract law is also 
effective in insurance law, as the famous phrase states: “ex dolo malo non oritur 
actio”. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an 
immoral or an illegal act. The accurate classification of public policy is not clear 
and there is no need to classify it, since the main object of the illegality defence 
is simple - that the wrongdoer cannot recover indemnity for the loss which has 
been caused - and various factors will be considered according to the fact of 
every individual case. 
In the context of insurance, the methods for dealing with the illegality which 
relates to tort claims under insurance contract were discussed in the chapter 
dealing with contract circumstances. The public policy applied in insurance 
cases which do not relate to tort claims is almost the same as the public policy 
applied in contract law. There is also a requirement for the intention and 
knowledge of the illegality on the assured’s part; the causation between the 
illegality and the loss and the seriousness of the illegality; the assured should not 
rely on or benefit from his own illegality. There is no need to discuss these 
principles any further since they have been examined in a former chapter and 
there is no difference between the contract law rule and insurance law rule on 
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this point. The essence of these principles to apply is that the intention and 
knowledge of the assured is of great importance, and this is the first fact which 
needs to be clarified by the courts, since in absence of this, under most 
circumstances, the illegality defence will be denied except for a situation where 
there is an express prohibition under statute. The tendency of the courts when 
dealing with illegality issues in insurance contracts under common law is not to 
render the whole policy unenforceable, except when all the requirements have 
been fulfilled, since the harsh consequence of this is to leave the innocent party 
uncovered. 
 
4.6 The difference between tort illegality and contract illegality 
This part will be divided into two sections: the first section will explore the 
differences between contract law and tort law when dealing with the illegality 
defence issue; and the second section will discuss the reasons for these 
difference.  
4.6.1 The differences between contract law and tort law when dealing with the 
illegality defence 
The first and most significant difference between the contract illegality defence 
and the tort illegality defence is that the objective and consequence of the 
defence are different. 
Under tort law circumstances, the objective of the illegality defence is to leave 
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the claimant (maybe a tortfeasor) without protection, and to bar the unlawful 
party from claiming loss or compensation from the other party, which may be an 
innocent third party like an insurer or a joint illegality conductor. There is no 
contractual privity between the defendant and the claimant before the tort 
conduct happens and the objective of the defence is clear and specified. 
However, under contract law, the objective of the defence is to render the 
contract unenforceable because of the illegality which exists in the formation of 
the contract or in the performance of the contract. The differences in the 
objectives results in differences in the consequences of these two illegality 
defences. In the tort situation, the illegal party only loses the right of 
compensation; however, if a contract is rendered unenforceable, the illegal 
parties will loss every remedy and contractual right under the contract, the 
compensation right being only one of them. This is very harsh for the illegal party 
especially in the circumstance where the formation of the contract is rendered 
illegal or the party has committed an illegality which is expressly prohibited by 
statute. 
The second difference is that the factors which the courts consider when dealing 
with the illegality issues are different.  
For example, the intention and knowledge of the illegality are considered a 
significant factor in contract law when determining whether the illegality defence 
should be sustained. However, in tort law, as was concluded, the intention and 
knowledge of the illegal party is not as important as in contract law; if a tort 
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action has been performed, the courts will pay more attention to the causation 
link between the tort conduct and the loss; even if the illegality is not intentionally 
performed by the claimant, the mere causation link between the conduct and the 
loss is enough for the defence to sustain. This has been demonstrated in 
numerous cases especially after the narrow and wide rule. 
Other differences exist in the rationales which underlie the illegality defence. For 
example, with regard to the casual principle, when the courts deal with tort cases, 
they will pay more attention to the issue of whether the tort conduct is the main 
causation of the loss whereas in contract law circumstances, the courts will 
consider whether the illegality of the contractual parties has a connection with 
the content of the contract. When dealing with statutory illegality, in tort law, the 
courts will consider whether the statute intends to forbid the tort action, whilst in 
contract law, the courts will consider whether the statutes which forbid such 
illegal conduct are intended to render the whole contract unenforceable. 
The third difference is that the formation of illegality and the conduct which 
triggers the defence is different under contract law and tort law. It is clear that 
under tort law, there is only one kind of illegality - illegal performance. Under 
contract law, however, the formation of the contract, such as when the insurance 
contract is entered with an unauthorized insurer or the aim of the contract is to 
perform some illegal wrong, can be illegal as well. 
In spite of this difference, there are more actions which trigger the illegality 
defence under contract law than under tort law. In a contract situation, not only 
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might the tort or criminal act committed during the performance of the contract 
trigger the illegality, but so also might illegal acts which are not that severe, such 
as illegal parking or illegal transfer. 
In conclusion, besides the difference between the formation and objectives of 
illegality, when dealing with illegality issues under contract law, the courts are 
more cautious than in tort law, and take more factors into consideration. 
4.6.2 The reason for these differences 
This section will explore the reasons which underlie the differences. As can be 
seen from the previous two chapters, both the tort and contract illegality 
defences originate from the same case, that is the Holman v. Johnson case, and 
there should be a reason why the defence has been applied differently. 
The first reason is that under most circumstances, tort conduct can be seen as a 
special performance of contract and the illegality defence under tort law only 
protects the defendant from the consequences caused by the claimant’s illegal 
act. However, under contract law, the illegality, such as, for example, the illegal 
intention of the contractual parties when entering into the contract, may exist 
before the formation of the contract or prior to the performance of the contract 
and therefore the illegality defence under contract law may have the function of 
preventing further illegality, for instance, rendering a sale of gun contract 
unenforceable and possibly preventing the criminal from firing the gun. 
However, this difference is also the reason why the courts, when dealing with 
contract illegality, have adopted a more careful method than in tort cases and 
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view the intention and knowledge of the contractual parties as vital. The function 
of the illegality defence here is to prevent any further illegality, and if the 
contractual parties enter into the contract without the intention to commit a legal 
wrong or without the knowledge of such a legal wrong, then this is clearly not fair 
to the contractual parties. 
The second reason for the differences is because of the severe consequences 
under contract law. As has been demonstrated by the authorities, if a contract is 
rendered illegal, then the guilty party or both of the contractual parties cannot 
enforce the contract if both of the parties need to be blamed; if a contract is 
illegal in its formation and the contract can be determined as void, this means 
that the contract has not existed before. Under some circumstances, this 
consequence may leave the innocent party or the third party uncovered.  
The third reason for the difference is that the relationship between the 
contractual parties under contract and the relationship between the victim and 
the tortfeasor are different. Therefore, under contract law, the reason why the 
courts deal with the illegality defence with caution is in order to avoid the 
non-guilty party from failing to perform his contractual obligation or gaining a 
windfall benefit under insurance circumstance by keeping the premium and 
refusing to indemnify the assured. However, under tort law, there is no such 
concern; because the tort action has been performed, most of the liabilities of 
the tortfeasor to the victim are regulated by statute. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
The illegality issue in contract law is far more complex than it is in tort law. Under 
contract law circumstances, not only are the performances of the contractual 
parties considered, but the intention and knowledge of the parties are also taken 
into account. Unlike illegality in tort, the illegality issue in contract has closer 
connections with insurance contracts, as was discussed; when rendering an 
insurance contract unenforceable because of illegality, the mere fact of illegal 
conduct is clearly not enough, and both the intention and knowledge of the 
illegality as well as the construction of the insurance policy should be considered. 
There is clearly no implied term of legality under contract law. 
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Part Three: Common law rules in marine insurance: a necessary reform or a 
supplementary instrument? 
In part one, the development of the warranty of legality in marine insurance was 
discussed. In the second part, the principles of the illegality defence in both 
contract law and tort law and the rationales which underlie it were introduced, as 
were the situations under insurance law. It can be seen from these two parts that 
there is a big difference between common law illegality defence and the warranty 
of legality in marine insurance law. 
In the third part, this thesis will concentrate not only on the proper method for 
dealing with the illegality issue under marine insurance law, and whether 
common law illegality principles can be properly applied to marine insurance 
issues, but will also introduce and clarify the issues of foreign law illegality and 
the pending draft bill for insurance contract law. After this, every aspect of the 
issue of the warranty of legality in marine insurance law will be examined, and a 
way to reform marine insurance law will be proposed. 
This part will contain five chapters. The first chapter will explore the differences 
between the illegality defence and the warranty of legality and the reasons 
behind these differences. The second chapter will consider a special aspect of 
the warranty of legality, that is, the illegality issue under foreign law. The third 
chapter will consider the law regarding the marine insurance legality issue in 
other commonwealth jurisdictions, especially in Australian law. The fourth 
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chapter will introduce and analyse the Law Commission Report No 353 and the 
new draft bill of the Insurance Contract Act in detail, with a particular focus on 
their impact on the warranty of legality in marine insurance law. Finally, the fifth 
chapter will propose reasonable method for reforming Section 41of Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, even though a reform has already been proposed by the 
Law Commission. 
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Chapter 5: The differences between the illegality defence in common law and 
the warranty of legality in marine insurance and the reasons for the differences 
This chapter acts as a conclusion to the research covered in the former two parts. 
The aim of this chapter is to compare the illegality defence and the warranty of 
legality in marine insurance and to give a clear picture of the differences 
between them. By analysing these differences, the chapter will try to highlight 
the insufficiency of warranty of legality from the common law perspective and 
then attempt to explore why the English courts have adopted another method in 
marine insurance cases and whether these reasons still function nowadays to 
prevent marine insurance law from adopting the illegality defence in common 
law. This work will form the basis of the chapter on the reform of marine 
insurance law. The chapter contains three parts: the first deals with the nature of 
section 41; the second examines the differences between section 41 and the 
illegality defence in common law; and the third part considers the reasons 
underlying these differences. 
5.1 The nature of section 41 
This section will consider the nature of section 41 in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 and assess the nature of a violation of this section, in order to see whether 
the violation can be rendered as a statutory illegality or a common law illegality. 
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This issue is important firstly because, as has been discussed, under English 
law, the factors considered by the courts when dealing with illegality issues vary 
according to whether it is a statutory illegality or a common law illegality; and 
secondly, because the consequences of a statutory illegality and a common law 
illegality will also be different. Furthermore, the reform proposal will also be 
based to a large extent on the nature of section 41. If a violation of section 41 is 
a statutory illegality then, as will be discussed later, an appropriate reform 
proposal would be its abolition, since, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
statutory illegality requires more strict compliance and the defences for the 
unlawful doer are very limited, which is very different to common law illegality.  
To answer this question, this section will first consider early marine insurance 
cases in order to clarify the intention of the construction of this warranty and the 
early application of it. The early application of Section 41 in certain marine 
insurance cases will then be compared with the illegality rules under common 
law to decide whether the warranty of legality is a statutory illegality or a 
common law illegality. 
Besides this question, other aspects of the nature of the warranty of legality will 
also be considered. One of these aspects concerns whether the warranty of 
legality is a pre-contractual or a post-contractual requirement. If the warranty is a 
pre-contractual one, then the proper consequence of it being breached is to 
make it void; if, however, the warranty is a post-contractual one, then there can 
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only be a termination of the contract from that point, and this termination should 
have no influence on the remedy of parties under the contract. In either 
circumstance, there should be no single rule or punishment for each individual 
situation.  
By analysing these two questions, it will be easier to come to a conclusion as to 
whether the warranty of legality should be rendered as a warranty in marine 
insurance law any longer. 
5.1.1 Is violation of section 41 a statutory illegality? 
The first question which needs to be clarified is whether a violation of section 41 
is a statutory illegality. It is clear that the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is a statute 
under English law; however, the mere fact of this is not enough to render a 
violation of section 41 as a statutory illegality. 
Based on the previous two chapters, the features of statutory illegality under 
common law are clear: the statutory illegality may exist in the circumstances of 
the formation of the contract, the adventure of the insurance contract which 
needs to be covered and the performance of the contract; as to the 
consequence of the statutory illegality, besides very limited exceptions, in most 
situations, especially when the contract is formed illegally, the contract is 
rendered as void from the beginning and the factors the courts will consider 
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when deciding such a consequence are basically the intention and words of the 
statute. 
In the context of marine insurance, in the analysis of the intention and words of 
section 41, cases prior to 1906 shall be analysed, since the Act is a codification 
of marine insurance cases before 1906. A conclusion will then be reached as to 
whether Sir Mackenzie Dalzell Chalmers intended section 41 to be a statutory 
illegality or not. 
This question will be considered in two parts because of the distinct two parts of 
section 41. As to the first section, which requires the adventure to be a lawful 
one, it is clear that the violation of such a requirement is a statutory illegality. 
This is because firstly, cases prior to 1906 required strict compliance with 
statutes related to shipping and an adventure can be rendered unlawful in 
violation of any statute, including the King’s or council’s order or the Merchant 
Shipping Act352. Secondly, the consequence of such a violation is harsh and 
there are very limited defences for the assured. Under most such circumstances, 
the adventure is rendered illegal and the insurance policy upon it is made void, 
except in the situation where there is no possibility of the assured having 
information of the illegality. Thirdly, the words and the intention of the orders and 
statutes are the only two factors which have to be taken into consideration by the 
                                                             
352 Farmer v Legg 101 E.R.926 
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courts353 when deciding whether an adventure was unlawful or not. Therefore, 
the violation of the first part of the section 41 is clearly a statutory illegality. 
However, the situation becomes more complex in the context of the performance 
of adventure. The complication is that this requirement is codified into the 1906 
Act, but based on former authorities, unlawful performance during a marine 
adventure should not be rendered as the commission of a statutory illegality for 
three reasons. 
Firstly, not every illegal performance is a violation of statute; it is impossible for 
statutes to cover every kind of illegal performance and sometimes a 
performance can be illegal because of a violation of common law or public policy 
such as in the case Potts v Bell and others354. Secondly, assureds clearly have 
more defences in illegal performance cases than in cases where adventures are 
illegal from the beginning. This is why the phrase “so far as the assured can 
control the matter” is used, and all the defences which have been mentioned in 
chapter 2 have clearly exceeded the boundary of defences for statutory illegality. 
For example, in cases of a violation of statute during performance, not only is the 
intention of the statute considered, but so too is the intention and knowledge of 
the assured, which is clearly different to what happens with a statutory illegality. 
The third reason is that, unlike in the illegal adventure part where the courts are 
normally limited to certain statutes and patterns and always reach the conclusion 
                                                             
353 Farmer v Legg 101 E.R.926 
354 Potts v Bell and others (1800) 8 TR 561 
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that the warranty is breached, judgments of illegal performance are 
unconstrained and the courts can reach different conclusions based on the 
factors which the courts take into account355. 
Therefore, based on the above analysis, it is clear that section 41 should not be 
considered as a whole. The first part of this section requires that the adventure is 
a lawful one, breach of which should be viewed as a statutory illegality, 
especially in the circumstances of the formation of the insurance contract and 
before the attachment of the adventure; breach of the second part of this 
section, however, should be regulated as a common law illegality, in spite of the 
fact that it has been enacted into the 1906 Act. However, under current marine 
insurance law, the whole of section 41 has been viewed as a statutory 
requirement. 
5.1.2 Section 41 - a pre-contractual or a post-contractual requirement? 
The next question is whether the legality requirement is a pre-contractual duty or 
a post-contractual duty? This question is of great importance since in marine 
insurance law, the difference between the violation of a pre-contractual duty and 
a post-contractual one is significant. For instance, in cases of the violation of 
utmost good faith, if the assured breaches the pre-contractual duty of utmost 
good faith, for instance, through non-disclosure, then the insurer is entitled to 
                                                             
355 As with the exceptions discussed in chapter two 
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avoid the contract356. However, if the assured breaches a post-contractual duty, 
through fraud, for example, then under such circumstances the insurer cannot 
void the contract, but only entitle damages under it. However, this is not the case 
with section 41, since there is no difference between the consequences of a 
violation of the legality requirement; under both pre-contractual and 
post-contractual circumstances, the insurer is entitled to discharge liability, which 
is clearly inappropriate. 
However, according to cases prior to section 41, it seems that there was a 
difference between them; that is, before the conception of the contract, if the 
assured had the knowledge that the voyage was illegal and intended to perform 
it, then the insurance policy was void; however, if during the performance of the 
voyage, an illegal act happened, then the courts would take the assured’s 
intention, knowledge and the connection between the illegality and the loss into 
consideration, even though under most circumstances the assured was only 
entitled to the return of the premium, rather than to compensation from the 
insurer. 
Based on the above, it is clear that the legality duty upon the assured is a 
continuing one, and that there is no distinction between the pre-contractual and 
post-contractual issue in this section. The law requires the adventure to be lawful 
from the beginning until the end of the adventure and the performance of the 
assured shall be lawful throughout the adventure as well, although, as in those 
                                                             
356 Marine Insurance Act 1906 section 17 
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cases introduced in chapter 2, the assured will have no excuse for his illegal 
performance before the beginning of the adventure. All the defences which the 
assured can use are only available after the start of adventure.  
 
5.2 The differences between the common law illegality defence and the warranty 
of legality in marine insurance 
The aim of this second part of the chapter is to discuss the differences between 
the warranty of legality in marine insurance and the illegality defence in common 
law. After analysing these differences, the reasons for them will then be 
discussed. 
The objective of the comparison between the common law illegality defence and 
the warranty of legality in marine insurance law is to clarify the defects of the 
warranty of legality. 
5.2.1 The nature of these two defences is different 
There are two main differences in the nature of the two defences.. The first one 
is that a violation of the implied warranty is a statutory illegality and a violation of 
the illegality defence in some circumstances is a common law illegality. Since, as 
has been demonstrated, when the courts deal with statutory illegality issues, the 
factors which the courts can take into consideration are quite limited; only the 
intention of the statute and the meaning of the words of the statute are 
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considered; this is partly the reason why the consequences of a violation of 
section 41 is more severe than it would be in common law. For this reason, the 
origin and true scope of section 41 needed to be explored in chapter 2 first, an 
exploration that revealed that, based on a true interpretation of the intention and 
the words of this piece of law, a violation of this regulation should not entitle the 
insurer to discharge their liability automatically in every circumstance. It is true 
that it is not appropriate to regulate such a requirement as an implied warranty in 
marine insurance law. Furthermore, as stated in 5.1, it is also inappropriate that 
a violation of section 41 should be dealt with as a statutory illegality. 
The second aspect is that the character of the illegality defence in common law 
and that of the warranty of legality is different. It is clear that in common law, the 
legality defence is not rendered as a fixed contractual term and therefore the 
character and function of the illegality defence in common law is changeable. In 
some circumstances, for example, if the construction of the contract is illegal, 
then the illegality is a condition and the contractual parties can avoid the contract 
or claim damages under it357. However, if an illegal act is committed during the 
contract, then this conduct only entitles the other party to claim damages or to 
deny payment under the terms of the contract. Thus, the illegality defence clearly 
cannot be regulated as one single type of term in contract law; the important 
                                                             
357 For example, if construction of contract is forbidden by statute, as can be seen in 
Chapter 4 
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factors which may influence the character of the illegality defence include the 
time when the illegality is committed or the seriousness of the illegality. 
However, under marine insurance law, the illegality is rendered as an implied 
warranty, the function of which is quite obvious and unchangeable. It can only be 
altered by abolishing the implied warranty in marine insurance. 
5.2.2 The consequences of a breach of the law are different 
The second difference between section 41 and common law illegality rules 
exists in the consequences of a breach of the law.  
It is commonly understood that, with regard to the consequences of illegality on 
contractual rights, there is a distinction between contracts that are illegal as 
formed (which includes circumstances where entry into or performance of a 
contract need to involve an illegal act) and contracts which are capable of being 
performed legally (with one or both of the parties intending to perform the 
contract illegally or for an illegal purpose or when the subject matter of the 
contract is for the use of an illegal design). 
The situation is clear in the first category of illegality that is if the contract itself is 
illegality or with illegal attention, and then such contract will be treated as void as 
if it had not been made at all, and neither party can claim contractual rights 
under such a contract. However, under some circumstances, if one of the parties 
is induced to enter into the contract, and is entirely innocent, then this party is 
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entitled to claim damages from the other party358. This principle was applied in 
the case Strongman LD. v Sincock359. In this case, the builder was assured by 
the architect that all the licences required by the Defence Regulation to carry out 
building work had been acquired but later, when the builder intended to claim the 
balance of the price over the licensed amount and other damages, the court held 
that the builder could not recover under the contract, since the contract was 
clearly forbidden by the Act; however, the builder could still recover damages 
against the architect unless the builders had themselves been morally to blame 
or culpably negligent, since the oral promise of the architect amounted to a 
warranty and breaching that promise was a breach of warranty360. 
However, the rules which relate to the second kind of illegality are more 
complex.  If both the contractual parties have knowledge of the illegal 
performance and intend to perform the contract unlawfully or for an unlawful 
purpose, then the contract is unenforceable, as in the first category; however, if 
one of the contractual parties has no knowledge of the other party’s illegal act 
and illegal purpose, then the contract is still enforceable on the innocent party, 
and the innocent party can clearly claim damages under the contract. 
Under common law circumstances, the consequence of such a violation is clear. 
Under most circumstances, if one of the contractual parties has committed an 
                                                             
358 For example, in cases where assured is induced to enter an insurance contract, as 
can be seen in Chapter 4 
359 Strongman LD. v Sincock [1955] 2 Q.B. 525 
360 Ibid 
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illegal act, and the other party has no relation to it, then the contract is 
unenforceable on the guilty party; however, if both the contractual parties have 
committed the illegal act, then the contract is unenforceable on both sides. 
Compared with the illegality defence in contract law, in tort, if during the 
performance of the insurance contract, the loss is caused by the assured’s own 
tort act, then under both circumstances, the assured will be denied payment; 
however, unless the adventure which is insured is unlawful, the insurer will still 
cover the losses which occur before the commission of the illegality.  
However, the consequence of breaching the warranty of legality is the most 
severe one. In marine insurance cases, according to the Marine Insurance Act, 
since the illegality defence is regulated as a warranty, then the insurer is 
discharged from liability from the date the illegality was committed, even though, 
according to cases prior to the Act, this was not always the case. In cases where 
the adventure is unlawful, such as trading with an enemy or sailing in a 
prohibited area, the marine insurance policy is normally voided and the insurer 
can retain the premium. 
5.2.3 The rationales underlying the common law illegality defence are more 
persuasive 
The common law illegality defence rules are more specific than section 41 and 
the rationales behind them are more reasonable. For example, with regard to the 
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ex turpi causa principle in tort law, and the reliance and no-profit principle in 
contract law, there are several factors which the courts should consider when 
dealing with similar cases. Even though this may result in complexity and 
instability in the law, it still provides clear and sufficient defences for the guilty 
party. The warranty of legality, on the other hand, is far more ambiguous: the 
rule is general, the meanings of the words in this section are unclear and there is 
no convincing rationale for the section. Although the judgement in the Redmond 
v Smith case is always considered as the origin of the section, it requires that the 
adventure must be lawful but fails to explain why this requirement must be an 
implied warranty. This general rule results in the defences for the assured being 
insufficient and ambiguous. There is only the “so far as the assured can control” 
defence for the assured, but the factors which may influence the judgement have 
never been clarified by the courts. 
The consequence of this difference is that it is more difficult for the illegality 
defence to be sustained in common law than in marine insurance law. For 
example, as was demonstrated previously361, only if it can be proved that the 
guilty party has knowledge of the illegality and intends to perform it, or if, in 
contract law, the construction of the contract itself is illegal or it is intended for 
the contract to be performed illegally, then the guilty party will lose every defence 
and either the contract is made unenforceable or the guilty party loses the right 
to claim compensation; otherwise, the illegality defence is not sustained 
                                                             
361 As can be seen in 4.2 
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automatically. In marine insurance law however, if there is an illegality during the 
adventure or the adventure itself is illegal, then the insurer’s liability is 
discharged from the beginning of the illegality, and there is no need to prove that 
there is a causal link between the loss and the illegality - the assured loses all 
cover and is not entitled to a return of the premium. 
5.2.4 Factors and exceptions are different  
The fourth difference between section 41 and common law illegality rules is that 
the implied warranty of legality is an absolute defence for the insurer as long as 
the insurer can prove the illegal act of the assured; however, in common law, for 
the defence to be sustained, the courts need to consider more factors than in 
marine insurance law, as has been explained. This difference may lead to an 
increase in the possibility of a breach of section 41 being abused by the insurer, 
in circumstances where the courts fail to explore the true scope of section 41; 
the assured may then face an unfair judgement and strict consequences.  
Examining cases prior to the 1906 Act, in some circumstances, the courts 
adopted the identical logic to that applied in common law. In cases where the 
assured’s illegal conduct renders the adventure illegal, if the assured entered 
into the contract without the intent to perform it unlawfully, or is  unaware of the 
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illegality, such as in cases dealing with trading with enemies362, the insurance 
policy is not void and the insurer may need to return the premium.. 
The first factor which considered differently is the knowledge of the assured. In 
the circumstances where the adventure which is insured is an unlawful one and 
the assured or both the assured and the insurer have knowledge of such 
illegality, then the insurance policy is void in both marine insurance law and 
non-marine insurance law. However, if the adventure which is to be insured is 
illegal, and the assured has no knowledge of it, then according to former 
authorities, this policy would also be void in marine insurance law; however, in 
common law, if it can be proved that, the assured has no knowledge of such 
illegal intention, and does not intend to perform the contract illegally, then even 
though the contract may still be unenforceable, the assured can recover the loss 
which relate to the contract. This is also the case if the assured intends to 
perform the adventure illegally from the inception of the risk; if both the insurer 
and the assured have the knowledge that the adventure will be performed 
illegally, then it is clear that the insurer is unable to use the warranty as a 
defence, since its application would make the insurer profit from his own illegality 
for not performing his contractual responsibility. 
In the circumstances where the illegality is committed during the performance of 
the adventure, the 1906 Act regulates that this is also an implied warranty, 
                                                             
362 Such as Parkin v Dick (1809) 11 East 502 along with other cases which have been 
discussed in Chapter 2 
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although only in circumstances where the assured can control the matter, the 
concept of which is unclear. Exploring the authorities prior to the Act, it is clear 
that there were some exceptions which would not render the insurance contract 
unenforceable; however, these exceptions were not covered by the 1906 Act. 
In the cases prior to 1906, there are basically two exceptions: one is the intention 
of the assured and the other is the knowledge of illegality of the assured. In the 
case Ingham and Others v Agnew363, it was decided that, if the parties had no 
intention of obeying the law or had the intention of breaking the law, then the 
insurance contract was void. A similar case was that of Atkinson v Abbott364. In 
this case, which concerned trading with the enemy, the court decided that, even 
though the assured’s vessel was captured because of trading in a battle area, 
there was no intention of the assured and his agent to violate the law which 
forbade trading with the enemy and the assured was entitled to be 
compensated. With regard to the knowledge of the assured, in Oom and Others 
v Bruce365, also a case dealing with trading with the enemy, the court decided 
that, since the assured and his agent had no knowledge of the breakout of war 
between the two nations, and the illegality of carrying out business between the 
two nations, then, even though the insurance policy was void, the assured was 
entitled to the return of the premium. 
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364 Atkinson v Abbott 170 E.R. 1048 
365 Oom and Others v Bruce 104 E.R. 87 
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However, with reference to common law cases, the difference is clear; in 
common law, not only the intention and knowledge of the assured has been 
considered, the following two questions: whether the assured needs to rely on 
his own illegality to plead and whether the assured intends to profit from his 
illegality will be considered as well. Besides these two important factors, another 
significant factor is whether there is a casual link between the loss and the 
assured’s illegality, a factor which the Law Commission refuses to consider even 
in their new draft bill of insurance contract act. 
5.2.5 The specificity of section 41 in marine insurance law 
Fifthly, the implied warranty of legality is only applied in marine insurance law; 
there is no such implied warranty in common law. However, there is no 
restriction on the application of the illegality defence in common law in marine 
insurance cases. And the question of how to apply this rule in marine insurance 
cases is the next question which needs to be discussed. 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
The main contradictions between the illegality defence in common law and in 
marine insurance law are that: firstly, the illegality defence has been considered 
as an implied warranty under marine insurance law; secondly, there are 
differences between the consequences of a breach of warranty under common 
contract law and under marine insurance law; thirdly, the factors considered by 
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the courts when dealing with illegality under contract cases and marine 
insurance cases are different and fourthly, under the 1906 Act, there is no 
difference between the pre-contractual duty and post-contractual duty of the 
assured. Another difference between marine insurance law and common law is 
that, in marine insurance scenarios, the illegality issue has been rendered as a 
statutory illegality, as discussed previously; when the courts decide whether a 
statutory illegality sustains, they will consider the intention of the law and the 
words of the statute; however, when the courts adopt this method, the law is still 
harsh for the assured, since the words of this piece of law are clear - the illegality 
is an implied warranty and the contract shall be void from ab initio, which means 
that the assured loses every defence he may have. This is the reason why 
section 41 should be abolished, since it is unfair and causes confusion 
5.3 Why the courts adopt another method when dealing with illegality in marine 
insurance cases 
It has been shown that, before 1906, when the courts were dealing with illegality 
issues in marine insurance cases, the courts adopted a method other than the 
illegality rules in common law. Therefore the question arises as to why the court 
abandoned the illegality rules settled in Holman v Johnson366 and sought to use 
another more severe method in maritime scenarios? This question has not been 
seriously considered yet, and it is difficult to give an accurate answer since it is 
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difficult to understand the judges’ thoughts when dealing with this issue. 
However, there are a number of possible explanations, as will be discussed 
below. 
The first reason may be that non-marine insurance does not in general constitute 
insurance on an adventure but on property, whereas marine insurance is on an 
adventure at any rate in the case of goods if not also of a ship367. Therefore, 
when the courts dealt with marine cases, the dangerousness of the adventure is 
the most important factor the courts need to consider. In earlier times, the 
carriage of goods by sea was quite a dangerous industry. The risks of sea 
transportation were quite high and, unlike the insured subject in non-marine 
insurance policies, such as property insurance or health insurance, once the 
vessel was out of the port, the insurers were unable to contact the vessel 
effectively or to control the risks of the adventure, which is a basic responsibility 
of the insurer. Therefore, in order to encourage insurers to engage in this high 
risk industry, the courts needed to provide effective defences for the insurer and 
to set strict liabilities on the assured because of the lack of supervision by the 
insurer during the adventure. 
The second reason is that, because of the lack of supervision discussed above, 
it was possible for the assured to commit an illegality at any time. The assured, 
normally a shipowner or a cargo owner, always sought to gain high profits from 
this high risk industry, and this may therefore sometimes have led to a shortage 
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of seamen, smuggling, taking short course and trading with enemies. It was not 
possible for the courts or the insurers to know accurately the time the illegality 
was committed, and the categories of illegality which could be committed by the 
assured were also unpredictable. Therefore, for the convenience of commercial 
activities, the courts needed to establish a piece of law which was not accurate 
but which covered a wide range of situations which should be distinguished. 
Another reason why the English courts adopted a method other than the 
common law illegality defence in marine insurance law was that, when dealing 
with marine insurance cases, given the special circumstances in marine cases, 
the courts tended to apply insurance principles rather than common law rules. 
For instance, in the case Furtado v Rogers, the judge contended that: “I forbear 
to enter into the argument suggested at the bar in favour of the Defendant that 
the law will not enforce a contract founded on a transaction detrimental to the 
public policy of the state. The ground upon which we decide this case is, that 
when a British subject insures against captures, the law infers that the contract 
contains an exception of captures made by the government of his own 
country”368. 
Fourthly, there were various kinds of statutes or orders that regulated the 
shipping industry and that forbade any kind of shipping activity in contradiction of 
the regulations. The courts’ decisions were clearly constrained and they had 
very limited choice except to adopt a severe approach. 
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Finally, there should be a fine line between an unlawful act and an unlawful act 
which entitles the parties to abolish the contract. However, in early judgments, 
since the regulation of the shipping industry required the severe punishment of 
actions which violated the statute, then the courts ignored this difference and 
settled most of the marine insurance policies which includes illegality 
unenforceable or void. As can be seen in the Redmond case, the foundation of a 
marine insurance policy is adventure, and if the adventure is illegal, the contract 
upon it is illegal as well. However, the factors which can amount to an illegal 
adventure are numerous. In earlier times, it was always the duty of the statute to 
give clear guidelines regarding which kinds of adventures were and were not 
illegal, but the courts ignored the scenarios in which the act of an assured could 
render an original legal adventure illegal, and this is a possible reason for the 
differences between common law and marine insurance law. 
As a result, the English courts adopted a more severe method when dealing with 
illegality issues in marine insurance cases and the main reason was the 
particularities of the shipping industry in early times. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, based on the former three chapters, the nature and character of 
the warranty of legality in marine insurance law has been examined from a 
comparative perspective with the illegality defence in common law, and a clear 
picture of the defects of section 41 have been given, along with the reasons 
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which underlie it. As was introduced at the beginning of this chapter, the purpose 
of this chapter is to provide the foundation for the proposal for the reform of 
section 41; this will be discussed in chapter nine. 
 
 
Chapter 6: Foreign law illegality in marine insurance law 
This chapter will consider a very special and controversial area of section 41, 
that is, whether the English courts recognise or should recognise foreign law 
illegality in marine insurance. Based on former authorities, it is implied in section 
41 that the English courts do not recognise a breach of foreign law as a breach 
of the warranty of legality. However, in other areas of common law, when dealing 
with whether foreign law illegality should be recognised, the English courts have 
adopted another approach. Therefore, what are the differences between these 
two approaches and should this area of section 41 be reformed as well if 
common law rules were applied in marine insurance cases? 
This chapter will begin with the origins of the rules on dealing with foreign law 
illegality in common law and in marine insurance law and then will introduce the 
current position of these two approaches; by comparing the differences between 
them, this chapter will consider whether this part of section 41 should also be 
reformed. 
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6.1 The English legal position on foreign law illegality in common law 
The principle that English law does not recognise foreign law illegality derived 
from the cases which have been introduced in chapter 2 and has been 
developed in both common law and marine insurance law since then. However, 
the effect of foreign law in English legal system when dealing with common law 
illegality has never been settled. There are several cases which need to be 
discussed in relation to this issue.  
The earliest and most straightforward judgment on this issue is found in the case 
Planche v Fletcher. In this case, it was decided by Lord Mansfield that the Courts 
in this country do not take notice of foreign revenue laws369. However, this is not 
the sole case, the English law has been developed in detail in this area, and not 
every foreign law is unenforceable in England. 
However, except the Planche case, based on the following cases which will be 
discussed later, It seems that, in English law, the issue whether the law which 
parties breach is foreign or not, has never become an important factor which 
would influence the decision of the English courts.  
One, more recent, clear authority on the foreign law illegality point is Ralli 
Brothers v Compañia Naviera Sota Y Aznar. In this case, when dealing with 
whether to pay more freight for imported jute more than 875 pesetas a ton which 
is illegal under Spain law would have an effect when such case was decided in 
                                                             
369 Planche v Fletcher (1779) 1 Dougl 251 
241 
 
English court; it was decided that, firstly, since the clause of the contract 
required the place of payment was Spain and secondly, pay on delivery in Spain 
in cash and furthermore, the simultaneous acts of delivery and payment were 
both to be performed in Spain, and the shipowners were a Spanish company, 
therefore, even though the whole charterparty should be governed by English 
law, the part which related to payment should be governed by Spanish law and 
the English courts should respect the Spanish law. Therefore, the English court 
was clearly unable to give effect to this contract under common law, and “that 
part of the contract which required the payment of freight in excess of 875 
pesetas per ton was invalid and could not be enforced against the charterers”370. 
In the case Foster v Driscoll, where five people sought to sell whiskey from 
England to the United States, when the sale of alcohol was illegal in America, 
Scrutton L.J delivered the judgment: “I have no doubt that if seller and buyer 
agreed to ship the whisky into the United States contrary to the laws of that 
country the contract would not be enforced here”371. When deciding this, he also 
considered former authorities and explored the differences between them. The 
first case he referred to was also decided by Lord Mansfield; in the case Holman 
v. Johnson, even though the seller knew the buyer intend to smuggle the goods 
into England, Lord Mansfield declined to give effect to the laws of his own 
country. In another case, Clugas v. Penaluna372, the violation of foreign law was 
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given effect in English courts, when the seller not only had the knowledge that 
the buyer intended to smuggle goods, but had also assisted in this illegality. It 
can therefore be seen that, when the English courts deal with illegality based on 
a violation of foreign law, the key factor is whether the parties have been 
involved in the illegality. In this case, Lawrence L.J also contended that "On 
principle, however, I am clearly of opinion that a partnership formed for the main 
purpose of deriving profit from the commission of a criminal offence in a foreign 
and friendly country is illegal, even although the parties have not succeeded in 
carrying out their enterprise, and no such criminal offence has in fact been 
committed; and none the less so because the parties may have contemplated 
that if they could not successfully arrange to commit the offence themselves they 
would instigate or aid and abet some other person to commit it"373. Lawrence L.J 
in this case set a more restricted rule than Scrutton L.J, stating that it is only the 
actual intention of the parties to perform the contract in a way that is illegal under 
a foreign law, even if the action has not been carried out, that can render the 
contract void. This rule was adopted by the House of Lords in the case 
Regazzoni v. K. C. Sethia. 
This case, Regazzoni v. K. C. Sethia, which concerned the smuggling of goods 
from India to South Africa in contravention of Indian law, is significant.  On the 
face of it, the contract could have been performed without violating any countries’ 
law, but the buyer had hidden his intention to commit this illegality. It was 
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decided in this case that, “whether or not the proper law of the contract is English 
law, an English court will not enforce a contract, or award damages for its breach, 
if its performance will involve the doing of an act in a foreign and friendly State 
which violates the law of that State” 374 . Lord Reid delivered the leading 
judgement of this case, by quoting Scrutton L.J’s judgment in the Foster case; 
he agreed that, when dealing with an illegality issue involving a violation of 
foreign law, the English courts should base their judgement on the public policy 
of the international comity. He also cited Dicey's Conflict of Laws: “It must, 
however, be noted that if a contract is an English contract, it will only be held 
invalid on account of illegality if it actually necessitates the performance in a 
foreign and friendly country of some act which is illegal by the law of such 
country”375. It is clear from the above that the English courts can take foreign law 
illegality into account. However, at the end of Lord Reid’s judgement, he 
discussed the limits of this application, and based on his judgment, saying that 
the English courts would not enforce a law which is “a foreign law involving 
persecution of such a character that we would regard an agreement to break it 
as meritorious”376. However, this is a vague definition377, as Denning L.J. said 
when he delivered the Court of Appeal judgment of this case: "these courts do 
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not sit to collect taxes for another country or to inflict punishments for it”378. It is 
clear that contractual relationships between private persons are not of this kind. 
However, Lord Mansfield and Denning L.J’s judgements do not hold in all 
circumstances, under some circumstances; the English courts also take the 
foreign state’s revenue laws into account. In the case Re Emery's Investments 
Trusts, it was decided that the husband’s act to register the common stock in 
American securities in his wife’s name was in order to avoid payment of 
American Federal tax, which was clearly illegal and the English court would not 
grant relief in respect of a transaction carried out in contravention of a law, albeit 
a foreign revenue law379. Even though this was a case in which both the parties 
were American, and it took place in America, using American dollars, the 
judgement of this case consists with the rules set in Euro-Diam Limited, which 
will be introduced later, and Lord Mansfield’s decision in Planche v Fletcher was 
clearly now out of date. 
This case also provided the reason why English courts will not enforce a contract 
which is carried out in a foreign territory and which violates foreign law; as Lord 
Reid stated, once a contract is tainted, the English courts will not assist either 
party to enforce it. 
In the latter case, Royal Boskalis Westminster v Mountain, the English courts 
enlarged the boundaries of this rule. This was a case in which five Dutch 
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companies sought to recover expenses paid to the Iraqi government in order to 
secure the demobilisation of their fleet and the repatriation of their employees 
under the sue and labour clause in their insurance policy, after they had waived 
all their claims under the construction contract which was a violation of an 
international sanction. Both the Iraqis and the five Dutch companies took this 
action according to a finalisation agreement between them which was legal 
under Iraqi law; the situation in this case was that there was no violation of the 
applicable law. However, when the issue of whether the transfer of the money 
was illegal or not was pleaded in an English court, Pill L.J and Stuart-Smith L.J 
contended that the Regazzoni’s rule should also apply to contracts governed by 
their proper law: if the contracts are illegal according to English law, then the 
English courts clearly cannot give effect to such contracts, even if the contract is 
legal under its proper law380. 
Based on the judgments of the cases above, it can be seen that the current 
position of English law on foreign law illegality is that, firstly, the adventure 
cannot be rendered illegal under either common law or marine insurance law 
purely according to foreign law; secondly, for foreign law to be effective under 
English law, several requirements need to be fulfilled, and such requirements 
differ from case to case. For example, the clearest category is when the activity 
of the assured is also illegal under English law, in which case, the defence will 
be triggered; also, foreign law must not contradict with the English law, as 
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decided in the case Re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd: “this court must be 
entitled to consider whether, looking at all the circumstances, the law is so 
far-reaching in its scope and effect as really to offend against considerations of 
public policy of this country”381. It also requires that there is a connection 
between the illegality which the assured committed and the foreign law; and 
certainly that the application of foreign law will need to fulfil the requirements of 
the Rome I Regulation. 
For English courts to decide whether a violation of foreign law is illegal in 
England, the detail of the foreign law is not relevant; the English courts only need 
to decide the intention of the parties when entering into the contract and the 
connection between the parties and the illegality, which is purely an English 
common law method as has been explained before, unless the foreign law which 
has been violated contradicts English law.  
For example, in the circumstances of the United Nations sanctions, the member 
states were required to give effect to them in their own domestic law and any 
violation of the sanctions should be viewed as an illegal act in English law as 
well. 
Moving the focus from the rules in ordinary contract law to the insurance contract 
law and the question arises whether the rules will still work in insurance 
                                                             
381 Re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd [1956] 2 W.L.R. 183 
247 
 
contracts, since there are always differences between contract law and 
insurance contract law. 
The leading case in insurance law which relates to this point is Euro-Diam 
Limited v Bathurst382. The fact of this case is that the assured seller insured the 
amount of diamonds which had been sold to the buyer but, in assisting the buyer 
to deceive the German customs authorities, the seller issued a false invoice for 
the buyer. The diamonds were stolen after this and the seller claimed losses 
under the insurance policy. One of the insurer’s defences was that by issuing a 
fake invoice to deceive the custom authorities, the insurance contract has been 
tainted by this illegality. One of the points of dispute was whether the English 
court should recognise the illegality under German law. In the judgement of this 
case, it was clear that there is no implied term in insurance law that the 
adventure would not be illegal under foreign law. The judge recognised the rule 
of foreign law but found it of no assistance since “Performance of the contract of 
insurance would take place wholly in England”. Therefore, a new pattern 
developed by the judge was that: “The question is therefore whether it has that 
degree of connection with illegal acts in Germany which would render it tainted 
and therefore unenforceable here. One can divide this question into two parts. 
First, if the acts concerned had been illegal by English law, would the contract of 
insurance have been enforceable? Secondly, if so, do the rules of conflict of 
                                                             
382 Euro-Diam Limited v Bathurst [1990] 1 Q.B. 1 
248 
 
laws justify reference to German law, and so produce the same result in this 
case?383” 
The judge delivered the judgment based on the Bowmakers and Beresford rules 
which have been discussed in chapter 4; the illegality defence was not sustained 
in this case and the second question was not been triggered. However, in the 
event that it had been triggered, then there are three factors which would have 
been considered regarding the judgment: “First, what is the legal topic with 
which the case is concerned? Secondly, what is the connecting factor prescribed 
by the rules of conflict of laws for assigning cases on that topic to a particular 
system of law? Thirdly, what system of law does the connecting factor point to in 
the case before the court”384? 
The significance of this case was that, except for the deception of the German 
customs authorities, there was no single connection between this contract and 
German law: the forum was English; the proper law of the insurance contract 
was English law; the place of performance of the contract was England. 
Therefore, strictly speaking, this is not a case which involved a foreign law 
illegality, as did the former cases; it seems that, in this case, the court adopted a 
more complex approach.  However, it is clear that Staughton J still agreed to 
the rules  which have been developed by the Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia385, and 
also examined the case according to English law criteria to decide whether it 
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was illegal or not.  It seems that, on this point, there is no clear difference 
between common contract law and insurance contract law. 
6.2 The English legal position on foreign law illegality in marine insurance 
The next point this chapter will discuss concerns the position of marine 
insurance law on foreign law illegality. According to authorities, it seems that 
there are still no defined rules on this due to the specificity of section 41. The 
position of section 41 on this point has been discussed in three cases - 
Euro-Diam Limited v Bathurst, Royal Boskalis Westminster v Mountain and most 
recently, The Nancy - and although the former two cases do not relate to marine 
insurance, section 41 was raised and considered in both of the judgements. The 
following section will firstly examine the judgments of the three cases and try to 
explore the courts’ position on this particular issue. 
In Euro-Diam Limited v Bathurst, section 41 was raised as a supportive 
argument in the insurer’s defence - that there was an implied term in the contract 
of insurance that “in so far as the defendant (which must have been intended to 
mean the plaintiffs) could control the matter, the adventure would be carried out 
in a lawful manner”386. Staughton L.J rejected this argument, but went on to 
consider the question of whether, if there was an implied term in the contract, 
such as section 41 in marine insurance, then would section 41 embrace foreign 
law illegality as well as illegality under English law? Based on two old cases, 
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Parkin v. Dick and Planché v. Fletcher, Staughton L.J came to the conclusion 
that, “There is nothing in that case to suggest that illegality by a foreign law 
would have the same result; or, for that matter, that it would be a breach of any 
implied warranty”387. However, the key point is that there was also nothing in 
those two cases to suggest that illegality by a foreign law would not have the 
same result; therefore, his final decision that “an implied term so far as concerns 
compliance with English law, I would have considerable doubt whether it 
extended to foreign law”388 , based on lack of evidence, although it is an 
inconclusive decision. 
This issue was then further considered by Rix J in the case Royal Boskalis 
Westminster v Mountain. In this case, section 41 was one of the three defences 
which the defendant raised under the Marine Insurance Act 1906, and the 
plaintiff submitted that, in any event, section 41 did not apply to foreign illegality. 
Rix J carefully examined the former authorities, especially the judgment in the 
case Euro-Diam, and came to the conclusion that: “No case has been drawn to 
my attention in which the unlawfulness of an adventure or the manner of its 
performance under foreign law had resulted in the failure of a policy or a claim 
under one prior to the Act”389. And although the case Foster was rightly decided, 
the rules in that case “would be so as a matter of common law”, irrespective of 
the Marine Insurance Act. 
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Besides the reasons given in the Euro-Diam case, Rix J. also gave two reasons 
why section 41 does not cover foreign law illegality. The first one was that, “the 
warranty contained in s. 41, if it applied to foreign law would be extremely 
wide390” and the assured would easily be unknown to foreign law or would ignore 
foreign law; the remaining two factors were the severe consequences of a 
breach of warranty and the lack of previously clear authorities, as pointed to by 
Rix J: “It seems to me to be odd to imply by way a term with the strength of a 
warranty to a situation not reflected in cases before the Act or even to the 
common law relating to foreign illegality as it has now developed”391. Rix J 
therefore concluded that section 41 only applies to English law and the 
consequences for a policy of marine insurance of unlawfulness under foreign 
law are therefore a matter for common law. 
This was the first time that the application of section 41 had been confined to 
illegality under English law only and not under foreign law; although there was 
still no final view on this point, it seems it had been rightly decided: in the most 
recent case Sea Glory Maritime Co, Swedish Management Co SA v AL Sagr 
National Insurance Co, the judge found that he should follow the judgement of 
Rix J392. 
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Based on the former authorities, it seems the rules which they developed were 
appropriate. As has been criticized before, section 41 is an implied warranty and 
no causal link is required; therefore, if section 41 can embrace foreign law 
illegality, it will be clearly unjust to the assured. 
Section 41 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is not mentioned in Dicey & Morris, 
The Conflict of Laws, 10th ed. (1980), although that may be because, if it does 
embrace foreign law, it is not a conflict rule but a rule of construction. 
As to the question of whether the English court recognise foreign law, it seems 
that the English court only applies the English illegality rules when dealing with 
such cases; as long as the English courts have the jurisdiction, the illegality 
issue is not changeable. 
6.3 A criticism of current marine insurance law with regards to foreign law 
illegality 
It has been made clear that, under section 41, English law does not recognise 
the illegality in foreign law; the only category of illegality which can trigger this 
implied warranty is illegality under English law.  
However, the issue of whether the English law should recognise foreign law 
illegality never ceases to be a controversial topic: firstly, from the English law 
point of view, it seems there is no need to modify this area of the law, because 
English law is still the dominant law of the marine market, and most sea 
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transportation activities choose English law as their governing law; furthermore, 
major international trade countries have developed their own maritime laws and 
regulations with reference to English law. Another point in support of not 
changing the current law is that it is not the English courts’ responsibility to be 
familiar with foreign law and apply it in English courts, since such application 
may result in deviation from the original law, and in circumstances where both 
parties have already chosen English law as the governing law, the raising of the 
illegality issue in foreign law by one party is not fair to the other party and 
naturally the English court should ignore this.  
However, from the non-English law point of view, this rigid and limited 
responsibility on the parties and the English court imposed by section 41 should 
be modified. Firstly, the modern marine insurance market is becoming a global 
one, and even though most countries have developed their respective 
regulations based on fundamental principles in English law, they have also 
developed their own particularities - for example, in Australian law, section 54 is 
very different to the English principles - and in this global market, it is impossible 
not to respect the positions on illegality issues in other jurisdictions. 
Secondly, marine insurance and the maritime industry are not two isolated fields, 
and both parties to a contract are required to comply with both maritime law and 
marine insurance law. According to section 41, the adventure can be an unlawful 
one if it has been carried out in an unlawful way. If the assured locates in a 
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foreign country and carries out the adventure in an unlawful way according to the 
law of that country, it would be absurd if the English court did not recognise the 
illegality and enforce the insurance. 
Thirdly, the lack of recognition of foreign law illegality can result in contradictory 
judgments on the same issue. For example, if the assured receives a 
punishment under the domestic law of his country, he may also get 
compensation under English law. 
Fourthly, although Rix J proposed the difficulties of recognising foreign law 
illegality in marine insurance, it seems from his point of view that he must have 
been aware of the harsh consequence imposed by section 41 on the assured 
and that he sought to lighten the assured’s liability by confining the boundaries of 
foreign law illegality in marine insurance; however, the harsh consequences for 
the assured are not caused by foreign law illegality and this restriction may result 
in a situation in which cases which involve both a foreign assured and a British 
insurer, and in which foreign law illegality is not recognised can cause losses to 
British insurers. 
6.4 Possible methods for dealing with foreign law illegality in marine insurance 
Thus, the pattern which English law should adopt is that, when dealing with 
foreign law illegality in marine insurance cases, it is the common law rules rather 
than section 41 which should be considered by English courts.  
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Besides this approach, the English courts should also allow parties to choose 
their own governing law and jurisdiction, and the English court should respect 
this choice. In the case Mackender v. Feldia A.G., it was decided by Lord 
Denning M.R. that “It all comes to this: the English courts have discretion 
whether or not to give leave to serve this writ out of the jurisdiction. Seeing that 
the underwriters have agreed to a foreign jurisdiction clause which gives 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Belgian courts, I think we should allow these 
disputes to be decided in the courts of Belgium.393” 
Furthermore, English courts should also allow the parties to contract out section 
41 in their insurance policy: As was pointed out in the judgment of Euro-Diam 
Limited, “For an implied term which the parties cannot contract out of is, so far as 
I am aware, a creature unknown to the common law”394. 
The most significant feature of common law when dealing with foreign illegality in 
English courts is that English courts may not apply the foreign law; however, the 
English courts will analyse whether they can find corresponding points in English 
law or whether the English law shares the same spirit as the foreign law. If this is 
not the case, then clearly the English courts will not adopt the foreign law in 
English courts. However, in marine cases which involve carriage of goods, 
international trade or admiralty, which are mostly covered by international 
treaties or law which originate from English authorities, it is unlikely that the 
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English courts will adopt an approach which opposes international conventions. 
Therefore, with regard to this point, the meaning of the phrase “foreign law” in 
section 41 should be precisely defined. The foreign law which the English courts 
should not consider when dealing with foreign law illegality in section 41 should 
be confined into the following categories: 1, a law which contradicts with English 
law or practice; 2, a law which has no common ground with English law either in 
spirit or practice, meaning that the English law has no common/similar intention, 
no common/similar regulation and no common/similar practice as the foreign law; 
3, in circumstances where there is a violation of international treaties, for the 
treaties to be ineffective, the treaties should not have been integrated into 
English law or the English law should not have similar domestic regulations and 
should have no intention of joining the treaties; 4, when the foreign law is not the 
foundation of the insurance policy or is immaterial to the policy and does not 
concern either of the parties, otherwise, English courts should also consider the 
foreign law. An example is the situation in the case Bell v Carstairs395 - even 
though in this case, the assured was in violation of a treaty between USA and 
France, since this treaty was the foundation for deciding whether the risk was 
illegal or not, and since it concerned a English underwriter, the foreign law was 
also considered. Therefore, these four categories are the circumstances where 
section 41 should not be applied. Besides these four circumstances, the 
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violation of foreign law should be recognised by English courts and as has been 
suggested in this chapter, the common law rules should be applied accordingly. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Based on the analysis above, it is clear that, either in common law or in marine 
insurance law, foreign law never ceases to be effective. The approach adopted 
in common law cases is clearly fairer to both parties. In marine insurance cases, 
although there are concerns, as raised by Rix J, if illegality is still confined to a 
violation of domestic law, it will be unfair to the insurer, especially in such a 
closely connected commercial world. Therefore, the foreign law which cannot be 
applied should be confined as was suggested in 6.4. However, a major 
precondition for this is that the harsh consequences of section 41 should be 
reformed first. 
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Chapter 7: The marine insurance legality issue in Australia and other common 
law Jurisdictions 
This chapter will consider the warranty of legality in Australia and two other 
common law jurisdictions, New Zealand and Canada. These three countries 
have warranties of legality in their own marine insurance law and although these 
derived from English law, they have been developed according to the 
circumstances of each individual country. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the current position of the warranty of legality 
in these three countries in order to provide supportive evidence for the need to 
reform section 41 from a foreign law perspective. 
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This chapter will have three sections: the first will provide a detailed analysis of 
the warranty of legality in Australia law; the second part will give a brief 
assessment of this warranty in New Zealand and Canada; and, finally, the third 
section will conclude the development of the warranties of legality in these 
countries, and analyse the valuable experience they provide for developing 
English law. 
7.1 The Australian legal approach to the illegality issue 
As well as the UK, other commonwealth countries have adopted the same 
approach as the MIA 1906. In the Australian Marine Insurance Act 1909, for 
example, there is also an implied warranty of legality that shares the identical 
words as the MIA 1906 Act. Section 47 of this Act provides that: 
“47. There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and 
that, so far as the assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried 
out in a lawful manner”396. 
The warranty of legality in Australian law raises similar concerns to those in 
English law; that is, that section 47 is so broad, given the numerous regulations 
and statutes and other kinds of rules which regulate the shipping industry, that it 
is very easy for an assured to violate one or two of the rules and the insurer is 
entitled to discharge his liability under many circumstances. Besides this, there 
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is no difference between the consequences of breaching the lawful adventure 
and those of breaching the lawful performance of the adventure. 
There are two significant cases which relate to this issue in Australia. In the case 
Doak v Weekes397, it is clear that there are various regulations which regulate 
the navigation of a vessel, such as that it has sufficient and qualified crew; in this 
case, when the owner knowingly sent the vessel without prudent and qualified 
crew to sea, then there was a breach of the warranty, even though the statute 
only required penalties for the breach. In the later similar case, Switzerland 
Insurance Australia Ltd v Mowie Fisheries Pty Ltd398, there were two express 
warranties in the insurance policy which provided: "(1) That the vessel is in 
survey and will remain in survey with the appropriate governmental authority of 
the State of registration at all times during the currency of the policy. (2) That the 
vessel will be skippered, manned, crewed, operated and licensed in accordance 
with the regulations and by-laws and all other applicable laws of the appropriate 
governmental authorities of the State of registration at all times during the 
currency of the policy.399" In this case, the vessel was lost during its voyage from 
Eden in New South Wales to Portland in Victoria and the insurer denied his 
liability on the ground that there had been a breach of express warranty as well 
as a breach of implied warranty, since there was no qualified crew on board, as 
required by the Marine Act, when the loss happened. In the first judgment of this 
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case, based upon the construction of the statute, Tamberlin J found, there had 
been no breach of express or implied warranty since the issue here did not fall 
into the scope of the statute400; in the appeal judgment, even though Beaumont J 
agreed with the judgment in the Doak case, since the Marine Act 1976 
(Tasmania) had no jurisdiction on this vessel, there was no breach of implied 
warranty in this case. Therefore, when dealing with the illegality issue, whether 
there has been a violation of the law is not a simple question; there must be a 
careful construction of the wording of the statute in the statutory illegality 
scenario and the intention of the parties in the violation of common law cases. 
These two judgments bring to mind the St John Shipping Corp case in English 
law. According to the view of some authorities401, it seems that Australia and 
England nations have adopted different ways of dealing with similar issues; that 
is to say that, even though all three statutes that the three cases violated only led 
to an imposition of penalties on the assureds, in English law the judge did not 
recognise the illegality issue, and in Australian law, the judge did, especially in 
the case Doak v Weekes. However, it seems that there is little difference 
between these two jurisdictions, since the scenarios of the St John Shipping and 
the Doak cases are different: firstly, the St John Shipping case was not a marine 
insurance case, and it was the freight under a charter party contract rather than 
the insurance that the claimant sought to recover, and since there is no implied 
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262 
 
warranty of legality in contract law, it is impossible for the court to judge this in 
the same way; secondly, in the St John Shipping case, there were no losses, 
and the shipowner did not need to rely on the issue of overloading to recover 
their freight under the contract, whereas in the Doak case, there was a loss, the 
adventure had been performed in an unlawful manner and the assured needed 
to rely on the illegality to claim the insurance; the third difference  is that, in the 
Australian case, the assured had knowledge of the illegality and intentionally 
sent the vessel, whereas in the St John Shipping case, neither the owner nor the 
captain had such knowledge. Therefore, from these perspectives, it seems that 
the Australian judgments on these two cases are reasonable, and it cannot be 
said that the Australia courts should adopt a stricter approach to dealing with 
illegality issues in marine insurance. 
As far as Australian law is concerned, it seems that the warranty of legality issue 
is more commonly raised under Australian law than English law and the method 
Australian law adopts now is different to the English one, although the Australia 
courts also very cautious when dealing with this warranty. In a more recent case, 
Solway v Lumley General Insurance Ltd & Ors, when the court went on to decide 
whether the non-registration of a vessel, which is a violation of the Transport 
Operations (Marine Safety) Act 1994, constituted a breach of implied warranty 
and the insurer would be able to deny liability because of it, the court decided 
that there was a reasonable excuse for the assured since the assured had 
already registered according to other similar Acts, “In other words, prima facie 
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there was an arguable representation that the owner of the vessel had complied 
with all the relevant requirements of the Queensland Act”402. Therefore, there 
was no breach of the warranty and the insurer’s appeal was set aside. If a similar 
case was to be decided under English law, then the reliance principle and the 
causation principle could be applied since the assured clearly did not need to 
rely on the illegality to plead his claim.  
Identical English common law factors have also been considered by Australian 
law. For example, in the case Norwest Refrigeration Services Pty Ltd v Bain 
Dawes, the insurance policy excluded the liability of the insurer in the case of a 
vessel which did not have a current Certificate of Survey issued pursuant to 
Western Australian legislation. However, both the agent of the assured and the 
broker failed to inform the assured of this exclusion clause, the vessel failed to 
obtain the certificate and was subsequently lost in a fire. In the second trial of 
this case, the agent of the assured sought to rely on the implied warranty of 
legality to discharge its liability; however, the judge decided that, if the assured 
had been informed of the clause, he would have obtained a certificate, and that, 
because the assured had no such knowledge nor the intention to violate the law, 
therefore, there was no breach of warranty403. 
In addition, in the Western Australian supreme court case Mercantile Mutual 
Insurance (Ltd) v Gibbs & Anor, the third party in this case was injured because 
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of the negligent navigation of the assured; however, the court decided that there 
had been a breach of the warranty of legality since the Certificate of Survey for 
the assured’s boat had run out, and even though there was no link between the 
illegality and the loss, by navigating the uncertified boat, the assured had 
rendered the adventure illegal. In this case, there were no defences for the 
assured like those in the former two cases, since the assured had full knowledge 
of this and there was no reasonable excuse404. 
Based on the judgments of these two cases, it is clear that, in circumstances in 
which Australia courts apply the warranty of legality in marine insurance cases, 
more factors, such as knowledge of the assured and a connection between the 
illegality of the assured and the loss, are still required. 
In circumstances where there is an express warranty in the policy which requires 
that the insurance shall be carried out according to local law and regulations, 
then it seems that the implied warranty does not take priority.405. 
Another area of Australian law which concerns cases that deal with the 
insurance policies which cover fines and penalties is the same as English law. In 
these circumstances, moral culpability is still the most important factor which 
needs to be considered, and if there is a lack of culpability, then especially with 
motor insurance, the assured or the third party can recover under the insurance. 
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However, even though Australian courts have adopted a reasonable approach 
when dealing with illegality issues in marine insurance, section 47 is still an 
obstacle in Australian law, and therefore, in order to avoid problems, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission proposed the following options for reform: 
“1, Amending the MIA to provide that an insurer may not avoid a contract of 
marine insurance by reason of a breach of a warranty if the insured proves the 
loss was not caused or contributed to by the breach of warranty.  
 2. Redrafting the MIA to distinguish between technical, non-material breaches 
of regulations and other illegality which substantially affects the risks involved in 
the adventure. As noted above, the wording of s 47 of the MIA distinguishes 
between adventures having a lawful purpose and being carried out in a lawful 
manner, but the consequences of a breach are the same in each case.  
 
 3. Restricting the circumstances in which the insurer is entitled to deny liability 
under the contract for breach of the warranty of legality to situations where the 
insured knew or should have known of the illegality”406. 
Furthermore, the law commission suggested that:  
“1, The MIA should continue to provide that an insurer may avoid a contract of 
marine insurance by reason of a breach of the implied warranty that the 
adventures have a lawful purpose.  
                                                             
406 Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 
266 
 
 2, The MIA should be amended to provide that an insurer may not avoid a 
contract of marine insurance by reason of a breach of the implied warranty that 
the adventure be carried out in a lawful manner if (i) the loss in respect of which 
the insurer seeks to be indemnified was not caused or contributed to by the 
breach of warranty and (ii) the insured neither knew nor ought to have known 
about the illegality at any time that it would have been possible for the insured to 
intervene”407. 
The law commission also proposed the abolishment of the implied warranty and 
that the insurer and the assured should insert the terms which express this 
function into the insurance contract; that is, to transfer the implied warranty into 
an express contract term and express the function of this term and the 
consequences for breaching it. For example:  
“So far as the insured can control the matter, the insured adventure shall have 
no unlawful purpose. If there is a breach of such a term, the insurer is 
automatically discharged from all liability under the policy”.  
“So far as the insured can control the matter, the insured adventure shall be 
carried out in a lawful manner. If there is a breach of such a term, the insurer is 
not liable to indemnify the insured for any loss that is attributable to the 
breach”408.  
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From the previous discussion, it can be seen that, in marine insurance cases, 
Australia seems to have adopted the same method as in England, and the 
proposals which have been raised by the law commission in Australia are also 
suitable to apply in England. However, it is commonly argued that the express 
term solution proposed by the Australian Law Commission should be adopted by 
English law. In the English law system, although there is still no official reform 
proposal from the law commission, it is commonly agreed that the illegality 
defence in common law should be applied in marine insurance cases, as 
demonstrated by the recent case the Sea Glory.  
When section 54(2) of the Insurance Contract Act 1984 is considered, the 
situation may be seen as confusing. In this section, the insurer may not refuse to 
pay the claim if the assured can prove that the loss which gives rise to the claim 
is not caused by the assured’s act, or that part of the loss which gives rise to the 
claim is not caused by the assured’s act409. The aim of this section is to insert a 
causation link between the loss and the act of the assured and to restrain the 
insurer’s power to exclude their liability. However, setting aside the discussion 
and chaos this section caused to Australian insurance law, section 54 was found 
to be little help to the illegality issue in insurance law or marine insurance law. 
Firstly, this Act does not apply to marine insurance, and secondly, in ordinary 
insurance law, the causation link should not be viewed as the only factor which 
needs to be considered when dealing with illegality issues. If, for example, a 
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motor has been used to transfer drugs and is involved in an accident which is 
caused by another car, it is difficult to argue that the assured of the motor can 
recover under his insurance policy, especially when the assured has the 
knowledge that this motor was being used to transfer drugs; if this insurance was 
allowed, this would be a typical example of a lack of consistency between the 
criminal judgment and the commercial judgment. 
Based on these points, it is hard to believe that the model of section 54 is helpful 
to English law on illegality issues, and it is clear that, based on limited cases, 
apart from the reform proposal raised by the Law Commission of Australia, the 
Australian system adopts almost the same approach as the English legal 
system; that is, it does not rely on the implied warranty of legality and does take 
the factors which have been considered in common law, such as knowledge and 
intention, into account. 
Compared to the reform proposal in Australia, the status in England is more 
shocking and conservative. In the English Law Commission Consultant Paper 
204, when considering whether the implied warranty needed to be reformed or 
not, the law commission contended that there was no need to reform the current 
implied warranties since firstly, according to the International Group of P&I 
Clubs, “If they were not implied they would need to be expressed in the policy. 
The effect of these sections is well-known to marine insured and their 
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intermediaries.410”And secondly, the LMA were not aware of any significant 
discontent on the part of the insurance buying community or their 
representatives411. In the law commission’s summary of responses to the third 
consultation paper, 66% of the consultees agreed to retain the implied 
warranties and make no change to them, and 78% of the consultees agreed that 
the implied warranty should operate exactly the same way as in express 
warranties conditions412.  
Furthermore, if it is true that the warranty of legality in English law is to be 
reformed rather than abolished, then English law needs to at least distinguish 
the consequences of a violation of an adventure which shall have a lawful 
purpose, and those of a violation of an adventure which shall be carried out 
lawfully. 
7.2 The warranty of legality issue in New Zealand and Canada 
In New Zealand and Canada, there are also sections which require a warranty of 
legality in marine insurance; however, in both of the countries, the piece of law 
which similar to section 41 in English law has been reformed. 
In New Zealand, when dealing with the illegality issue in marine insurance cases, 
two Acts are of great importance. The first one is section 42 of the Marine 
Insurance Act, which adopts the same wording as section 41 in English law, and 
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the second Act is Section 11 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 which 
provides that: 
“(a) By the provisions of a contract of insurance the circumstances in which the 
insurer is bound to indemnify the insured against loss are so defined as to 
exclude or limit the liability of the insurer to indemnify the insured on the 
happening of certain events or on the existence of certain circumstances, and 
(b) In the view of the Court or arbitrator determining the claim of the insured the 
liability of the insurer has been so defined because the happening of such 
events or the existence of such circumstances was in the view of the insurer 
likely to increase the risk of such loss occurring, - 
the insured shall not be disentitled to be indemnified by the insurer by reason 
only of such provisions of the contract of insurance if the insured proves on the 
balance of probability that the loss in respect of which the insured seeks to be 
indemnified was not caused or contributed to by the happening of such events or 
the existence of such circumstances.413” 
It was further provided that no provision in the 1908 Act shall override Section 11 
because of Section14 of this Act. Therefore, it is clear that, when New Zealand 
courts decide illegality cases in marine insurance, the causation link between the 
illegality and the losses is of great importance. 
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There are very limited cases which relate to this issue, but two typical cases will 
be looked at below. 
The first case is Harbour Inn Seafoods v Switzerland General Insurance Ltd414. 
In this case, a fishing vessel which drifted onto a reef while "laying to" (i.e. 
drifting at sea at night with no watch, the engine turned off and all the crew 
asleep -common practice when vessels sail overnight). However, during the 
night the vessel struck the rocks and was later abandoned. The assured claimed 
losses against the insurer. The insurer denied coverage on the basis of a clause 
in the policy which provided that the vessel was to be operated "in accordance 
with the regulations and bylaws and all other applicable laws", and also that this 
practice was a breach of the implied warranty of legality. In the judgment, the 
court found that this practice, although common, was a serious violation of 
Collision Regulations, and that the adventure had clearly been carried out in an 
unlawful manner in terms of section 42, and that furthermore, the ship owner had 
knowledge and would have been able to prevent the losses caused by the 
“laying to” but did not do so. Therefore, this was clearly a violation of section 42. 
Another case which is important is Womersley v Peacock415. In this case, the 
assured’s vessel did not obtain the certificate required by law and caused losses. 
When dealing with whether there had been a breach of the warranty of legality, 
the judge concluded that “The real question is whether the illegality, the absence 
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of a certificate of survey, caused or contributed to the capsize”416. Therefore, in 
this case, since there had been no such causation link between the breach and 
the losses, the breach of section 42 was not sustained. 
Based on the previous cases, it is clear that, when dealing with whether there is 
a breach of the warranty of legality, the causal connection is clearly a vital factor 
which needs to be considered by New Zealand courts. However, one exception 
which has been noticed by judgments of these two cases is that whether Section 
11 of the Insurance Law Reform Act can override a statutory warranty is still 
doubtful. However, New Zealand law inclines to the position that, where the 
assured can establish an absence of causal connection, it is likely that Section 
11 can still be applied417. 
In Canadian law, there is a similar warranty in both the British Columbia Marine 
Insurance Act and the Marine Insurance Act 1993418. 
The first important case is James Yachts Ltd. v Thames and Mersey Marine 
Insurance Co419, a case which involved a boat builder who stored boats in his 
yard contrary to Municipal by-laws. A fire destroyed the boats and equipment so 
stored. The British Columbia Supreme Court agreed with the insurer that the 
assured's behaviour was a breach of the implied warranty of legality and that the 
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insurer was therefore discharged from liability. In this case, it was also possible 
to establish that there was a causal connection between the fire caused by the 
illegality of the assured and the losses, that the breach was a violation of statute, 
and that the assured also had the knowledge of the illegality. 
Another case involving the breach of this warranty is that of Federal Business 
Development Bank v Reinsurance and Excess Managers Ltd420. That case 
involved a tugboat that sank while towing a jet boat loaded with cedar shingles 
that had been illegally taken from the cutting site without being scaled. The Court 
declined to find that this technical breach of the Forestry Act discharged the 
insurer from liability as the assured was not deliberately acting in an unlawful 
manner and the failure to have the shingles scaled did not bear a direct 
relationship to the cause of the loss. 
7.3 Conclusion 
From the Acts and the judgments of these three jurisdictions, two points are 
clear. Firstly, the requirement for a causal connection between the assured’s 
illegality and the losses is of great importance and has been established either 
by common law or statute in all three of these jurisdictions; although this 
approach has caused confusion at some points (such as in New Zealand law), 
the merits of such a rule are clear and it is clearly more fair to the assured in 
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circumstances where only technical rules have been breached. Secondly, the 
knowledge and intention of the assured is another vital factor which needs to be 
considered; in circumstances where the assured had no intention to commit an 
illegality, this policy should not be compromised. 
Therefore, the most significant points which English law should absorb from 
other common law jurisdictions are to adopt common law rules, as in Australian 
law, or to adopt a causal connection test when dealing with issues concerning 
breaches of the warranty of legality. If English law does not do this, it is clear that 
it will be outdated. 
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Chapter 8: The coming reform of the warranty of legality in the draft bill of the 
Insurance Contract Act 2014 
It is unfair to say that the English courts have not achieved any progress on the 
illegality issue in marine insurance, and the status of the current law in England 
is fast changing. In the NO.353 Law Commission Report, the Law Commission 
proposed a reform on various controversial areas in insurance law, including the 
areas of good faith, fraudulent claims and warranties. A new insurance contract 
law bill was drafted according to this reform report, in part three of which the 
warranty issue was considered, with section 9 being concerned with warranties 
and representations and section 10 with breach of warranty. This sector will first 
provide a clear introduction to the reforms proposed by the Law Commission and 
the new regulations in the coming insurance contract law, and will then consider 
the impact of these on the issue of the warranty of legality in marine insurance 
law, considering whether the new bill contains useful methods for dealing with 
this issue.  
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8.1. The new recommendations proposed in the Law Commission Report and 
the Insurance Contract Law Bill 2014 
The warranty issue, as noted by the Law Commission, is of great significance in 
insurance law because of the differences which exist in the functions of warranty 
terms in common contract law and in insurance law.  
In chapter 12 of the Report, three recommendations related to warranty in 
insurance law were made by the law commission, one of which, the second, is 
closely connected to the warranty of legality: 
 “(2) To provide that breach of warranty suspends rather than discharges the 
insurer’s liability, which may be revived if and when the breach is remedied.”421. 
In chapter 13, the Law Commission gives a brief introduction to the current law 
of warranty in insurance and marine insurance law: since the legal position on 
warranty has not been changed in the last two issue papers published by the 
Law Commission, and because this law has been discussed before, this chapter 
will not re-introduce it here. The most significant problems identified by the Law 
Commission are that the consequences of breach of warranty in insurance law 
are harsh, the assureds are normally not familiar with the content of the 
insurance policy and the contractual terms and, particularly, the fact that “With 
the law as it currently stands, policyholders are at the mercy of their insurer as to 
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which approach is taken, and insurers are increasingly accepting that this 
situation is unfair”422. 
The Law Commission then provides an important reason why the arguments 
opposing reform should not stand: “The reality is that people and organisations 
are fallible, and that insurance is often purchased to protect against human error. 
If only perfect businesses were able to buy insurance, the market for insurance 
would be a small one”423. 
The Law Commission thus agreed that the law of warranty in marine insurance 
should be reformed and since the warranty is codified in the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906, the reform would constitute a statutory reform. The details of the 
reform can be summarised as follows: 
Firstly, the insurer should ensure that the consequences of a breach are set out 
fully in the contract, and should take sufficient steps to draw the insured’s 
attention to them. With regard to the warranty of legality, if the insurer requires 
that some specific law needs to be strictly complied with, the insurer should put 
the name of the statute or other legal document into the insurance contract, and 
specify the consequences of a breach, in a way which will draw the attention of 
the assured. 
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The most significant change in the Bill is the abolition of the automatic discharge 
of the insurer’s liability in a situation where there has been a breach of warranty. 
Another recommendation which is of great importance to the warranty in 
insurance law is that “the insurer’s liability should be suspended rather than 
discharged in the event of breach, and that liability could be restored if the 
breach of warranty is remedied. Where the breach is remedied before a loss, the 
insurer should pay the claim. Where loss occurs, or is attributable to something 
happening, after a breach but before remedy, the insurer should not be liable for 
that loss”424. 
The fourth important recommendation is that the warranty can be contracted out: 
“We are not preventing insurers from including conditions which are so 
fundamental that breach by the insured should discharge the insurer from all 
liability. However, where this is the case, the insurer should ensure that the 
consequences of breach are set out fully in the term, and should draw the 
insured’s attention to it”425. 
Finally, a factor which the Law Commission found significant when deciding the 
warranty issue is whether the wording of the contract is material to the risk of 
loss or whether the suspensory provision has been carried out before the 
deadline. 
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However, what the limits of the law of warranty of legality is remains unclear 
since the proposal for the requirement of a causation link to trigger a breach of 
warranty was abolished by the Law Commission for the following reasons: 
increased investigation costs, complex litigation, uncertain outcomes and 
difficulties of proof. Furthermore, it was felt that a causation test would not be 
appropriate for all warranties since some warranties may be relevant to the loss 
without having a causal connection with it - for example facts which are critical to 
the insurer during the period of the acceptance of the risk, such as the age of the 
driver and the criminal record of an employee. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
causation principle adopted in common law will be applied here. 
Based on the recommendations of the Law Commission, the section dealing 
with law of warranty in the Insurance Contract Law Bill 2014 has been formed 
thus: 
“10 Breach of warranty 
(1) Any rule of law that breach of a warranty (express or implied) in a contract of 
insurance results in the discharge of the insurer’s liability under the contract is 
abolished. 
(2) An insurer has no liability under a contract of insurance in respect of any loss 
occurring, or attributable to something happening, after a warranty (express or 
implied) in the contract has been breached but before the breach has been 
remedied. 
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(3) But subsection (2) does not apply if— (a) because of a change of 
circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to the circumstances of the 
contract, (b) compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any 
subsequent law, or (c) the insurer waives the breach of warranty. 
(4) Subsection (2) does not affect the liability of the insurer in respect of losses 
occurring, or attributable to something happening— (a) before the breach of 
warranty, or (b) if the breach can be remedied, after it has been remedied. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, a breach of warranty is to be taken as 
remedied— (a) in a case falling within subsection (6), if, (b) in any other case, if 
the insured ceases to be in breach of the warranty. 
(6) A case falls within this subsection if — (a) the warranty in question requires 
that by an ascertainable time something is to be done (or not done), or a 
condition is to be fulfilled, or something is (or is not) to be the case, and (b) that 
requirement is not complied with. 
(7) In the Marine Insurance Act 1906 — (a) in section 33 (nature of warranty), in 
subsection (3), the second sentence is omitted, (b) section 34 (when breach of 
warranty excused) is omitted”426. 
Clause 10(2) is of great importance since it illustrates circumstances where a 
breach of warranty cannot be remedied: the first category is clear - when loss 
happens during the breach of warranty, the insurer will be discharged from 
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liability; the second category - that something happening during the breach of 
warranty does not result in losses immediately, but will potentially lead to losses 
even after the breach of warranty has been remedied - is not quite so 
straightforward and needs to be analysed. One possible example set out by the 
Law Commission in their Report is that a box of fine wine requiring storage in a 
cool place was stored in a warm house, and even though it was transferred to a 
cool warehouse later, the high temperature during the breach may have already 
spoiled the wine. In this situation, even though the warranty was remedied, 
something happened during the breach that attributed to the loss. 
In clause 10(5), two different modes of remedy for a breach of warranty are listed: 
firstly, in clause 10(5) (b), it is stated that a breach of warranty is generally to be 
taken as remedied when the insured “ceases to be in breach of the warranty”. 
The essence of this is the question of whether the risk the insurer agreed to 
insure has been altered after a remedy of breach. Thus, as in the example given 
by the Law Commission, the insurer is still liable if a vessel which deviated from 
an approved course for a while and came back to it later got lost as a result of 
encountering a storm on the approved course, since the risk of encountering a 
storm is the same whether or not the vessel had deviated from the approved 
course and no new character has been added. 
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Another kind of remedy of breach concerns the time-specified warranty, which is 
of limited use to the warranty of legality since the legality warranty requires the 
whole adventure to be carried out lawfully and there is no suspension of this. 
Where the policyholder has given a warranty as to past or present fact (as 
opposed to a continuing or “promissory” warranty), it is unlikely that a breach 
could ever be remedied if the representation was inaccurate. For example, if the 
warranty which requires an adventure to be a lawful one is breached, then it is 
unlikely that the breach can be remedied, as in the case of smuggling which has 
been analysed in Chapter 2, unless the assured abandons such illegal 
adventure before it commences. 
The imminent revised Insurance Contract Bill can also be applied to the marine 
insurance implied warranty, as stated by the Law Commission: “Clause 10 
applies to warranties in insurance contracts. It applies whether a warranty is 
express or implied in a contract of insurance, and to all types of insurance 
contracts. It will therefore apply to the implied marine warranties in sections 39, 
40 and 41 of the 1906 Act. The existing remedy for breach of those warranties 
(discharge of liability) is removed by virtue of clause 10(7), as discussed above.” 
According to the Law Commission Report, implied warranties should be retained; 
there were no strong arguments in favour of their removal, and the Report stated 
that “we do not recommend any changes to the implied marine warranties.” 
Because there is no distinction between implied marine warranties and other 
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warranties of this kind, Clause 10 therefore applies to all warranties, express and 
implied. 
Based on the imminent changes to the law of marine insurance warranty 
discussed above, it can be seen that the major changes to the law are: firstly, the 
insurer’s liability for breach of warranty will be suspended rather than 
automatically discharged; secondly, the breach of warranty can be remedied 
after a breach except in circumstances where a breach of warranty has altered 
the risks; thirdly, the insurer can only suspend those liabilities caused by the 
breach of a warranty, and not the insurer’s other liabilities. 
8.2 The position of the warranty of legality in the new Insurance Bill 
Following the discussion of the reform of warranty in the Insurance Bill, this 
section will consider the possible changes to the warranty of legality in marine 
insurance law which would be initiated by the Bill: it will consider how to deal with 
the illegality issue in marine insurance law after the Bill comes into force, and will 
make a comparison between the impending Bill and the illegality rules in 
common law, which this thesis holds form a better approach for the English 
courts to adopt. 
The changes which could be initiated by the new Insurance Bill on the warranty 
of legality are tremendous, especially changes to the second part of section 41. 
The potential changes to the two parts of section 41 will be analysed separately. 
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In the first part of section 41, which requires the adventure insured to be a lawful 
one, if the adventure is unlawful when the assured enters into the contract, and 
the assured intends to insure this unlawful adventure, then the warranty will be 
breached according to the new Bill. This breach of warranty cannot be remedied, 
as according to 10(2) and 10(5), even though the insurer’s liability is still 
suspended rather than automatically discharged, this suspension will not cease 
until the assured insures a lawful adventure and the breach of warranty will not 
be remedied until then. 
If the adventure insured is lawful at the time when assured enters into the 
contract, but becomes unlawful due to a change of law or a change in 
circumstances which are impossible for the assured to predict or know  - for 
example, sanctions being placed by one nation on another or a declaration of 
war between two nations during a voyage - then based on clause 10(3), this 
situation constitutes a change in circumstances in which the warranty ceases to 
be applicable; since it is impossible for the assured to know the adventure has 
become an unlawful one, this section of warranty shall cease apply. Therefore, 
in such circumstances, the insurer’s liability should not be suspended and the 
adventure is still under cover. 
When moving to the second part of section 41, one important issue which needs 
to be clarified is whether a breach of the warranty of legality can be remedied. 
According to the new Bill, a breach of warranty is irremediable where the 
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assured has given a warranty as to past or present fact. As has been stated, this 
only relates to the first part of section 41, where the assured promises that the 
adventure is a lawful one before the attachment of the risk. Since the warranty of 
legality is a continuing or a promissory warranty, the breach can clearly be 
remedied after the adventure has been carried out. 
The second part of section 41 requires the adventure to be carried out in a lawful 
manner so far as the assured can control the matter, and the forthcoming Bill 
clearly has more impact on this part than on the first part of section 41. This is 
the case firstly because of the three main defects discussed in the second 
chapter of this dissertation: 1) the lack of clarity in the meaning of “so far as the 
assured can control the matter”; 2) the harsh consequences for the assured after 
a breach of the warranty; and 3) the numerous technical or non-technical rules 
which it is not possible for the assured to be aware of. 
The application of the coming Bill will address these weaknesses: the insurer will 
not have the right to an automatic discharge of liability; the insurer’s liability will 
be suspended only when the adventure is carried out in an unlawful manner, and 
as soon as the assured is aware of the illegality, then the insurer will be liable 
again; and if the insurer intends the assured to comply with some specific 
technical rules or laws, the insurer shall express such requirement explicitly in 
the insurance policy so as to gain the attention of the assured, otherwise, there 
will be no such implied warranty on the assured.  
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However, there are still weaknesses in this Bill, the first one being that it requires 
strictly compliance with the warranty, since there is still no requirement for a 
causal link for a breach of warranty to be sustained, therefore, any losses which 
occur during the breach of the warranty of legality are still not covered by the 
policy, whether the losses were caused by the illegality or not. 
The first defect results in the second deficiency of this Bill, that no matter how 
trivial the illegality is, under this Bill, the losses which may occur during the 
breach are still unrecoverable. These two defects have actually lessened the 
positive impact of this bill on the warranty of legality, since in some 
circumstances, a breach of the warranty can simply be because, for example, a 
loading limitation has been exceeded (such as in the St John Shipping case) or a 
payment to a company in a country under sanctions has been initiated (such as 
in The Nancy case), neither of which circumstances has any relation to the 
losses which the assured sought to recover. Even worse, in some situations, a 
breach of the warranty of legality is claimed by the insurer for illicit purposes, the 
aim being to discharge his liability as far as possible, regardless of whether it is 
possible for the assured to comply with the warranty. The insurer himself in 
some cases may have no idea of which law he intends the assured to comply 
with or which law has been violated by the assured; the law may even be 
unknown to the insurer until he finds a violation that will sustain the breach of 
warranty, only as an instrument to discharge his liability. 
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The third problem is still caused by clause 10(2). A violation of a law or the illegal 
performance of the assured is sometimes committed unbeknownst to the 
policyholder, so not intentionally. It is clear that, based on the words of section 
10 of the Bill, if the illegality is unknown to the assured, it cannot be remedied, 
and therefore the warranty will remain breached until the assured becomes 
aware of the illegality and corrects it, during which time, the insurer’s liability 
would be suspended. If such a breach existed throughout the voyage, then the 
assured would not be able to recover all the losses occurring during this voyage, 
which is what happened in the St John Shipping case. If this is the law that is 
applied in this special situation, then it is clearly not fair to the assured. 
Besides the defects which the new Bill may cause with regard to this implied 
warranty, there are also technical problems that need to be clarified when 
applying this Bill. The first problem exists in deciding when it can be said that the 
breach has been remedied and whether the warranty is a general warranty or a 
specific warranty. 
According to clause 10(5), the insurer will be back on risk as soon as the breach 
has been remedied. The criterion used to decide whether a breach has been 
remedied is based on seeing that “the risk to which the warranty relates later 
becomes essentially the same as that originally contemplated by the parties”. As 
has been described before, the rule of remedy in a general warranty and in a 
time specified warranty is different, and the warranty of legality should be viewed 
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as a general warranty as per the Law Commission’s explanation, since it 
requires the adventure to be lawful and carried out lawfully during the whole 
period of voyage, not simply for a specified period of time. Therefore, the rule for 
the remedy of a breach of the warranty of legality follows the rules of a general 
warranty. 
The pattern which has been adopted with general warranties is to ascertain 
whether the risk has been altered after a remedy of breach. There are two 
meanings of the phrase “risk has not been altered”: the first one, as in the vessel 
deviation example given by the Law Commission, means that in the event of a 
random breach of warranty, if there is an equal risk of encountering a loss even 
without the former breach of warranty, then the breach has been remedied from 
the point when the assured ceases to breach; the second one is that, in the 
event of a planned breach of warranty, the warranty can only be remedied when 
the original risk has not been changed into some adventure which both parties 
have not contemplated in the contract, meaning that, even if, at the time of 
suffering loss, the warranty is not being breached, as long as it has been 
contained in the period of changing risk, then the warranty is still un-remedied. 
Therefore, with regard to the first meaning, what has been implied by the Law 
Commission is that there shall be some link between the breach of warranty and 
the losses after the breach has been “remedied”. However, since the Law 
Commission denied the causal link principle, what principle should be fulfilled in 
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the event of a breach of the warranty of legality is still unclear. For example, if a 
vessel has been navigated illegally for a period then even though the illegality is 
corrected later, the loss caused by a collision sustained after the alteration, 
cannot be covered since the breach has not actually been remedied. Another 
situation in which a breach of warranty cannot be said to have actually been 
remedied is when illegal acts have increased the risk of suffering losses even if 
after the illegal act has been corrected.  
Furthermore, according to the second meaning of remedy, a breach of the 
warranty of legality cannot be said to be remedied in the event where, for 
example, a vessel has constantly been secretly used to smuggle goods into one 
country, and loss happens because of a tornado during the period of mooring in 
that country when no smuggling is actually taking place; then it cannot be said 
that the breach of warranty has been remedied simply because the unlawful act 
has ceased. In a situation where an adventure has been carried out unlawfully, 
for example where the crew requirements of the navigation code have not been 
met, then when the vessel seeks to supply enough seamen when mooring in a 
port and suffers losses because of the weather, then even if there are enough 
seamen on board when these losses are suffered, as per the meaning of the Bill, 
the breach is still un-remedied. 
However, there are several points needing attention when applying this law. The 
first one is that, in the event of a random breach of the warranty of legality, if the 
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insurer intends to deny that the warranty has been remedied, he should prove 
that the loss which the assured has suffered after the remedy of the breach is 
not a loss which could equally have happened had the warranty not been 
breached; so, there should be a connection between the breach and the loss.  
The second issue which needs attention is that the time when the warranty 
seems to have been “remedied” needs to be part of the planned breach of 
warranty or that the intention of parties by that time is still to carry on the breach 
of warranty. Otherwise, the breach would be remedied. 
The next problem is about ascertaining the time of the breach of warranty and 
the time of the remedy. Especially in circumstances which involve the transfer of 
money, when can it be said that the breach has been remedied? There is no 
official regulation on this issue and by the time the new Bill comes into force, this 
regulation will cause problems. 
It can be seen that the reform that will be implemented by the impending Bill will 
have a limited impact on the current law of the warranty of legality. Despite the 
automatic discharge of liability being abandoned, the lack of a requirement for a 
causation link is still reserved and the word “any losses” in clause 10 (2) is 
clearly unfair to the assured. Furthermore, even though the breach of warranty 
can now is remedied, there is no clear restriction on when the insurer can argue 
that the breach has been remedied or that it is incapable of being remedied. 
Thus, the new Bill still favours the insurer on the warranty of legality issue.  
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Based on this analysis, it can be seen that, when dealing with a breach of the 
warranty of legality in marine insurance law, clause 10 is still not the best method 
to adopt. The essence of this reform is that it abolishes the automatic discharge 
of liability which prevents the former failing of a mere illegality rendering the 
whole adventure void. However, problems such as a causation link, foreign law 
illegality, moral hazard of the assured and circumstances which are outside the 
control of the assured have not been considered. These are the issues which 
are really controversial. The following section will give a brief comparison of the 
draft bill and common law rules and clarify the reasons why common law rules 
should be applied first, despite the draft bill coming into force in the near future. 
The most significant difference between the draft bill and common law rules is 
that common law rules require a causal link between the loss and the assured’s 
illegal act. The position of clause 10 and common law rules on the unlawful point 
is the same: if the adventure is unlawful from the beginning, then the warranty is 
breached and the insurer is not liable. The differences are concentrated in the 
area of illegal performance. As has been discussed before, the common law 
which governs this sector is a combination of different factors; the illegal act itself 
cannot render the adventure, either the whole of it or only part of it, void. Other 
factors need to be taken into account. The causal link, which has not been 
approved by the Law Commission, states that if there is no connection between 
the loss and the illegal act, then the loss will be covered; this criterion will be 
examined first. In addition, in commercial cases, if the assured does not need to 
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rely on the illegality for a compensation plea, then the compensation will be 
granted as well. Furthermore, even if there is a causation link between the loss 
and the illegality, if it can be proved that the assured had not planned to carry out 
the adventure unlawfully or does not intend to profit from his illegality then the 
adventure will be covered as well. In common law, the insurer is only not 
responsible for losses which have been caused by the illegality, not losses that 
may have occurred during the period of the breach; this is a big difference 
between clause 10 and common law rules. 
It can be seen from the above that the obstacles which underlie the unfairness of 
section 41 and the reform of section 41 still exist. As has been stated before, the 
main obstacles preventing section 41 from being a fair law is the different 
character and function of the terms of warranty in common law and in marine 
insurance law: the automatic discharge of liability, no causal connection test and 
strict compliance. In this new draft bill and the Law Commission Report, only the 
automatic termination of the risk has been abolished. This seems adequate in 
cases involving an express warranty, since this warranty is promised by the 
assured to the insurer under the stipulations of an express warranty which both 
parties have knowledge of and which therefore clearly requires strict compliance, 
making the rejection of the causal connection reasonable in this situation. 
However, what the Law Commission failed to accomplish is to distinguish the 
rules which govern an express warranty from those which govern an implied 
warranty of legality. The rules cannot be the same because of the unique 
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character of section 41, and at least the causal connection test should be 
applied when dealing with the breach of a warranty of legality.  
There are basically two reasons given by the Law Commission for rejecting the 
causal connection test, as has been discussed. The first one is that warranties 
which are about former facts or claims that may be relevant to current losses, 
such as a criminal record or a former claim history in motor insurance, are crucial 
to the insurer when deciding whether to accept the risk; the second one is that 
warranties which are about objective facts (such as information of the vessel or 
ship route) even though their breach may not cause loss, are still crucial to the 
insurer when assessing risk. 
However, it is clear that both these kinds of warranties are about objective facts 
before the attachment of the risk; they are not warranties which relate to the time 
of the adventure. Therefore, the two reasons provided above cannot sustain in 
the warranty of legality, since this is not a warranty which is only about former or 
current objective facts before the insurer decides whether to accept the risk or 
not. The only part of section 41 which does not need a causal connection test is 
when the assured pledges to the insurer that the adventure is a lawful one, 
before the issue of the policy. 
Based on the above analysis, until the causal connection test is applied in the 
warranty of legality, a better approach to dealing with illegal issues is still to 
apply the common law rules. 
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8.3 Conclusion 
It seems from the above that the method of solely relying on the new bill is 
clearly not a good solution to the warranty of legality issue. The reform of the 
rigid system is of little use to this particular implied warranty and consequently, 
the most reasonable approach is to adopt common law rules in marine insurance, 
as has been suggested with regard to the foreign law illegality issue and in other 
jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
295 
 
Chapter 9: A Proposal for the Reform of Section 41 
As the last chapter of this dissertation, this part will propose ideas for the reform 
of section 41 based on the analysis in the former eight chapters. Despite the new 
report from the Law Commission, it is hoped that the recommendations from this 
chapter will still be valuable. 
 
9.1 The need for reform 
Even though the Law Commission revealed that the implied warranties should 
be retained and not changed, the warranty of legality on the other hand should 
be abolished or reformed, as pointed out by Professor Howard Bennett: “In my 
opinion, the implied warranties should be retained. Notwithstanding the views of 
brokers, it is hard to see an argument in favour of illegality……427” Therefore, at 
least from the brokers’ and the assured’s points of view, the warranty of legality 
should be changed. In chapter 14 of the most recent Law Commission Report, 
the Law Commission provide clear reasons why the warranty of insurance law 
should be reformed, all of which are applicable on section 41. 
The reasons in favour of reform can be concluded as follows: firstly, section 41 in 
the Marine Insurance Act has become a rigid system and one which is  
unusable if the illegality issue under foreign law is involved; secondly, the 
                                                             
427 Summary of Responses to Third Consultation Paper The Business Insured’s Duty of 
Disclosure and the Law of Warranties Chapter 2: The Law of Warranties at 4.7 
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consequences of a violation of the warranty are too harsh and unclear, and there 
should be a distinction made between unlawful adventure and unlawful 
performance to prevent this; and thirdly, and unreasonably, there is no 
requirement for a causal link between the illegality committed and the losses 
which the assured seeks to recover. 
9.2 Reform proposals 
The question is how section 41 should be reformed and how the market should 
deal with the illegality issue in marine insurance. The first option, as listed in the 
Australian Law Commission Report is that the parties could make the legality 
requirement and the consequences of a breach of these express terms in the 
insurance contract. This method is simple but may cause further problems if the 
construction or the wording of these express terms are disputed, which would 
make the issue more complex. Also, as suggested by the Law Commission 
Report, “The principle of automatic discharge of liability is subject to any express 
terms of the contract. It therefore represents the default position. Where there is 
an express provision, the effect can be that it ‘waters down’ section 33 by 
restricting the circumstances in which a warranty will bite”428. Therefore, it seems 
that the most straightforward way to avoid legal disputes is for the parties to 
specify the boundaries of what may amount to illegal performance and breach of 
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Fraudulent Claims; And Late Payment Law Com No 353, at Page 160 in 13.19 
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the warranty at the policy-drafting stage, as well as, naturally, specifying the 
consequences of such a breach. 
The second recommendation is that the warranty of legality should be abolished, 
that, particularly, it should not be rendered as a warranty in marine insurance 
law. Since the warranty character of this piece of law is the main problem exists 
in this issue as has been pointed out in chapter 2. 
The three reasons for this proposal are complex and are that, firstly, under 
current circumstances in English law the implied warranty should be abolished 
rather than reformed into an express warranty, since, as the law of warranty in 
marine insurance law is under reform itself, it does not seem beneficial to 
incorporate the legality issue into it. Even if the legality requirement becomes an 
express warranty, the consequences for the assured could still be severe, since 
there is still no causal link requirement under English law and the strict 
compliance principle has already been demonstrated to be a disaster with 
regard to the illegality issue. 
Secondly, the Australia Law Commission proposed that the implied warranty of 
legality should either be abolished and replaced with the illegality defence under 
common law or that the implied warranty should be converted into an express 
warranty or express terms in the policy. The English Law Commission currently 
has no plans to reform this piece of law, as has been explained before, but the 
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issue has constantly been raised in academic area429, and in the light of the 
recent judgement of The Nancy, it may attract the more attention from the Law 
Commission. 
The third reason is that the abolishment of section 41 will not result in the 
illegality issues in marine insurance law being unlegislated since common law 
rules could be applied in its stead.  
The key fact resulting in the current problem is that, in marine insurance law, 
Section 41 uses a statutory instrument to regulate a common law issue. This 
statute clearly forbids all unlawful performance and adventures, but does not 
stipulate what factors should be taken into account.  
It is clear that, in English common law, when dealing with statutory illegality, the 
court will consider the words and intentions of the statute; in chapter 2, the 
boundaries of section 41 have been examined and the exceptions which lie in 
the law have been cleared up. Therefore, it is clear that, even when deal with 
statutory illegality issues in marine insurance law, section 41 is not the only 
authority which the court should follow, this section should still be under the 
restriction on common law. 
It is a fact that, prior to the 1906 Act, when the court dealt with marine insurance 
illegalities, some factors which were considered in common law were considered 
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in marine insurance as well430. However, there is a big difference between them. 
In marine insurance scenarios, only in very exceptional circumstances would the 
court consider the failure of the illegality defence, for example, the impossibility 
of supplying seamen; and the judgments commonly contradicted with each other. 
There was no general rule in marine insurance law the same as rules in contract 
law or tort law, which required the court to consider certain factors when similar 
circumstances arose again. Therefore, the author of the 1906 Act only regulated 
all exceptional circumstances as outside the control of the assured, but since the 
circumstances which are out of the control of the assured during an adventure 
are numerous, there are actually no clear boundaries . 
Furthermore, technology is far more advanced today than it was in the 18th and 
19th centuries, and therefore communication between the assured and the 
carrier has become more effective and the assured’s knowledge and control of 
the goods or the adventure has grown; in addition, insurance law which relates 
to the risk of war has been more fully developed. Because of these 
developments, scenarios in which the assured is not in control of the adventure 
rarely happen. Thus, the so far as the assured can control the matter defence 
rarely sustains either. From this perspective, marine insurance still needs the 
help of the common law when dealing with illegality issues. 
The question is whether common law rules can be applied in marine insurance 
cases. It seems that there is no obstacle to do this. There is a big difference 
                                                             
430 As according to the research in chapter 2 
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between marine insurance law and other kinds of insurance law, and not every 
piece of law or every rule that is functional in general insurance law can be 
applied in marine insurance law; the function of the warranty term, for instance, 
is different in insurance law and marine insurance law. The main reason behind 
this is that marine insurance policies should be based on marine adventures 
which mean exposure to maritime perils and this resulted in great uncertainty 
and danger for the insurer, especially in early times. This explains why marine 
insurance law always seems to be severe as far as the assured is concerned, 
and the reason why ordinary principles in contract law and insurance law cannot 
be applied in marine insurance cases; the application of ordinary principles 
would probably result in the insurer being vulnerable.  
However, this is not the case when dealing with issues of illegality. Firstly, in 
circumstances when parties enter into an insurance policy with illegal intentions, 
then no matter whether it is a marine insurance policy or not, the guilty party will 
perform the contract illegally and therefore even applying common law principles 
in marine insurance cases would not result in unfair to the assured. Secondly, 
illegality can exist in every aspect of a marine adventure, such as in the 
transaction of freight, as in The Nancy case; therefore, if only marine insurance 
law is applied, it is clearly unjust to the assured. Thirdly, the application of the 
section 41 is too narrow; this section only recognises illegality under English law. 
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The application of common law principles has been demonstrated in the most 
recent case, Sea Glory Maritime Co. v Al Sagr National Insurance Co. In this 
case, it can be seen not only how common law rules are applicable in marine 
insurance cases, but also how Section 41 can be abusively used as an 
instrument to defend the insurer’s profit. In this case, the ship The Nancy 
became constructive total loss on the Japan Sea, because of a fire on board, 
and the assured claimed damages against the insurer. However, in order to 
discharge his liability, the insurer claimed five defences, one of which was 
illegality. The insurer claimed that a payment from the bank to the assured with 
regard to a voyage from China to Iran was illegal under US law since the US had 
placed sanctions on the Iranian government. The insurer sought to rely on 
section 41 to discharge his liability. However, in this case, the court decided that 
section 41 could not be applied since it only applies in English law. The court 
went on to consider common law principles in English law, including the reliance 
principle in the Bowmakers case and the non-profit principle decided in the 
Beresford case. In this case, the assured did not rely on the illegality of his 
former voyage to claim his indemnity in his current policy, and nor had he 
profited from his illegality. Furthermore, when the court dealt with the illegality in 
connection to the former transaction, it was found that the assured had no 
intention to violate US law and had not known that the transaction was illegal 
under US law. The illegality defence was not therefore sustained. 
302 
 
At the end of the judgement, the court made it clear that, if at the time of entering 
into the policy, the claimants had intended to perform the adventure in a manner 
which involved a breach of the US, and then the defence may have been 
sustained. 
It is clear from the judgement of this case that section 41 is unworkable when 
dealing with illegality issues, since the factors which need to be considered are 
unclear and only applicable in English law. However, in contrast, common law 
has clear rules regarding which factors should be considered and which factors 
are prior for the court to consider. It seems that there is clearly no need to apply 
section 41 anymore. Even though this section in the 1906 Act may have had the 
function of reminding the contractual parties that illegality was forbidden in 
marine insurance, the chaos and uncertainty it causes is far greater than this 
function now. 
The illegality issue can exist in two types of marine case. It can exist in scenarios 
where there is a contractual relationship between the two parties, for example, 
when there is a dispute under over the contract or over the actual construction of 
the contract. In addition, the illegality issue may exist in scenarios when there is 
no contractual relationship between the two parties, for example, in tort cases on 
the sea, which may involve collision claims, salvage or towage claims. In these 
situations, the key question is whether, if any of the several codes or statutes 
regulating the collision or towage dispute have been broken, then to what extent 
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can the illegality defence be applied, such as the collision convention and the 
salvage convention, and there are also so many technical rules which regulate 
the operation of the vessel and loading and unloading of goods and so on. 
Therefore, should the violation of technical rules to be rendered as unlawful 
conduct under the concept of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, namely whether 
the section 41 aims to cover this kind of violation. Another issue is whether the 
assured should be punished by convention or by the insurance act. One 
particular area which may deserve some attention is the circumstances of tort 
actions such as collisions at sea, which are subject to the regulations of common 
law and statute. If the collision or damage to the vessel is caused by negligence, 
then tort law will apply, and there is no room for section 41 even if the negligence 
results in a violation of statute. If the collision is caused intentionally, then clearly 
it is subject to criminal law, and clearly the insurer is not liable for the loss; 
however, this cannot be seen as an application of section 41 since it is very 
obvious. 
It seems logical that the implied warranty of legality under English law should be 
abolished, and that when an illegality issue arises under marine insurance law, 
common law principles can be applied. There may be obstacles, however, such 
as an underwriter being afraid of the increase of the risk on his part if there is no 
warranty of legality. However, it is commonly agreed that only a slight violation or 
alteration of the adventure or the warranty cannot be seen as creating an 
increased risk, and there is no implied requirement that during the period of the 
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cover, the assured would not alter the adventure so as to increase underwriters’ 
risk as happened in the case Hussain v. Brown. Therefore, in marine insurance 
law, unless the assured commits a criminal act, an illegality under technical rules 
is not serious enough to change the essence of the adventure, and section 41 
cannot therefore be invoked. 
After the abolishment of section 41, when dealing with illegality issues, the 
common law method should be applied, although the illegality defence in 
common law, as was discussed in chapters three and four, is also complex and 
needs to be reformed. However, by applying it, the main concerns in marine 
insurance law, such as the causation link and the overly severe consequences, 
can be addressed. The factors adopted by common law could make the current 
marine insurance law more flexible.  Creating a consistent approach based on 
both common law and marine insurance law could make this area of law less 
complex as well. The application of common law rules in marine insurance law 
can be concluded into following points: 
Firstly, in the first part of section 41, it is still necessary for the adventure to be a 
lawful one. In this section, both the intention and the knowledge of insurer and 
the assured should be considered and if the assured has the knowledge that the 
adventure is not lawful and still insures it, then the insurance shall be void. If the 
assured has no knowledge that the adventure is unlawful and the insurer does 
have this knowledge, then the insurer should refuse to grant the insurance. In 
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this event, if the insurer does not deny it in the beginning and then seeks not to 
cover it and to retain the premium later, then the insurer will lose the illegality 
defence under common law, and should compensate the assured’s loss431. 
Moreover, if both the assured and the insurer have no knowledge that the 
adventure they intend to insure is unlawful, then if it is an adventure which is 
forbidden by statute, then the insurance policy is void ab initio as well, which is 
completely different to the same situation in the performance of contract. In 
addition, if the assured intends the subject matter insured to be used in an 
unlawful way or to achieve an unlawful objective, then this insurance is also void. 
The second part of section 41 is more complex and is in great need of reform. As 
can be seen from the discussion above, common law does not recognise the 
unenforceability of a contract which is lawful and has been performed unlawfully 
later. Therefore, if common law rules were to be applied in marine insurance law, 
it would not be possible to make the marine insurance contract unenforceable 
due to illegal performance. Furthermore, as has been illustrated in the Sea Glory 
case, the court still needs to consider other factors as well, such as whether the 
assured relied on his illegality to claim for loss and, most importantly, whether 
the loss was caused by the illegal act. The difficulty of applying common law 
rules may occur in a situation when the illegal act is committed by an agent of 
the assured, such as the crew, raising the question of what defence the assured 
should have. In this scenario, the so far as the assured can control the matter 
                                                             
431 Strongman (1945) Ltd v Sincock [1955] 2 QB 525 
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defence should still be the relevant law, and the assured should not be liable for 
losses caused by his agent’s illegality, so long as the assured can prove that he 
has no knowledge of it. This is extremely true in tort cases at sea. However, 
when dealing with sea tort cases, there is still a question as to what extent the 
illegality rules can be applied, and how the illegality rules may influence the 
judgement of such cases, since it is clear that there are numerous regulations in 
this area and the consequence of a breach vary from country to country. When 
encountering such scenarios, the English courts can make reference to 
Australian law. When there is an express warranty in the marine insurance policy 
which requires the assured to carry out the policy according to local regulations 
and lawfully, then it seems that the implied warranty will not be effective, since 
firstly, the express warranty is the agreement between the insurer and the 
assured, and the assured’s responsibility shall be confined to this accordingly, 
and secondly, if the adventure is carried out in foreign territory water, then the 
implied warranty will  not be triggered, since it is only recognised in English law. 
In this situation, if there is no implication or explicit statement in the express 
warranty that there is a requirement to comply with local regulations, then it 
should be construed that the underwriter does not want this protection432. For 
example, in the case Elafonissos Fishing and Shipping Company v Aigaion 
Insurance Company SA, the express warranty which required that the vessel 
should be laid up in the port of Mahajan GA did not mean that the regulations of 
                                                             
432 Elafonissos Fishing and Shipping Company v Aigaion Insurance Company SA [2012] 
EWHC 1512 (Comm) 
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this port automatically applied in the policy433. Therefore, in this situation, it is 
clear that section 41 will not be applied. 
In conclusion, below are the methods which could be used to resolve the implied 
warranty issue in marine insurance law. Firstly, section 41 should be abolished 
and common law rules should be applied in marine insurance cases, as was 
proposed by the Australian Law Reform Commission and as was applied in the 
Sea Glory case. The difficulties with this are whether common law rules are too 
complex for the marine insurance scenario, and might make the law more 
unstable. Secondly, the main issue with marine insurance law, an issue which 
attracts condemnation and criticism, is that, in marine insurance law, for a 
violation of the implied warranty to be sustained, there is no requirement for the 
connection between the illegal conduct and the losses to be shown, and this is 
because section 33 of the Marine Insurance Act requires complete compliance. 
If the Law Commission could reform this aspect of the law in the marine 
insurance warranty then it would not be necessary to abolish section 41 at this 
point. Thirdly, if it is not possible to implement both the former two solutions, then 
according to the authorities before 1906, the court can narrowly construe the 
scope of the word unlawful and apply the rules in technical conventions and 
treaties rather than the Marine Insurance Act.  Therefore, for instance, a 
violation of the Collision Convention 1989 would not be rendered unlawful under 
                                                             
433 Elafonissos Fishing and Shipping Company v Aigaion Insurance Company SA [2012] 
EWHC 1512 (Comm) 
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the Marine Insurance Act, and the punishment of the assured who breached this 
convention should be based on the convention itself, rather than on the 1906 
Act; by construing the unlawful act in a narrow way, the rigidity of section 41 will 
not be harmful to the interests of the assured.  
9.3 Conclusion 
Therefore, from based on the analysis above, the major proposal of this chapter 
is to reject the implied warranty in marine insurance and apply the common law 
rules when dealing with  marine insurance cases. 
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